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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Restoration of Ties between Tehran and Riyadh: From Paper to Implementation

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By Amer Ababakr

The agreement between Tehran and Riyadh to normalize the relations between the two countries and “resuming diplomatic relations within two months and reopening their embassies and political representatives”, which was initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping and was published in a surprising manner in Beijing, if implemented, it can undergo the security equations of the West Asian region and the Persian Gulf to a severe shock.

The Obvious question to start is why now?

The trend towards normalization of relations between the two countries began following the dialogue hosted by Iraq and followed by the Sultanate of Oman through the transmission of exchanged messages. This dialogue came to keep pace with the direction of the US administration, headed by Joe Biden, towards re-establishing the nuclear agreement with Iran. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have always called for adding regional issues to the agreement and including these countries in the talks. However, this did not materialize due to Iran’s refusal to link the nuclear talk to any other issue or to include new players who might add conditions and demands that would complicate the negotiation process. However, the suspension of the Vienna nuclear negotiations after the completion of the draft agreement due to a disagreement over some complementary elements, including Iran’s demand for guarantees that America will not leave the agreement in the future and to find a mechanism to verify the lifting of the American-Western blockade on it, contributed to the stopping of the Iranian-Saudi dialogue. This is because Saudi Arabia was synchronizing the steps of normalizing relations with Iran and the negotiations in Vienna, and this is reminiscent of what happened after the nuclear agreement in 2015 when Riyadh was preparing for talks with Iran, but it returned and stopped it in light of Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidency with a promise he made to cancel the nuclear agreement, and followed is Saudi Arabia’s welcome to Trump’s termination of the agreement and his launch in 2018 of a fierce sanctions campaign against Iran.

In addition, Saudi Arabia wanted a comprehensive agreement with Iran in the renewed dialogue in the last two years, which would restrict Iran’s presence and role in the region, at a time when Iran wanted to limit it to restoring diplomatic representation and normalizing relations between the two countries and leaving the discussion of regional files to other frameworks, especially since Iran refuses to be an agent for its allies in deciding their national affairs.

Recently, things have moved again for several reasons:

The success of the Iranian government and people in thwarting the bet on destabilizing it in the broad campaign led by people  supported arguably by the US and its allies to force the leadership of the Islamic Republic to submit. The emergence of a rapprochement between China and Saudi Arabia, represented by the visit of the Chinese president to Riyadh and the signing of partnership agreements between the two sides, and then the visit of the Iranian president to Beijing and the agreement to activate the strategic partnership agreement signed by the previous government during the era of President Rouhani.

Reassuring the Saudi Arabia that the United States is seriously seeking to sign a nuclear agreement with Iran, and that the references to that are countless, under the pretext that the agreement is in the interest of American national security and ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon after the rapid progress in its program. Here, Saudi Arabia did not want to appear to be lagging behind.

There was a divergence between the democratic administration in Washington and the Saudi leadership over their supposed roles in supporting each other, and this was recently reflected in Saudi Arabia’s position not to respond to Washington’s request to condemn Russia and increase oil production to meet the demand for it in the United States.

Saudi Arabia is increasingly devoted to providing the appropriate environment for the implementation of Vision 20-30, and this requires developing the truce in Yemen into permanent stability, and then – from its point of view – involving Iran in putting pressure on “Ansar Allah”, at a time when Tehran considers that there is no way out. From recognizing the role of “Ansar Allah” in determining the future of Yemen, along with other Yemeni components.

The Second inevitable question is Why in China?

Over the past years, China has been able to develop broad relations with many countries in the region, despite the intimidation campaign led by Washington to alienate these countries from the Chinese role under security pretexts or claiming that there are motives for hegemony so that the atmosphere remains clear for the United States in the region. Chinese successes are no longer confined to anti-American countries such as Iran, but extend to traditional allies of Washington such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which forged important economic, technological and armament relations with Beijing that aroused Washington’s ire. Turning east has become an imposed reality in one way or another, despite the fact that the United States formulated plans to establish a regional system that brings together the Gulf states and “Israel” and takes over its leadership from a distance, with the aim of focusing on the increasing confrontation with Russia and China, which are plans that the Gulf states interpreted as turning their backs on the allies.

China’s emerging position allowed it to play an acceptable conciliatory role between its two important partners, and it believes that ensuring its interests in the region depends to a large extent on stability arrangements between the active countries. In my estimation, the Saudi side wanted to “sell” the paper of understanding to restore relations with Iran to the Chinese mediator and not to the Iraqis, because it is betting on developing relations with China economically and militarily in the phase of reducing the American presence in the region, and it is also sending, in one way or another, a message of protest to the United States. And Riyadh wants to show that it has other options than absolute dependence on America. This perspective does not negate the fact that Saudi Arabia is currently negotiating with America to acquire the status of a major ally outside NATO, similar to other smaller Gulf states such as Qatar and Bahrain.

With this, China was able to hold on to both sides of the relationship with its two major partners from the middle, and moved away from previous Saudi bets in giving priority to relations with the Kingdom at the expense of Iran, especially after Saudi Arabia increased its oil exports to China and provided it with very large investment inducements. China has always shown that it is a rising international power keen to gain soft influence and does not practice politics in its arrogant sense in the Western style, and that it is interested in establishing relations with all actors in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Zionist entity and Turkey, and it is also interested in not losing Iran to the interest of India, which strengthens its relations. Economic and commercial transport links with Iran, especially through the port of Chabahar in southern Iran.

The announcement of the restoration of relations between Riyadh and Tehran would not have provoked shocking responses in Washington had it not been issued by Beijing and with Chinese mediation. that is, the return, in and of itself, was not excluded, and there was no American objection to the role of Iraq and Oman to restore the broken link between Riyadh and Tehran. However, the entry of the Chinese engineer into the line and his success in achieving a Middle Eastern breakthrough seemed to come at the expense of the declining American role in the region, and aroused astonishment and anxiety in Washington, which dealt with it as an event that might represent a regional-geopolitical turning point, and perhaps a historic one. Because of this size, it immediately occupied the headlines and sparked a flood of preliminary comments and readings that intersected in its interpretation when it was considered a Chinese target in the American goal, at a moment when the Biden administration was talking about the Chinese danger and mobilizing to weaken its influence in the world and to confront it in its Asian home and beyond.

In its first response, the administration seemed as if it was surprised by this development, despite saying that “Saudi Arabia has kept it informed about its dialogue with Iran,” according to White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby, who added that it “supports any efforts to reduce tension in the region.” The generality of his words and his ambiguous wording – as he ignored the mention of China – indicates that the administration was surprised by the announcement. What is worse is that it embarrassed it in several respects and aspects that observers placed in the category of net American losses. Most notably, China has broken the unity of dependence in the region on the United States, whose policies have led to “vacuum and failure there.”  That is, Beijing, has known the ways to undermine this policy, as well as the entrances that lead to enabling it to address the region in a language that takes into account its sensitivities, and thus strengthens relations with it and trust in it.

China’s other gain is that it recorded the first successful diplomatic entry into the arena of international conflicts, especially the Middle East, by building this role on an approach to international relations that is based more on interests than on calculations and security guarantees. Thus, it gave the region an encouragement to diversify relations instead of relying on a single power, leaving space for the freedom of local decision-making and the primacy of its interests.

However, all of this depends on the steadfastness of the return of relations between Riyadh and Tehran, and whether this return is the title of a “coexistence” process between the two neighbors, or is it perhaps the result of a deal to resolve a crisis, even if an important one, such as the Yemen war. The backgrounds and facts outweigh the first possibility, given that the sponsor is a weighty international party that countries need until further notice. The Kingdom has worked in recent years, after strained relations with the administration of President Joe Biden, to weave in-depth relations with China as another option, if not as a final alternative. And Iran sought, through its partnership with Beijing, to break its isolation, which was achieved, albeit in part, by restoring its relations with the Kingdom. On these accounts, all three were winners.

Besides the administration, Israel was the biggest loser. It is believed that the Prime Minister of the incumbent government, Benjamin Netanyahu, has disappointed his bets on a normalization deal that has been repeated in recent days with Saudi Arabia. Some reports stated that the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs “refused” to comment on the return of Saudi-Iranian relations. A position that reflects the extent of the unease, as is the case in Washington; Although there were those who were quick to downplay the matter by considering it a development that would serve the administration in the sense that it would help “liberate it from the troubles of instability” in the region, thus allowing it to devote itself to its most important issues with China and Russia in the Ukraine war.

But it is an explanation closer to mitigating the impact of the shock, as the process seemed closer to an American failure in exchange for Chinese sophistication that achieved understanding between two opponents united by aversion, each for its own reasons and to varying degrees, from America.

China’s main goal for mediating between Tehran and Riyadh is to de-escalate the tension in a region that sees its peace and security as aligned with its strategic interests as the world’s largest energy importer and the largest exporter of goods to the West Asian region.

China is currently the largest buyer of Iran’s crude oil and also the largest foreign trade partner of Saudi Arabia, and more than 55 billion dollars out of the estimated 120 billion dollars of trade between the two countries this year is related to Saudi Arabia’s oil exports to China.

In this way, it seems that China has used its purchasing power in Tehran and Riyadh as a political lever in a situation and at a time when there was enough favorable ground between the two countries to enter into thematic negotiations.

Another factor that has left China’s hand free in advancing the discussed political initiative is the desire of the United States to gradually leave the West Asian region on the one hand, and thr Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war and the reduction of Moscow’s attention to developing its presence and influence in the Persian Gulf region on the other hand.

What lies ahead 

There have been many reactions to the Iranian-Saudi agreement, most of which hope that it will lead to a broader rapprochement that would contribute to resolving several crises in the region, including Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. However, the differences that governed relations for four decades and were permeated – as Tehran sees it – Saudi bets on bullying the West to weaken Iran and contribute to the blockade measures imposed on it and destabilize it by supporting rebel groups, all of which left scars in relations that cannot be erased easily. On the other hand, the Saudi side wants Iran to commit itself not to play any competing regional role with it, and to refrain from providing support to the forces of the axis of resistance, and to let Riyadh exercise its leading role in influencing the policies of other countries. Iran considers this division unfair and unrealistic.

Therefore, the resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not considered a quick entry point to warm relations, or to an agreement on regional issues around which a multilateral conflict revolves. But it is a necessary step for political communication between the two sides at the official level after an era of estrangement. This means that there will be no immediate reflection on the regional issues in dispute, but a door may be opened for an exchange of views on how to contain their repercussions, control their rhythm, and perhaps contribute later to finding settlements if conducive conditions are available. Tehran always stresses that it does not replace the allies in determining their national affairs and interests.

Courtesy: Modern Diplomacy


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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Pentagon’s THAAD Deployment in Israel: A Signal to Iran and the Question of Global Double Standards

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By Baba Yunus Muhammad

The Pentagon’s decision to bolster Israel’s air defense systems with a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, supported by 100 U.S. troops to operate it, sends a powerful message. The THAAD is designed to intercept ballistic missiles, with Iran clearly in the crosshairs. This deployment is an escalation, illustrating the United States’ unwavering support for Israel in its regional confrontations, particularly with Iran. But it also raises significant questions: Who stands with Iran in this looming confrontation? And does America’s uncritical backing of Israel expose its double standards on human rights and international law?

America’s Stance: Double Standards and Duplicity

The United States’ support for Israel has long been criticized as riddled with hypocrisy. While Washington postures itself as a global advocate for democracy and human rights, it continues to supply the arms that fuel Israel’s military machine, which has been implicated in the deaths of thousands of innocent Palestinian women, children, the elderly, and the infirm. The moral outrage America projects against other regimes, particularly in the Muslim world, is conspicuously absent when it comes to Israel’s transgressions. This duplicity reflects a clear bias that undermines America’s credibility as a global arbiter of justice.

One of the most troubling aspects of U.S. foreign policy is the selective application of international law. Israel, despite numerous violations of human rights, continues to receive billions in military aid annually. Meanwhile, countries like Iran are sanctioned, demonized, and isolated for far less egregious offenses. Is this about justice, or does Israel’s strategic importance in the Middle East render its violations invisible to Western eyes?

The Forgotten Two-State Solution

As the world watches the current crisis, one fundamental issue has been almost entirely ignored: the two-state solution. Once at the center of every peace process, the notion of a Palestinian state coexisting alongside Israel has been sidelined. Instead, the narrative is now dominated by military escalations, airstrikes, and defense systems. The right of Palestinians to self-determination, to a land they can call their own, is no longer part of the discourse.

Israel, with the tacit approval of its Western backers, continues to pursue its “Greater Israel” agenda. Settlements expand, Palestinian homes are demolished, and Jerusalem is increasingly Judaized, all in direct contravention of international law. The West’s silence on this is deafening. Why has the right of the Palestinians to a country of their own been so easily brushed aside in the name of ‘security’?

Iran: A Nation Standing Alone?

In this complex geopolitical landscape, Iran is portrayed as the villain. Yet, it is important to ask: does Iran truly stand alone? While it lacks a superpower willing to defend it from Israeli aggression, Iran is not without allies, both politically and ideologically. More importantly, as an Islamic republic, Iran’s identity is rooted in its faith, particularly in tawheed (the belief in the oneness of Allah) and its reliance on divine justice. Iran may not have the might of THAAD systems, but it has the conviction that Allah’s help is greater than any worldly power.

The strength of the Islamic faith is not found in military arsenals, but in the belief that the oppressed will eventually triumph over the oppressors. As history shows, superpowers come and go, but the power of the oppressed, united in their faith and resolve, can overcome even the most insurmountable odds. Iran, in its resistance against Israeli aggression and Western duplicity, is likely to turn to Allah for protection and justice, embodying the Qur’anic verse:

“And if you remain patient and conscious of Allah, their plot will not harm you at all. Surely Allah is fully aware of what they do.”** (Qur’an, 3:120)

This verse speaks to the resilience of those who trust in Allah against overwhelming odds. It is a reminder that no matter how powerful the aggressor, the ultimate victory lies with those who maintain their faith and stand firm in the face of oppression.

Other Critical Issues

There are additional issues worth considering. The first is the long-term impact of America’s military involvement in the region. By sending troops to operate the THAAD system, the U.S. is not just providing arms—it is becoming an active participant in the defense of Israel, making it complicit in whatever actions Israel takes. This blurs the line between defense and aggression, and America must ask itself whether it is willing to shoulder the moral responsibility for Israeli actions.

Secondly, the deployment of advanced defense systems like THAAD only exacerbates the arms race in the Middle East. As Israel strengthens its defenses, neighboring countries will feel compelled to enhance their own military capabilities, increasing the likelihood of conflict rather than reducing it.

Finally, the question of international accountability must be addressed. If Israel, with its advanced military capabilities and the backing of the world’s most powerful nation, continues to flout international law without consequence, what message does this send to other countries? Does might make right? And where does this leave global efforts to maintain peace and justice?

Conclusion

 The Pentagon’s THAAD deployment in Israel is a reminder of the dangerous escalations that are taking place in the Middle East, with Iran as the primary target. Yet, the broader context reveals a troubling picture of global double standards, where Israel is given a free hand to violate human rights while the rights of Palestinians are ignored. As Iran prepares to defend itself, it does so with the faith that no system, no army, no alliance is greater than the power of Allah. The verse from the Qur’an serves as a powerful reminder of where true strength lies: not in missiles, but in faith, patience, and the belief in divine justice.


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Escalating Conflict in the Middle East: Iran’s Retaliatory Strike against Israel and the Growing Regional Tensions

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The ongoing conflict in the Middle East continues to devastate countless lives, particularly in Gaza, Israel, and Lebanon. Recent escalations, including Iran’s ballistic missile strike on Israel, highlight a dangerous shift in the region’s dynamics. In this article Baba Yunus Muhammad delves into the circumstances surrounding Iran’s aggressive response, the motivations behind it, and the broader implications for regional stability. It also questions the role of global powers, particularly the United States, in perpetuating the conflict, while reflecting on the absence of a unified military alliance among Muslim nations to defend against Israeli aggression. 

The recent intensification of conflict between Israel, Gaza, and Lebanon has further deepened the tragic cycle of violence in the Middle East. The situation, marked by Israel’s military actions and retaliatory strikes from its adversaries, particularly Iran, is emblematic of decades of geopolitical tension, occupation, and armed confrontations.

Context of the Iranian Attack on Israel

Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 2nd marked a sharp escalation in the broader conflict. This retaliatory strike was a direct response to Israel’s aggressive targeting of key Hezbollah and Hamas commanders. The killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon pushed Tehran to act, signifying a growing frustration within Iran over perceived inaction. Iranian officials made it clear that the attack was not only defensive but also justified as a response to the increasing Israeli strikes across the region. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued the order, and the attack was supported by both the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the Iranian defense ministry.

While Iran’s previous strike in April was seen as more symbolic, this latest assault was far more aggressive. It hit multiple urban centers, and Tehran claimed that 90% of its missiles reached their intended targets. Though the full extent of the damage is still unclear, this represents a significant shift in Iran’s strategy, moving from symbolic gestures to serious military reprisals.

Why Did Iran Retaliate?

Several reasons motivated Iran’s retaliation. First, the assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders by Israeli forces played a crucial role. Iran had already held off from responding to earlier provocations, particularly the assassination of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in July. Iranian officials believed this restraint, done in hopes of securing a ceasefire deal in Gaza, was a strategic mistake. Instead of quelling Israeli aggression, it rather emboldened Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to continue with escalations. Israeli strikes in Lebanon, coupled with the rhetoric from Netanyahu that recent actions aimed to “change the balance of power in the region,” convinced Iran’s leadership that not responding would further weaken their regional influence.

The Iranian response also reflects a growing divide within its leadership. Hardliners in Tehran, who felt that the country’s reputation as the leader of the “axis of resistance” was being undermined, viewed the lack of previous retaliation as a sign of weakness. This pressure led to the aggressive missile strike in October, highlighting that the country was ready for war if necessary. This response from Iran signals a turning point, where the threat of broader war no longer serves as a deterrent for Iran’s leadership.

US-Israel Relations and Broader Implications

The United States remains Israel’s staunchest ally, with its defense of Israeli actions viewed by many Muslim nations as part of a larger pattern of Western double standards. During Iran’s missile strike, US forces stepped in, intercepting some of the missiles, and US President Joe Biden dismissed the attack as “ineffective.” The unyielding support for Israel, however, continues to fuel resentment in the Muslim world, where many see this dynamic as part of an ongoing effort to suppress Muslim populations and movements.

The broader geopolitical context of this conflict cannot be ignored. While NATO is often lauded as a successful military alliance in the West, it is seen in many Muslim nations as a destabilizing force, responsible for chaos in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Iran’s frustration with NATO’s continued support of Israel, and its pivotal role in defending Israeli interests, underpins much of the animosity. Tehran views the Western military alliance as fundamentally biased, contributing to the marginalization and suffering of Muslim-majority countries.

The Role of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

As the conflict escalates, a question often asked is: why doesn’t the Muslim world form a unified military response to counter Israeli aggression? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the world’s second-largest intergovernmental body after the United Nations, has been relatively passive when it comes to creating an effective military coalition. Muslim countries, with their vast resources and manpower, could potentially form a powerful defense alliance, yet political fragmentation and differences in national interests have prevented such a coalition from materializing.

Historically, regional divisions, ideological differences, and varying levels of cooperation with Western powers have stifled the creation of a unified Muslim military front. The creation of a robust defense mechanism under the OIC remains elusive, as individual member states often prioritize their national interests over collective action. Nevertheless, the absence of such a coalition leaves Muslim populations across the region vulnerable to foreign aggression and continued conflict, with Israel benefiting from its military superiority and diplomatic support from the West.

If peace is ever to be realized in this volatile region, there must be a reevaluation of the global power dynamics, especially the role of the US and its unwavering support for Israel. At the same time, Muslim countries will need to overcome their internal divisions to form a unified front capable of protecting their interests against external aggressions. Until then, the cycle of violence is likely to continue, with devastating consequences for the people of Gaza, Lebanon, and Israel.

Baba Yunus Muhammad is the President of the Africa Islamic Economic Forum, Tamale, Ghana


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The US Election and its Impact on the Middle East

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As the U.S. presidential election draws near, the United States faces several economic, social and political challenges that will play a decisive role in determining whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will be the next president of the United States. Inflation remains high, the gap between the haves and the have-nots is growing, and views on immigration and the border continue to polarize the public. But the election’s outcome will also have implications beyond U.S. domestic policy.

The overriding foreign policy matter at issue in this election concerns economic competition with China and the associated tensions in the South China Sea, through which one-third of global trade passes. Other foreign policy priorities include the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict and its regional repercussions. Though the divide between the Republicans and the Democrats on the Ukraine war might be irreconcilable, their differences on the Middle East, including the war in Gaza, are mostly minor. Apart from safeguarding the vital interests of the U.S., both presidential contenders will eschew deep involvement in Middle East affairs.

Determinants of U.S. Policy

Five constants drive the direction of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The first is Israel’s security and the U.S. commitment to maintaining Israel’s military superiority in the region, which is apparent from the state-of-the-art military hardware that Israel receives from the U.S. compared to the less advanced equipment delivered to other countries. The second constant relates to U.S. control of the region’s oil and ensuring its passage through the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb in order to reach international markets. U.S. commitment to this cause undermines any Iranian threats to block navigation through the Persian Gulf and Houthi threats to block access to the Red Sea. The third constant is the U.S. commitment to preventing Russia or China from dominating the region’s politics, a fact understood well by Middle Eastern countries. The fourth constant is ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. And the fifth focuses on combating terrorism.

The U.S. understands that given the complexity of Middle East politics, it cannot transform the region. It learned this lesson from the failures of its 2003 invasion of Iraq despite its heavy investment in democratization and reconstruction efforts. Its limited interest in the Middle East has driven its increasing desire to restrict its involvement there. This started when the U.S. intensified its pivot to Asia, an effort that began during Barack Obama’s presidency.

Moreover, U.S. voters (with the exception of Arab and Muslim Americans) are preoccupied with problems that have nothing to do with the Middle East. The enormous interest of activists and the media in the Gaza war does not reflect the priorities of voters themselves.

Straightforward Republican Approach

If Trump wins the presidency, he will pursue a foreign policy based on “America First” principles, including by signing trade deals, displaying a reluctance to engage in military interventions abroad and reducing international commitments, including to NATO.

In the Middle East, Trump has shown little interest in the crises in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, preferring to focus on domestic challenges instead. On the Israel-Palestinian conflict, he has shown little enthusiasm for a two-state solution and prefers to impose quick solutions without focusing on their feasibility.

Trump will likely seek direct normalization deals between Israel and its neighbors (especially Saudi Arabia), similar to those he concluded between the Israeli government and other Gulf states in 2020. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is eager to sign a peace treaty with Israel, even without an Israeli commitment to establishing a Palestinian state – though he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seem to have put the project on hold pending the outcome of the U.S. election, preferring to give credit to Trump rather than Harris for its success. Trump could also consider signing a formal defense treaty with Saudi Arabia to prod it to make peace with Israel, but this would be challenging considering that getting the support of two-thirds of the Senate seems unlikely. After making peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Trump will likely pressure Qatar, Kuwait and Oman to conclude similar deals.

As for relations with Iran, Trump will adopt a more hostile policy, but he is unlikely to resort to military action, relying instead on sanctions and economic pressure. He has hinted at the possibility of a deal with Tehran, but only on his terms. It’s unclear if the Iranians can afford another four years of austere sanctions under a second Trump term, so they could be amenable to striking a deal, facilitated by the recent election of a reformist Iranian president. Despite the apparent different approaches between the Republicans and the Democrats on Iran’s nuclear program and regional proxies, the core U.S. perspective on Iran cuts across the two political parties. Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and although Biden pledged to restore it if he won the presidency, lengthy negotiations in Vienna did not yield results, and the Trump-era sanctions remain in effect.

Nuanced Democratic Approach

Most Republican congressional candidates who won their primary races support Israel unconditionally. In contrast, Democratic congressional candidates adopted a more nuanced approach. They invariably voiced their commitment to Israel’s security and well-being but with specific qualifications about human rights, the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population and a two-state solution. Still, Democratic candidates avoid extreme criticism of Israel based on the fact that results in the primary elections demonstrate that anti-Israel views are still unpopular among mainstream Democratic supporters. Protests at college campuses against Israel’s conduct in Gaza neither shape public opinion nor determine the Democratic Party’s policy choices.

The divide among Democrats on this issue results from profound differences in the views of the demographic groups that make up the party’s base, with younger, non-white voters being more sympathetic to the Palestinians and more critical of Israel, while older whites are more pro-Israel. Republican support for Israel, meanwhile, has increased with the surging influence of right-wing Christian groups within the party.

Since the inception of the Gaza war, Democratic members of Congress have been pressing to end the war and provide aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza. However, Democrats’ criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu antedate the Gaza war. President Joe Biden and Democratic members of Congress opposed Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul and the appointment of two radical lawmakers to Cabinet.

Arguably sympathetic to the case presented by Palestinian rights activists, Harris has been unable to reconcile the demands of the pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli sides of the party. Pro-Palestinian activists felt that the Democratic Party failed to address their demands for primetime speaking slots during the 2024 Democratic National Convention, further exacerbating their feelings of marginalization.

If Harris wins the election, her foreign policy will adhere to the broad lines of the Democratic Party, such as defending democratic principles and human rights, strengthening international alliances, confronting global challenges such as climate change and nuclear proliferation, cooperating with allies, especially in NATO, and paying particular attention to confronting Russia in Ukraine and curtailing Chinese influence in the Pacific region.

As vice president, Harris avoided talking about strategic policies and initiatives in the Middle East. But if she wins the presidency, she will be forced to deal with the region’s intractable issues. It’s unlikely that U.S. support for Israel will witness a dramatic shift if Harris wins office. Still, in recent months, she has taken steps to distinguish herself slightly from Biden. She was the first senior U.S. official to call for a cease-fire in Gaza, opposing the idea that a deal can be reached only after Hamas is destroyed. She stressed Israel’s right to defend itself but chose to boycott Netanyahu’s speech before Congress in July.

Harris did not want the Gaza war to be one of the main issues in her election campaign. She chose Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, who has limited foreign policy experience, as her running mate to sway uncommitted Democrats to vote for her. (Nearly 19 percent of voters in the Minnesota Democratic primary for president voted “uncommitted.”) Walz has recognized Israel’s right to defend itself and distinguished between Hamas, which he condemned for the Oct. 7 attack, and the civilians who have been caught in the crossfire in Gaza.

Ultimately, Harris’ position on ongoing tensions in the Middle East will be uncertain. During her tenure in the Senate, Harris consistently voted against arms deals with Saudi Arabia and U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. In 2020, she stated that the United States must reevaluate its relationship with the Saudis to defend U.S. values and interests, though she did not specify which values and interests she was referring to. Harris’ policies will likely mirror Biden’s. Her goals will include strengthening security relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and cooperating in technology and the green energy transition. In the context of the ongoing escalation between Iran and Israel following the assassination of senior Hezbollah and Hamas leaders, Harris is likely to adopt a balanced approach toward Iran and stress the need to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal, pending the outcome of the fighting between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah.

Limits of U.S. Foreign Policy

Many in the Middle East understand the limits of U.S. policy in their region. They support U.S. engagement when it comes to combating terrorism and keeping sea lanes open for trade. They also accept, though grudgingly, the unpopular constants of U.S. policy, especially Israeli exceptionalism and regional supremacy.

They also recognize the United States’ reluctance to engage militarily in the region on matters that do not directly intersect with its own interests. In 2012, Syrian President Bashar Assad admitted to having chemical weapons but said they were meant for use only against foreign aggression. Obama warned him against using them against his people, saying he would be crossing a red line. But before the year’s end, Assad’s forces used sarin gas in rebel-held areas near Damascus, killing 1,400 people. The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations supported punishing Assad’s army for committing the massacre, but failing to secure authorization from either chamber, Obama opted against using force against the Syrian regime.

In September 2019, the Houthis targeted Saudi oil installations. They expected the Trump administration to defend the kingdom, but it did not. The Saudis viewed the Houthi attacks as a threat to international oil supplies, a view that Washington did not share because the incident had little impact on U.S. oil imports. That such attacks disrupted the flow of Saudi oil to Europe, China and India did not bother Washington.

The United Arab Emirates says it does not expect to resume talks with the U.S. over a multibillion-dollar deal to buy F-35 fighter jets regardless of who wins the election. Trump had signed an agreement to supply the UAE with the advanced aircraft, which no other country in the Middle East has besides Israel, before the end of his presidency in early 2021. The Emiratis now say the same factors that caused the suspension of the talks when Biden took office still exist, so they do not plan to reopen negotiations.

Apart from achieving vital national interests, the Middle East is of little interest to the United States and U.S. policymakers. The region accounts for less than 5 percent of the world’s economy, much of which comes from hydrocarbon exports. This lack of interest gives the region’s authoritarian leaders impunity to violate human rights and oppress their people.

Hilal Khashan, a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut and a respected author and analyst of Middle Eastern affairs, is a contributing analyst at Geopolitical Futures, and author of six books, including Hizbullah: A Mission to Nowhere. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.) He is currently writing a book titled Saudi Arabia: The Dilemma of Political Reform and the Illusion of Economic Development.is a contributing analyst at Geopolitical Futures. 

This article was first published in the Geopolitical Futures


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