Rejoinder to Prof. Isa Ali Pantami on Democracy, Secular Politics, and Islamic Governance

Baba Yunus Muhammad

The BBC Hausa service aired a lengthy interview with Prof. Isa Ali Pantami — a prominent Islamic scholar and former minister in Nigeria on Saturday, February 21, 2026 — in which he sought to justify his active participation in partisan politics and defend democracy as a legitimate system of governance for Muslims. While his intentions may be sincere and rooted in contemporary political realities, the arguments presented merit careful critique from both Islamic theological perspectives and principled political theory.

In that interview, Prof. Pantami argued that engagement in democratic politics and party systems is not only permissible but necessary for Muslims who wish to contribute meaningfully to national development and represent their communities within modern nation‑states. This view resonates with common pro‑democracy arguments that emphasize representation, accountability, and public participation — elements that many contemporary Islamic scholars (such as Sheikh Yusuf al‑Qaradawi and Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah) have interpreted as consistent with shura (consultative governance). However, these positions often rest on assumptions that democracy is a neutral tool rather than a comprehensive ideological framework, and that interpretation opens significant conceptual gaps.

The essential problem with Pantami’s defense — and with many scholarly justifications for democracy — is that it tends to treat democracy as a purely pragmatic system rather than an ideological construct with embedded philosophical commitments. While participation in the civic life of a country may be necessary under certain conditions, legitimizing democracy in principle raises serious concerns for Muslims who take seriously the Islamic doctrine of divine sovereignty (hukmullah). Democracy, as historically conceived, does not originate from Islamic political theory; it emerged from secular Greek philosophy and was shaped by Enlightenment ideas that prioritize human will as the ultimate source of law. This foundational premise contradicts the Qur’anic teaching that sovereign authority belongs to Allah alone.

Proponents like Sheikh Yusuf al‑Qaradawi have argued for a form of participatory governance that they see as reconcilable with Islam, focusing on maslahah (public interest) and shura without compromising Shariʿah. Yet this position often fails to grapple with the ideological underpinnings of modern democracy, which include secular constitutionalism, an elevation of the people’s will as supreme, and partisan competition as standard practice. These elements have no direct basis in classical Islamic governance models, where law and policy are subject to divine command rather than majority preference or party strategy. Indeed, democratic constitutions often assert their own supremacy over religious mandates, meaning that laws can be valid even if they directly contradict Shariʿah principles.

It is one thing to advocate for Islamic clerical participation in public affairs within flawed political systems; it is another to endorse the system itself as a legitimate and normative framework for Muslims. The latter blunts crucial theological distinctions. It implicitly suggests that systems rooted in secularism and human sovereignty can be harmonized with Islamic governance — a claim that lacks robust basis in Islamic legal theory. Even among scholars who allow conditional participation, many stress that such involvement must be limited to mitigating harm and safeguarding Muslim interests, not affirming the system’s normative legitimacy.

Moreover, the elevation of partisan politics into a central plank of civic life — as embraced by Prof. Pantami — overlooks the ethical deformations that arise when religious scholars actively endorse party systems that emphasize electoral success and allegiance to party leaders over justice, competence, and moral accountability. In many democratic contexts, political parties prioritize power consolidation, populism, and strategic alliances that often conflict with Islamic ethical norms. This dynamic undermines the traditional Islamic view that leadership should be grounded in merit, moral integrity, and obedience to divine law, not alliances formed through competitive party politics.

Another critical issue is the normalization of secular constitutionalism, which often places human‑made law at the apex of the legal hierarchy. When constitutions claim supremacy over religious law, Muslims are implicitly asked to accept human will as the basis for legitimacy. From an Islamic theological standpoint, this is problematic because it compromises the central tenet that Allah’s law is the ultimate standard for governance and legislation. Simply asserting that democracy can be adapted or that Muslims can use it instrumentally does not adequately address this deeper doctrinal conflict.

In the specific case of Nigeria, the lived reality of democratic politics further exposes the conceptual weakness of Pantami’s defense. Democratic structures in the country have been criticized widely, even by secular commentators, as fragile, manipulated, or failing to deliver justice and genuine accountability. These practical shortcomings are not incidental; they are rooted in political systems that separate moral responsibility from governance mechanisms and reduce civic engagement to periodic electoral contests rather than sustained moral responsibility. Critics — including some Nigerian commentators — have observed that the democratic process often fails to protect the interests of ordinary citizens and instead entrenches elite power structures.

Islamic thinkers who have attempted to reconcile democracy with Islamic principles sometimes cite elements of shura as analogous to democratic consultation. Yet equating shura with Western‑style elections and party frameworks overlooks crucial differences: shura is bounded by moral and divine constraints, whereas democratic mechanisms often exist apart from any religious moral framework. Thus, borrowing procedural elements without addressing philosophical foundations risks conflating two fundamentally different systems.

In conclusion, while well‑intentioned and reflective of contemporary political realities, Prof. Pantami’s argument in defense of participation in partisan democracy by Islamic clerics does not fully grapple with the ideological and theological tensions between democratic theory and Islamic political doctrine. To normalize democracy as an acceptable form of governance for Muslims is to overlook the fact that its foundational premises — human sovereignty, secular constitutionalism, and partisan competition — are in tension with the Islamic understanding of divine authority and moral accountability. Any legitimate engagement with political systems must start from clarifying these conceptual differences, not simply offering tactical participation within them.

Baba Yunus Muhammad is President of the Africa Islamic Economic Forum (AFRIEF) and a leading intellectual, writer and policy advocate specializing in Islamic economics, governance, and ethical development. His work focuses on the intersection of political authority, economic justice, and civilizational thought in Africa and the Muslim world.