Zambia’s Second Mandate: the Election Beyond the Election

Hakainde Hichilema has secured another five years in office. In this article, Baba Yunus Muhammad asks the more consequential question whether Zambia can convert economic stabilisation into broad-based prosperity while preserving the democratic confidence on which its long-term development depends.

On 13 August 2026, Zambians went to the polls to elect their president, parliament and local representatives. Five days later, on 18 August, President Hakainde Hichilema was declared the winner of the presidential election with approximately 60 percent of the vote, securing a second five-year mandate. His principal challenger, Brian Mundubile, obtained about 38 percent.

Ordinarily, the declaration of the result would have marked the conclusion of the electoral contest. In Zambia, however, the election has continued to generate political and institutional questions that may prove almost as consequential as the result itself.

On 19 August, Mundubile rejected the outcome and indicated that he intended to challenge the election, alleging irregularities in voting, counting and the transmission of results. On 24 August, the country’s judiciary was closed on the final day of the legal window for filing an electoral challenge, with the authorities citing security concerns. The development immediately raised questions about the practical ability of the opposition to seek judicial review of an election it disputed.

The situation became considerably more serious on 27 August, when Mundubile and his running mate, Makebi Zulu, were taken into police custody in connection with an alleged treason offence. At that stage, police confirmed that the two men had provided “warn and caution” statements but did not publicly disclose the substance of the allegations. On 30 August, however, their lawyer confirmed that both had been formally charged with treason and remained in custody. The authorities have linked the investigation to alleged national-security concerns, while the opposition has rejected the allegations.

These developments should be treated with appropriate caution. The opposition’s allegations of electoral irregularities remain allegations, just as the treason accusations remain matters for due legal process. The government has a legitimate responsibility to investigate credible threats to national security, while those accused are entitled to the protections of the law. The broader significance lies in whether Zambia’s institutions are seen to operate impartially and transparently at a moment when political confidence is already under pressure.

This matters because Zambia’s second Hichilema mandate begins at an unusually important point in the country’s economic history. The president inherited an economy in deep distress in 2021, when Zambia was emerging from sovereign default, severe debt pressures, high inflation, currency weakness and deteriorating relations with international creditors. His first term was consequently dominated by the difficult work of macroeconomic stabilisation and debt restructuring.

There is now substantial evidence that this effort has produced results. Zambia has restructured a large portion of its external debt, inflation has fallen significantly from the levels experienced at the beginning of Hichilema’s presidency, and investor confidence has improved. The country is increasingly being discussed in international financial markets as a recovery story rather than simply as a sovereign-debt crisis. Reuters described the election as providing investors with continuity after a first term dominated by debt restructuring and IMF-backed reforms.

These achievements deserve recognition because macroeconomic stability is not a trivial accomplishment. A country cannot sustain development when inflation erodes household incomes, debt absorbs public resources, foreign-exchange shortages restrict imports and investors lose confidence in the credibility of economic policy. Zambia’s recovery from the conditions surrounding its 2020 sovereign default is therefore an important achievement.

Yet this is precisely where the second-term challenge begins, because macroeconomic stabilization is not the same thing as economic transformation.  The distinction is fundamental. Stabilization prevents an economy from falling apart; transformation changes the structure of the economy so that prosperity becomes more productive, resilient and widely distributed. Hichilema’s first term was necessarily concerned with the former. His second term will ultimately be judged by whether it succeeds with the latter.

The importance of this distinction becomes clearer when macroeconomic indicators are considered alongside household welfare. Zambia continues to face very high levels of poverty, and more than 70 percent of the population has been estimated to live below the international $3-a-day poverty threshold. The election itself demonstrated the political importance of this gap between national economic recovery and household experience. Zambia’s improving economic indicators have not necessarily translated into a comparable improvement in the daily lives of many citizens, particularly in the face of high food and energy costs.

The central economic question of the second mandate is therefore not simply whether Zambia can maintain growth. It is whether growth can become sufficiently productive and inclusive to change the structure of opportunity available to ordinary Zambians. That challenge is particularly important because Zambia’s economic future remains closely tied to copper.

The country possesses some of Africa’s most important copper resources, and the strategic importance of copper has increased substantially as the global transition towards electric vehicles, renewable energy, electricity networks and other technologies increases demand for critical minerals. Hichilema has set an ambitious objective of raising annual copper production to three million tonnes by 2031.

The target could transform Zambia’s fiscal and export position, but production volume should not become the sole measure of success. Zambia has mined copper for generations, and the fundamental historical problem has not been the absence of mineral wealth. It has been the country’s limited capacity to capture a sufficiently large share of the economic value created around that wealth.

The strategic question for the second mandate is therefore whether Zambia can transform copper from an export commodity into the foundation of a broader industrial economy. That would require a much stronger domestic ecosystem around mining. It would involve refining and processing, but it would also require the development of engineering companies, equipment manufacturers, chemical industries, logistics providers, financial services, research institutions and specialised technical enterprises capable of supplying the mining sector. A larger proportion of Zambian businesses and workers would need to participate in the value chain rather than simply in the extraction process.

Three million tonnes of exported copper would make Zambia a larger mining economy. Three million tonnes supporting domestic processing, engineering, manufacturing and technological development could make Zambia a fundamentally different economy. This is the distinction between resource extraction and resource transformation, and it should be at the centre of Zambia’s second-term economic strategy.

There is, however, a constraint that could determine whether this ambition succeeds: electricity. Zambia’s experience with drought and power shortages has demonstrated the close relationship between energy security and economic security. A factory cannot operate reliably without electricity. A hospital cannot provide modern services without dependable power. Agricultural processing and irrigation depend upon energy, while a digital economy requires stable electricity and telecommunications infrastructure. Energy policy is consequently not merely a utility-sector issue; it is also industrial policy, agricultural policy, health policy and education policy.

Hydropower will remain important to Zambia, but the experience of drought has demonstrated the risks of excessive dependence on a single source of generation. Solar power, storage, transmission investment, regional electricity trading and other forms of diversification will therefore become increasingly important. The objective should be to create an energy system capable of supporting industrial expansion while remaining resilient to climatic shocks.

This is particularly important if the country is serious about using its copper resources as the foundation for industrialisation. Mining and mineral processing are energy-intensive activities, and Zambia cannot realistically aspire to a substantial expansion of domestic processing without a reliable and competitively priced electricity supply.

The same principle applies to human capital. Zambia has taken important steps towards expanding access to education, including its policy of free education. Increased access is an important social achievement, but access alone cannot determine whether the education system is meeting the country’s developmental needs. The more difficult question concerns the quality and relevance of the skills being produced.

An economy seeking to expand copper production and industrial processing requires engineers, geologists, technicians, electricians, metallurgists and specialised managers. A modern agricultural economy requires agronomists, extension workers, technicians and entrepreneurs. A digital economy requires programmers, data specialists and information-technology professionals. A sophisticated financial system requires economists, accountants, analysts, risk specialists and financial managers.

Education policy should therefore be connected more deliberately to economic strategy. Technical and vocational education, apprenticeships, digital skills, university-industry partnerships and applied research deserve greater prominence because they can help convert Zambia’s young population from a demographic challenge into a productive economic asset. The quality of the country’s education system will ultimately influence whether investment produces jobs for Zambians or simply creates an economy in which foreign capital and foreign expertise capture much of the value.

Healthcare deserves the same treatment. Health expenditure is often discussed primarily as a social obligation, but health is also a form of productive capital. A population affected by malnutrition, preventable disease or inadequate access to healthcare cannot achieve its full productive potential. Zambia has made progress in a number of health indicators, but significant challenges remain. UNICEF data indicate that approximately 32 percent of Zambian children under five are stunted, representing nearly one child in three.

That statistic should be viewed not only through the lens of public health but also through the lens of economic development. Chronic malnutrition during childhood can impair physical and cognitive development, affecting educational attainment and future productivity. When poor health contributes to lower educational outcomes, and lower educational outcomes contribute to lower incomes, poverty becomes self-reinforcing.

This is why education, nutrition and healthcare should not be treated as peripheral sectors in Zambia’s economic transformation. They are among the foundations upon which productive economies are built.

The same argument can be extended to electricity itself. UNICEF has reported that more than half of Zambian schools have operated without access to a power source, limiting learning hours and restricting access to computers and other educational resources. The implications are significant because a country cannot realistically pursue a modern digital and industrial economy while large portions of its educational infrastructure remain disconnected from reliable electricity.

The challenge of the second mandate is therefore to connect these apparently separate policy areas into a coherent development strategy. Copper requires electricity. Industrialisation requires skills. Skills require education. Productivity requires health. Health services require reliable energy. Rural development requires transport, electricity and irrigation. Investment requires stable institutions. The development process is consequently interconnected, and progress in one sector can be undermined when another remains structurally weak.

This brings the discussion back to democracy. Zambia has historically enjoyed a reputation as one of Southern Africa’s relatively stable multiparty democracies. That reputation has value beyond politics because institutional credibility is itself an economic asset. Investors consider not only the size of a country’s mineral reserves or the growth rate of its economy, but also whether contracts will be respected, courts will function independently, property rights will be protected and disputes can be resolved through credible institutions.

Political stability is therefore a form of economic infrastructure. This is why the events surrounding the August election deserve careful attention. The question is not whether a government has the right to investigate allegations involving national security. It plainly does. Nor is the issue whether the opposition is entitled to make allegations without scrutiny. It is not. The essential question is whether the institutions responsible for adjudicating these matters are sufficiently independent, transparent and credible to command confidence across the political spectrum.

The closure of the judiciary on 24 August, on the final day of the period for challenging the presidential result, inevitably created concern because it occurred at precisely the point when an electoral dispute would ordinarily move into the legal arena. The subsequent detention and formal charging of the principal opposition candidate with treason have intensified those concerns.

The government’s handling of the case will therefore matter not only for the opposition but for Zambia’s wider institutional reputation. A transparent judicial process, credible evidence and full respect for due process would help demonstrate that the country’s institutions remain capable of dealing with political conflict within the framework of law. Conversely, a perception that legal mechanisms are being used selectively against political opponents could damage confidence in institutions even if the government’s underlying security concerns are genuine.

This is particularly important because Zambia has an opportunity to build upon its economic recovery. International investors are already interested in the country’s copper and critical-mineral potential, and the United States, China and other external powers increasingly view Zambia through the strategic lens of mineral supply chains.

The country should welcome investment, but it should also recognise that investment is not an end in itself. The objective should be to use foreign capital, technology and market access to strengthen domestic productive capacity. Zambia’s mineral resources should generate greater domestic value addition, stronger local enterprises, better employment opportunities and increased public revenues capable of financing human development.

The second mandate therefore presents Hichilema with a rare opportunity. He now has five years in which to pursue a long-term economic agenda without the immediate pressure of seeking another presidential term. The quality of his legacy will depend on how that opportunity is used.

He could leave behind a Zambia that successfully escaped its debt crisis, restored macroeconomic stability and expanded copper production. Such an outcome would represent a significant achievement.

He could also leave behind something considerably more consequential: a Zambia in which mineral wealth has become a platform for industrialisation; reliable electricity supports manufacturing and agriculture; education produces relevant skills; healthcare strengthens human productivity; economic growth reduces poverty; and democratic institutions become stronger as the economy becomes more prosperous.

The latter would represent genuine transformation. It would also provide Zambia with a more durable form of economic security than dependence on the international price of copper. Commodity prices rise and fall, but productive capabilities, skilled people, resilient institutions and diversified industries can continue to generate value across economic cycles.

The election of 13 August has therefore left Zambia with two simultaneous narratives. The first is encouraging: a country that defaulted on its sovereign debt has restructured much of that debt, reduced inflation, restored investor confidence and returned to economic growth. The second is more troubling: the political space has become contested, the opposition has challenged the election, the judiciary was unavailable on the final day for an electoral petition, and the principal opposition candidate and his running mate have subsequently been charged with treason.

Neither narrative should be ignored. The economic recovery deserves recognition, but it cannot substitute for institutional confidence. Democratic concerns deserve attention, but they should not obscure the genuine progress that has been made in stabilising the economy. Zambia’s challenge is to demonstrate that economic reform and democratic consolidation can reinforce rather than undermine each other.

Ultimately, the success of Hichilema’s second mandate will not be determined simply by whether Zambia achieves a particular growth rate or reaches its target of three million tonnes of copper production. It will be determined by whether those achievements translate into higher productivity, better employment, lower poverty, stronger human capital and greater opportunity for ordinary citizens.

The most important election, therefore, is the one that begins after the ballots have been counted. It is the continuing choice between an economy that extracts resources and one that transforms them; between growth that improves national statistics and growth that changes household circumstances; between political authority and institutional legitimacy; and between a country that merely recovers from crisis and one that uses recovery as the foundation for structural transformation.

Hichilema has secured his second mandate. The responsibility now is to demonstrate that Zambia’s economic recovery can become a genuinely inclusive development project and that its democratic institutions can emerge from the tensions of the 2026 election with their credibility strengthened rather than diminished.

The ultimate test of the second mandate will therefore be whether Zambia can convert the confidence of financial markets into confidence among its citizens. That will require more than copper, debt restructuring and macroeconomic stability. It will require an economy capable of creating productive opportunities, a state capable of delivering quality public services and institutions capable of commanding trust even when political disagreements become intense.

That is the election beyond the election, and it is the contest that will ultimately determine the meaning of Hakainde Hichilema’s second term.

Baba Yunus Muhammad is President of the Africa Islamic Economic Forum (AFRIEF), an intellectual, writer and policy advocate whose work spans Islamic economics, governance, political thought and ethical development. His writings focus particularly on Africa, the Muslim world and the relationship between leadership, economic justice and civilizational renewal. He has engaged with the public affairs and political leadership of Africa for several decades.