Connect with us

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Taliban Redux: Opportunities and Challenges for China in Afghanistan

Published

on

Spread the love

US withdrawal from Afghanistan has engendered a new reality in the region. Their hasty departure, followed by the Taliban’s rapid takeover of Afghanistan, presents both opportunities and challenges to Eurasia’s regional powers, especially for China.

Representatives of the Afghan Taliban and China met in Tianjin in July. The Afghan Taliban stated that it will never allow any force to use Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China. Besides, it hopes that China will become more involved in Afghanistan’s peace and reconciliation process and play a larger role in its future reconstruction and economic development. After the takeover of Kabul, Yue Xiaoyong, the special envoy for Afghan affairs in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that China respects Afghan sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence, and China respects the Afghan people’s will and choice. Despite different arguments about the future position of China in Afghanistan, generally there are two narratives concerning China’s future position in Afghanistan: one of opportunities and one of challenges.

First narrative: opportunity for China?

Some critics of President Biden’s decision to pull out from Afghanistan claim that this will lead to an increase in both the economic and political influence of China over the country. Moreover, they argue that the withdrawal of US forces creates a vacuum in Afghanistan, and China will have a chance to replace the US and extract resources from the country to improve its regional position in both Central and South Asia.

Firstly, the new situation in Afghanistan creates new opportunities for Chinese companies, especially in terms of investments in rare earth metals. Rare earth metals in Afghanistan are estimated to be between $1 trillion and $3 trillion in 2020. China provides more than 85 percent of the world’s rare earth metals, accounting for two-thirds of the global supply. Investing in Afghanistan’s rare earth metals may increase China’s market share and its leverage capability vis-a-vis Western powers and Japan.

Secondly, possible stability in the country may increase the attractiveness of Afghanistan as a transit country for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In September 2019, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed to push the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) because greater stability in the country may prompt the extension of the corridor through Afghanistan. Integrating Afghanistan into Belt and Road also improves China’s leverage with India because it has a greater chance of encircling India economically through surrounding trade partners.

Thirdly, integrating Afghanistan into Belt and Road would increase connectivity between South and Central Asia, and could result in the rise of China’s economic influence in terms of trade, investments, and loans. Furthermore, new railway or highway routes throughout Afghanistan would help to diversify China’s export and import routes and strengthen land-based connectivity between the EU and China. These kinds of investments and projects related to Afghanistan’s integration into BRI would increase the dependency of the Afghan Taliban on China and prevent it from supporting radical groups inside China or Central Asia.

Fourthly, the new situation could prompt a new division of labor between China and Russia, as in the case of Central Asia, which could lead to further securitization as both countries would want to prevent terrorism, strengthen their stability in Central Asia, and focus more on their nearby geographies, such as East Asia for China and Eastern Europe for Russia.

Finally, stable Afghanistan may play an important role for the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Since 2012, Afghanistan has been only an observer in the SCO. If the Taliban controls all state territories, it could apply for full membership again. Afghanistan’s membership to the SCO would further enhance regional authoritarian rules and norms, reduce China’s vulnerability in the western and southwestern side of China, and extend its pro-China rent-seeking elite patronage into Central Asia.

Second narrative: new challenges for China?

At the same time, the situation in Afghanistan is not as rosy for China as some experts make it seem. The return of the Taliban creates more challenges than opportunities for China because of the unstable condition of the state. Firstly, despite the Taliban’s declaration that the war is over, there is no guarantee that other ethnic or religious groups, especially radical Islamist groups, will not resist the Taliban. In addition, there is great uncertainty as to whether the Taliban will stabilize the country or encourage an endless civil war in Afghanistan. For example, the vice president in the ousted government, Amrullah Saleh, claimed in a post on Twitter to have the title of the president under Afghanistan’s US-brokered 2004 Constitution, and he did not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government. Furthermore, Ahmad Massoud, the son of the mujahedeen leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, also did not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government and he said that has not any intention to leave the Panjshir Valley.

Secondly, the Taliban is not a unified but a fractured organization; that is why there is no guarantee that different branches of the organization won’t support terrorism and separatism inside of China or Central Asia. For example, the Director of the Research Department of the National Institute of Strategic Studies at Tsinghua University told the Global Times that the “fact is, there are still supporters of the East Turkestan Movement within the Taliban.” Moreover, while the Afghan Taliban does not support other groups, its victory in Afghanistan could be a source of inspiration for radical groups and contribute to the rise of radicalism in Central Asia.

These groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-u-Tahrir (HUT) and the Pakistan Taliban, may also increase pressure on the Central Asian and Pakistan governments and may destabilize regional states and threaten Chinese investments. Furthermore, a fractured Afghanistan creates not only problems for the integration of the state to the BRI but also threatens other transport corridors in Central Asia, such as the Middle Corridor and the New Eurasia Land Bridge, due to terrorism risks. In addition, refugees from Afghanistan to neighboring countries, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, may increase pressure on Central Asian economies. These factors represent a destabilizing force in the region, threatening pro-Chinese governments in Central Asia.

Thirdly, the existence of resistance groups will discourage Chinese companies from investing in Afghanistan. Since the 2000s, there have been various projects related to energy, infrastructure, and the natural resources that Chinese companies initiated. For example, a contract to develop and exploit a copper mine in Mes Aynak, and in 2011, Chinese energy giant China National Petroleum Corp. winning a tender for an oil field in the Amu Darya in the north of the country. However, both of the projects unraveled due to the insecure conditions and clan and tribal politics in the country. Even now, the absence of central government and inadequate infrastructure makes it hard to transport goods. The lack of proper legal frameworks, lack of institutional capacity, and corruption all make it very difficult to invest in any industry, especially the mining sector. There is little chance these issues will be resolved quickly, dampening investment efforts by China in Afghanistan.

Fourthly, with regard to the integration of Afghanistan into Belt and Road, this is also potentially very difficult. There are three main border crossings between Afghanistan and China: Chalachigu Valley, Wakhjir Pass, and North Wakhjir Pass. All three are unsuitable for infrastructure development due to seasonal challenges and extreme territory conditions. In the absence of direct connection between China and Afghanistan, there are three indirect routes that connect the two countries. The first is China-Tajikistan-Afghanistan route. But this route not viable for intensive trade and infrastructure development because of the landscape problems and the instability of the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border crossing. Second is the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan railway route. However, this option is not feasible for medium term because of the weak railway network. Finally, the best route is China-Afghanistan-Pakistan route which would hypothetically link the country to the CPEC corridor. As other routes, this route also requires a high volume of investment and stability in Afghanistan. Furthermore, at the moment, such an add-on is not a priority for the CPEC corridor. The inherent challenges in all the possible high-volume trade linkages between China and Afghanistan illustrate that the potential for rapid integration of Afghanistan into the BRI is an exaggeration.

Finally, increased vulnerability along the western border of China may force China to increase its presence in terms of security in Central Asian countries, especially in Tajikistan and Pakistan. This factor also triggers regional competition between China and India or Russia, which may lead to increased strategic ambiguity in the region. Besides, the fractured situation in Afghanistan may distract China’s strategic focus from East Asia and the South China Sea to Central and South Asia partially, which could increase China’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the United States.

Conclusion

The recent success of the Afghan Taliban raises concerns and opportunities for China. At the moment, instability in Afghanistan, resistance groups, and the absence of centralized government all make it difficult for China to gain a foothold in Afghanistan, and integrating the state to BRI seems unrealistic over the short-term. Rather than calculating any newfound influence in Afghanistan, China first needs to protect its own and partners’ boundaries from extremism and terrorism. But in the medium- to long-term, by way of Beijing’s strategic partnership with Pakistan, China has the potential to play a more important role as a regional public goods provider and mediator.


Spread the love
Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Pentagon’s THAAD Deployment in Israel: A Signal to Iran and the Question of Global Double Standards

Published

on

By

Spread the love

By Baba Yunus Muhammad

The Pentagon’s decision to bolster Israel’s air defense systems with a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, supported by 100 U.S. troops to operate it, sends a powerful message. The THAAD is designed to intercept ballistic missiles, with Iran clearly in the crosshairs. This deployment is an escalation, illustrating the United States’ unwavering support for Israel in its regional confrontations, particularly with Iran. But it also raises significant questions: Who stands with Iran in this looming confrontation? And does America’s uncritical backing of Israel expose its double standards on human rights and international law?

America’s Stance: Double Standards and Duplicity

The United States’ support for Israel has long been criticized as riddled with hypocrisy. While Washington postures itself as a global advocate for democracy and human rights, it continues to supply the arms that fuel Israel’s military machine, which has been implicated in the deaths of thousands of innocent Palestinian women, children, the elderly, and the infirm. The moral outrage America projects against other regimes, particularly in the Muslim world, is conspicuously absent when it comes to Israel’s transgressions. This duplicity reflects a clear bias that undermines America’s credibility as a global arbiter of justice.

One of the most troubling aspects of U.S. foreign policy is the selective application of international law. Israel, despite numerous violations of human rights, continues to receive billions in military aid annually. Meanwhile, countries like Iran are sanctioned, demonized, and isolated for far less egregious offenses. Is this about justice, or does Israel’s strategic importance in the Middle East render its violations invisible to Western eyes?

The Forgotten Two-State Solution

As the world watches the current crisis, one fundamental issue has been almost entirely ignored: the two-state solution. Once at the center of every peace process, the notion of a Palestinian state coexisting alongside Israel has been sidelined. Instead, the narrative is now dominated by military escalations, airstrikes, and defense systems. The right of Palestinians to self-determination, to a land they can call their own, is no longer part of the discourse.

Israel, with the tacit approval of its Western backers, continues to pursue its “Greater Israel” agenda. Settlements expand, Palestinian homes are demolished, and Jerusalem is increasingly Judaized, all in direct contravention of international law. The West’s silence on this is deafening. Why has the right of the Palestinians to a country of their own been so easily brushed aside in the name of ‘security’?

Iran: A Nation Standing Alone?

In this complex geopolitical landscape, Iran is portrayed as the villain. Yet, it is important to ask: does Iran truly stand alone? While it lacks a superpower willing to defend it from Israeli aggression, Iran is not without allies, both politically and ideologically. More importantly, as an Islamic republic, Iran’s identity is rooted in its faith, particularly in tawheed (the belief in the oneness of Allah) and its reliance on divine justice. Iran may not have the might of THAAD systems, but it has the conviction that Allah’s help is greater than any worldly power.

The strength of the Islamic faith is not found in military arsenals, but in the belief that the oppressed will eventually triumph over the oppressors. As history shows, superpowers come and go, but the power of the oppressed, united in their faith and resolve, can overcome even the most insurmountable odds. Iran, in its resistance against Israeli aggression and Western duplicity, is likely to turn to Allah for protection and justice, embodying the Qur’anic verse:

“And if you remain patient and conscious of Allah, their plot will not harm you at all. Surely Allah is fully aware of what they do.”** (Qur’an, 3:120)

This verse speaks to the resilience of those who trust in Allah against overwhelming odds. It is a reminder that no matter how powerful the aggressor, the ultimate victory lies with those who maintain their faith and stand firm in the face of oppression.

Other Critical Issues

There are additional issues worth considering. The first is the long-term impact of America’s military involvement in the region. By sending troops to operate the THAAD system, the U.S. is not just providing arms—it is becoming an active participant in the defense of Israel, making it complicit in whatever actions Israel takes. This blurs the line between defense and aggression, and America must ask itself whether it is willing to shoulder the moral responsibility for Israeli actions.

Secondly, the deployment of advanced defense systems like THAAD only exacerbates the arms race in the Middle East. As Israel strengthens its defenses, neighboring countries will feel compelled to enhance their own military capabilities, increasing the likelihood of conflict rather than reducing it.

Finally, the question of international accountability must be addressed. If Israel, with its advanced military capabilities and the backing of the world’s most powerful nation, continues to flout international law without consequence, what message does this send to other countries? Does might make right? And where does this leave global efforts to maintain peace and justice?

Conclusion

 The Pentagon’s THAAD deployment in Israel is a reminder of the dangerous escalations that are taking place in the Middle East, with Iran as the primary target. Yet, the broader context reveals a troubling picture of global double standards, where Israel is given a free hand to violate human rights while the rights of Palestinians are ignored. As Iran prepares to defend itself, it does so with the faith that no system, no army, no alliance is greater than the power of Allah. The verse from the Qur’an serves as a powerful reminder of where true strength lies: not in missiles, but in faith, patience, and the belief in divine justice.


Spread the love
Continue Reading

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Escalating Conflict in the Middle East: Iran’s Retaliatory Strike against Israel and the Growing Regional Tensions

Published

on

By

Spread the love

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East continues to devastate countless lives, particularly in Gaza, Israel, and Lebanon. Recent escalations, including Iran’s ballistic missile strike on Israel, highlight a dangerous shift in the region’s dynamics. In this article Baba Yunus Muhammad delves into the circumstances surrounding Iran’s aggressive response, the motivations behind it, and the broader implications for regional stability. It also questions the role of global powers, particularly the United States, in perpetuating the conflict, while reflecting on the absence of a unified military alliance among Muslim nations to defend against Israeli aggression. 

The recent intensification of conflict between Israel, Gaza, and Lebanon has further deepened the tragic cycle of violence in the Middle East. The situation, marked by Israel’s military actions and retaliatory strikes from its adversaries, particularly Iran, is emblematic of decades of geopolitical tension, occupation, and armed confrontations.

Context of the Iranian Attack on Israel

Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 2nd marked a sharp escalation in the broader conflict. This retaliatory strike was a direct response to Israel’s aggressive targeting of key Hezbollah and Hamas commanders. The killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon pushed Tehran to act, signifying a growing frustration within Iran over perceived inaction. Iranian officials made it clear that the attack was not only defensive but also justified as a response to the increasing Israeli strikes across the region. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued the order, and the attack was supported by both the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the Iranian defense ministry.

While Iran’s previous strike in April was seen as more symbolic, this latest assault was far more aggressive. It hit multiple urban centers, and Tehran claimed that 90% of its missiles reached their intended targets. Though the full extent of the damage is still unclear, this represents a significant shift in Iran’s strategy, moving from symbolic gestures to serious military reprisals.

Why Did Iran Retaliate?

Several reasons motivated Iran’s retaliation. First, the assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders by Israeli forces played a crucial role. Iran had already held off from responding to earlier provocations, particularly the assassination of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in July. Iranian officials believed this restraint, done in hopes of securing a ceasefire deal in Gaza, was a strategic mistake. Instead of quelling Israeli aggression, it rather emboldened Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to continue with escalations. Israeli strikes in Lebanon, coupled with the rhetoric from Netanyahu that recent actions aimed to “change the balance of power in the region,” convinced Iran’s leadership that not responding would further weaken their regional influence.

The Iranian response also reflects a growing divide within its leadership. Hardliners in Tehran, who felt that the country’s reputation as the leader of the “axis of resistance” was being undermined, viewed the lack of previous retaliation as a sign of weakness. This pressure led to the aggressive missile strike in October, highlighting that the country was ready for war if necessary. This response from Iran signals a turning point, where the threat of broader war no longer serves as a deterrent for Iran’s leadership.

US-Israel Relations and Broader Implications

The United States remains Israel’s staunchest ally, with its defense of Israeli actions viewed by many Muslim nations as part of a larger pattern of Western double standards. During Iran’s missile strike, US forces stepped in, intercepting some of the missiles, and US President Joe Biden dismissed the attack as “ineffective.” The unyielding support for Israel, however, continues to fuel resentment in the Muslim world, where many see this dynamic as part of an ongoing effort to suppress Muslim populations and movements.

The broader geopolitical context of this conflict cannot be ignored. While NATO is often lauded as a successful military alliance in the West, it is seen in many Muslim nations as a destabilizing force, responsible for chaos in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Iran’s frustration with NATO’s continued support of Israel, and its pivotal role in defending Israeli interests, underpins much of the animosity. Tehran views the Western military alliance as fundamentally biased, contributing to the marginalization and suffering of Muslim-majority countries.

The Role of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

As the conflict escalates, a question often asked is: why doesn’t the Muslim world form a unified military response to counter Israeli aggression? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the world’s second-largest intergovernmental body after the United Nations, has been relatively passive when it comes to creating an effective military coalition. Muslim countries, with their vast resources and manpower, could potentially form a powerful defense alliance, yet political fragmentation and differences in national interests have prevented such a coalition from materializing.

Historically, regional divisions, ideological differences, and varying levels of cooperation with Western powers have stifled the creation of a unified Muslim military front. The creation of a robust defense mechanism under the OIC remains elusive, as individual member states often prioritize their national interests over collective action. Nevertheless, the absence of such a coalition leaves Muslim populations across the region vulnerable to foreign aggression and continued conflict, with Israel benefiting from its military superiority and diplomatic support from the West.

If peace is ever to be realized in this volatile region, there must be a reevaluation of the global power dynamics, especially the role of the US and its unwavering support for Israel. At the same time, Muslim countries will need to overcome their internal divisions to form a unified front capable of protecting their interests against external aggressions. Until then, the cycle of violence is likely to continue, with devastating consequences for the people of Gaza, Lebanon, and Israel.

Baba Yunus Muhammad is the President of the Africa Islamic Economic Forum, Tamale, Ghana


Spread the love
Continue Reading

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The US Election and its Impact on the Middle East

Published

on

By

Spread the love

As the U.S. presidential election draws near, the United States faces several economic, social and political challenges that will play a decisive role in determining whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will be the next president of the United States. Inflation remains high, the gap between the haves and the have-nots is growing, and views on immigration and the border continue to polarize the public. But the election’s outcome will also have implications beyond U.S. domestic policy.

The overriding foreign policy matter at issue in this election concerns economic competition with China and the associated tensions in the South China Sea, through which one-third of global trade passes. Other foreign policy priorities include the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict and its regional repercussions. Though the divide between the Republicans and the Democrats on the Ukraine war might be irreconcilable, their differences on the Middle East, including the war in Gaza, are mostly minor. Apart from safeguarding the vital interests of the U.S., both presidential contenders will eschew deep involvement in Middle East affairs.

Determinants of U.S. Policy

Five constants drive the direction of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The first is Israel’s security and the U.S. commitment to maintaining Israel’s military superiority in the region, which is apparent from the state-of-the-art military hardware that Israel receives from the U.S. compared to the less advanced equipment delivered to other countries. The second constant relates to U.S. control of the region’s oil and ensuring its passage through the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb in order to reach international markets. U.S. commitment to this cause undermines any Iranian threats to block navigation through the Persian Gulf and Houthi threats to block access to the Red Sea. The third constant is the U.S. commitment to preventing Russia or China from dominating the region’s politics, a fact understood well by Middle Eastern countries. The fourth constant is ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. And the fifth focuses on combating terrorism.

The U.S. understands that given the complexity of Middle East politics, it cannot transform the region. It learned this lesson from the failures of its 2003 invasion of Iraq despite its heavy investment in democratization and reconstruction efforts. Its limited interest in the Middle East has driven its increasing desire to restrict its involvement there. This started when the U.S. intensified its pivot to Asia, an effort that began during Barack Obama’s presidency.

Moreover, U.S. voters (with the exception of Arab and Muslim Americans) are preoccupied with problems that have nothing to do with the Middle East. The enormous interest of activists and the media in the Gaza war does not reflect the priorities of voters themselves.

Straightforward Republican Approach

If Trump wins the presidency, he will pursue a foreign policy based on “America First” principles, including by signing trade deals, displaying a reluctance to engage in military interventions abroad and reducing international commitments, including to NATO.

In the Middle East, Trump has shown little interest in the crises in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, preferring to focus on domestic challenges instead. On the Israel-Palestinian conflict, he has shown little enthusiasm for a two-state solution and prefers to impose quick solutions without focusing on their feasibility.

Trump will likely seek direct normalization deals between Israel and its neighbors (especially Saudi Arabia), similar to those he concluded between the Israeli government and other Gulf states in 2020. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is eager to sign a peace treaty with Israel, even without an Israeli commitment to establishing a Palestinian state – though he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seem to have put the project on hold pending the outcome of the U.S. election, preferring to give credit to Trump rather than Harris for its success. Trump could also consider signing a formal defense treaty with Saudi Arabia to prod it to make peace with Israel, but this would be challenging considering that getting the support of two-thirds of the Senate seems unlikely. After making peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Trump will likely pressure Qatar, Kuwait and Oman to conclude similar deals.

As for relations with Iran, Trump will adopt a more hostile policy, but he is unlikely to resort to military action, relying instead on sanctions and economic pressure. He has hinted at the possibility of a deal with Tehran, but only on his terms. It’s unclear if the Iranians can afford another four years of austere sanctions under a second Trump term, so they could be amenable to striking a deal, facilitated by the recent election of a reformist Iranian president. Despite the apparent different approaches between the Republicans and the Democrats on Iran’s nuclear program and regional proxies, the core U.S. perspective on Iran cuts across the two political parties. Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and although Biden pledged to restore it if he won the presidency, lengthy negotiations in Vienna did not yield results, and the Trump-era sanctions remain in effect.

Nuanced Democratic Approach

Most Republican congressional candidates who won their primary races support Israel unconditionally. In contrast, Democratic congressional candidates adopted a more nuanced approach. They invariably voiced their commitment to Israel’s security and well-being but with specific qualifications about human rights, the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population and a two-state solution. Still, Democratic candidates avoid extreme criticism of Israel based on the fact that results in the primary elections demonstrate that anti-Israel views are still unpopular among mainstream Democratic supporters. Protests at college campuses against Israel’s conduct in Gaza neither shape public opinion nor determine the Democratic Party’s policy choices.

The divide among Democrats on this issue results from profound differences in the views of the demographic groups that make up the party’s base, with younger, non-white voters being more sympathetic to the Palestinians and more critical of Israel, while older whites are more pro-Israel. Republican support for Israel, meanwhile, has increased with the surging influence of right-wing Christian groups within the party.

Since the inception of the Gaza war, Democratic members of Congress have been pressing to end the war and provide aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza. However, Democrats’ criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu antedate the Gaza war. President Joe Biden and Democratic members of Congress opposed Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul and the appointment of two radical lawmakers to Cabinet.

Arguably sympathetic to the case presented by Palestinian rights activists, Harris has been unable to reconcile the demands of the pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli sides of the party. Pro-Palestinian activists felt that the Democratic Party failed to address their demands for primetime speaking slots during the 2024 Democratic National Convention, further exacerbating their feelings of marginalization.

If Harris wins the election, her foreign policy will adhere to the broad lines of the Democratic Party, such as defending democratic principles and human rights, strengthening international alliances, confronting global challenges such as climate change and nuclear proliferation, cooperating with allies, especially in NATO, and paying particular attention to confronting Russia in Ukraine and curtailing Chinese influence in the Pacific region.

As vice president, Harris avoided talking about strategic policies and initiatives in the Middle East. But if she wins the presidency, she will be forced to deal with the region’s intractable issues. It’s unlikely that U.S. support for Israel will witness a dramatic shift if Harris wins office. Still, in recent months, she has taken steps to distinguish herself slightly from Biden. She was the first senior U.S. official to call for a cease-fire in Gaza, opposing the idea that a deal can be reached only after Hamas is destroyed. She stressed Israel’s right to defend itself but chose to boycott Netanyahu’s speech before Congress in July.

Harris did not want the Gaza war to be one of the main issues in her election campaign. She chose Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, who has limited foreign policy experience, as her running mate to sway uncommitted Democrats to vote for her. (Nearly 19 percent of voters in the Minnesota Democratic primary for president voted “uncommitted.”) Walz has recognized Israel’s right to defend itself and distinguished between Hamas, which he condemned for the Oct. 7 attack, and the civilians who have been caught in the crossfire in Gaza.

Ultimately, Harris’ position on ongoing tensions in the Middle East will be uncertain. During her tenure in the Senate, Harris consistently voted against arms deals with Saudi Arabia and U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. In 2020, she stated that the United States must reevaluate its relationship with the Saudis to defend U.S. values and interests, though she did not specify which values and interests she was referring to. Harris’ policies will likely mirror Biden’s. Her goals will include strengthening security relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and cooperating in technology and the green energy transition. In the context of the ongoing escalation between Iran and Israel following the assassination of senior Hezbollah and Hamas leaders, Harris is likely to adopt a balanced approach toward Iran and stress the need to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal, pending the outcome of the fighting between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah.

Limits of U.S. Foreign Policy

Many in the Middle East understand the limits of U.S. policy in their region. They support U.S. engagement when it comes to combating terrorism and keeping sea lanes open for trade. They also accept, though grudgingly, the unpopular constants of U.S. policy, especially Israeli exceptionalism and regional supremacy.

They also recognize the United States’ reluctance to engage militarily in the region on matters that do not directly intersect with its own interests. In 2012, Syrian President Bashar Assad admitted to having chemical weapons but said they were meant for use only against foreign aggression. Obama warned him against using them against his people, saying he would be crossing a red line. But before the year’s end, Assad’s forces used sarin gas in rebel-held areas near Damascus, killing 1,400 people. The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations supported punishing Assad’s army for committing the massacre, but failing to secure authorization from either chamber, Obama opted against using force against the Syrian regime.

In September 2019, the Houthis targeted Saudi oil installations. They expected the Trump administration to defend the kingdom, but it did not. The Saudis viewed the Houthi attacks as a threat to international oil supplies, a view that Washington did not share because the incident had little impact on U.S. oil imports. That such attacks disrupted the flow of Saudi oil to Europe, China and India did not bother Washington.

The United Arab Emirates says it does not expect to resume talks with the U.S. over a multibillion-dollar deal to buy F-35 fighter jets regardless of who wins the election. Trump had signed an agreement to supply the UAE with the advanced aircraft, which no other country in the Middle East has besides Israel, before the end of his presidency in early 2021. The Emiratis now say the same factors that caused the suspension of the talks when Biden took office still exist, so they do not plan to reopen negotiations.

Apart from achieving vital national interests, the Middle East is of little interest to the United States and U.S. policymakers. The region accounts for less than 5 percent of the world’s economy, much of which comes from hydrocarbon exports. This lack of interest gives the region’s authoritarian leaders impunity to violate human rights and oppress their people.

Hilal Khashan, a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut and a respected author and analyst of Middle Eastern affairs, is a contributing analyst at Geopolitical Futures, and author of six books, including Hizbullah: A Mission to Nowhere. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.) He is currently writing a book titled Saudi Arabia: The Dilemma of Political Reform and the Illusion of Economic Development.is a contributing analyst at Geopolitical Futures. 

This article was first published in the Geopolitical Futures


Spread the love
Continue Reading

Trending

Copyright © 2024 Focus on Halal Economy | Powered by Africa Islamic Economic Forum