Ten years ago, it appeared to be the beginning of the end for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. His government’s brutal crackdowns on peaceful protests in 2011 had given birth to an insurgency backed by foreign foes—the U.S. among them. Atrocities mounted, including use of chemical weapons against civilians, mass murders and torture, over the course of the decade-long civil war that followed. Estimates suggest that more than 600,000 people have died and millions more have been displaced, making the Syrian civil war one of the deadliest, most disruptive conflicts of the 21st century.
One by one, countries severed ties with Assad and his government, including the U.S., which imposed economic sanctions in 2011 and shuttered its embassy for good in 2012. Even the Arab League, an influential organization of fellow regional nations, banished Assad in the fall of 2011 in hopes of welcoming the growing armed opposition to his rule—a strategy it had used with dissidents in Libya, where longtime leader Muammar el-Qaddafi was slaughtered by NATO-backed rebels just as foreign governments and the United Nations were preparing to take action in Syria as well.
Assad, in short, became an international pariah. But now it’s the twilight of 2021, and the Syrian president has not only survived but appears poised to make a stunning comeback on the world stage. A decade after his actions helped set the civil war in motion, Assad stands strong over a largely broken country that has few other options for leadership. And with the help of longtime allies Iran and Russia, he has managed to retake much of Syria from the hands of the rebels and jihadis that tried to oust him.
Now, recognizing reality, many of the countries that cut him off 10 years ago have begun to welcome him back, despite ongoing U.S. opposition to his rule. Telling signs: Just last month Jordan reopened its border with Syria, and the Arab League is widely expected to reinstate its membership shortly.
“Assad will stay in power,” former Ambassador Robert Ford, the last U.S. envoy to Syria, tells Newsweek. “There’s no way to imagine that the Syrian opposition now through force of arms is going to be able to compel him to step down. There isn’t a viable alternative.”
For Ford, who witnessed the developments that led to the civil war firsthand, dodging angry mobs in Damascus in the fall of 2011 and the al-Qaeda-linked bombs that rocked the capital city the following winter, it’s a tough outcome to watch. “Syria is a shattered country economically, it’s shattered socially, too,” he says. “Half the country’s been displaced [and] more than a fourth of the population has fled the country. It’s not going to get better for average Syrians inside Syria, and it’s not going to get better for Syrian refugees. It’s just tragic.”
With a change in leadership unlikely, the emphasis will now shift to how other countries deal with Damascus, says Mona Yacoubian, a former State Department analyst who today serves as senior adviser on Syria at the United States Institute of Peace. “Given stalwart Russian and Iranian backing, Assad is likely to maintain his hold on power for at least the medium term,” Yacoubian tells Newsweek. “Many countries in the region have come to understand this, and we are starting to see more prominent efforts to accommodate this reality.”
As rapprochement between Syria and other Arab nations moves forward, what is not yet clear is just what shape those efforts will take and, critically, how the U.S. will respond—developments that are likely to affect the balance of power in the region and beyond.
Out of the Cold, Back in the Fold
What’s driving the countries that shunned Assad to move toward normalizing relations, given that the conditions that led to him being ostracized haven’t fundamentally changed? Experts say the desire for regional stability appears to be stronger than the concerns over Assad’s leadership or the allegations of mass human rights abuses that have accompanied it.
“As the region contends with crisis and chaos, deepening economic challenges, the COVID pandemic and widespread humanitarian suffering, governments in the region are more interested in de-escalating conflicts and addressing these persistent and destabilizing challenges,” Yacoubian says.
Among the examples she cites of the shift in regional sentiment toward Assad is the recent improvement in relations between Syria and Jordan, a major U.S. partner in the Middle East. In addition to reopening the border in September, Jordan’s King Abdullah II symbolically took a call from Assad earlier this month, the first such communication between the two leaders in a decade. Also noteworthy: the recent decision by the Biden administration to alleviate some of the harsher sanctions against Assad encoded in the Caesar Act, a 2019 law that restricts foreign companies from engaging in business activities that support Damascus. The changes allowed delivery of Egyptian gas and Jordanian fuel to energy-starved Lebanon through Syria.
Other signs of tensions easing in the region: The UAE and Bahrain have already reopened their Damascus embassies, and INTERPOL this month readmitted Syria to the global law enforcement body for the first time since banishing the country in 2012.
The motives for bringing Syria back into the fold among various Arab states were elucidated in a report earlier this year by David Schenker, who served as assistant State Department Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs until January, and is now a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
“A range of parochial motivations appear to be driving this embrace,” Schenker wrote in his report, which he shared with Newsweek. “For the UAE, reintegrating Assad and rebuilding Syria holds the promise of ending Turkey’s deployment in Idlib, where the Emirati adversary has stationed troops to prevent additional refugee flows. Jordan seems driven primarily by a desire to help its economy, repatriate refugees, reestablish consistent trade and restore overland transportation through Syria en route to Turkey and Europe. In this regard, Washington’s Caesar Act restrictions continue to irritate Amman.”
Larger regional concerns have also swayed the likes of Egypt and Israel, which hope to limit the entrenchment of another non-Arab power: Iran. “More broadly, Egyptian officials seemingly subscribe to the dubious idea that Syria’s reentry into the league would gradually accentuate its ‘Arabism’ and thereby move Damascus away from Persian Iran,” Schenker says in the report. “Other regional states likely share similar views; even some Israeli national security figures improbably assess that Russia may limit Iranian encroachment in postwar Syria under Assad.”
All of these developments, though, are at odds with the official U.S. stance on Assad and Syria. Diplomatic ties between Washington and Damascus remain severed, and their respective embassies closed, with no clear path to reconciliation.
Still, unofficially at least, there appear to be changes afoot. “The Biden administration has said that it will not normalize relations with Assad, but does not appear any longer to be dissuading Arab partners from doing so,” Schenker tells Newsweek. “Caesar Act sanctions, if applied, may prevent Arab states from resuming ‘normal’ relations, including trade, with Assad’s Syria. But the increasingly senior engagements are undermining the isolation of the Assad regime and what’s left of the Trump-era policy of pressuring the regime” to implement a 2015 United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire and a political settlement to end Syria’s ongoing civil war.
“Until now, this policy has prevented the Assad regime from achieving a full victory,” Schenker says. “As Arab states move to reembrace Assad, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the sanctions.”
A US military convoy takes part in joint patrol with Turkish troops in the Syrian village of al-Hashisha on the outskirts of Tal Abyad town along the border with Turkish troops, on September 8, 2019.
Meanwhile, Syria continues to maintain a diplomatic presence in the U.S. in the form of the country’s permanent mission to the United Nations in New York City. Aliaa Ali, who serves as third secretary at the mission, tells Newsweek her government hopes that the recent decision by the Biden administration to allow energy shipments to Lebanon will “reflect positively on the Syrian people, and be a stepping stone for the United States of America to rescind its wrong policies and approaches in the region.”
Ali characterizes these developments as a triumph for Syria and a loss for the U.S., saying that they “would not have taken place without the victory of the Syrian state, the failure of the American administrations to achieve their goals and the realization of the majority of regional and international countries that no results can be reached regarding policies or drawing strategic paths in the region unless coordinating with Damascus.”
But the presence of unsanctioned foreign troops on Syrian soil remains a sticking point with Damascus—about 900 U.S. troops remain in the country, even after the Biden administration’s military exit from Afghanistan and stated goal of ending “forever wars.” Bouthaina Shaaban, one of Assad’s top advisers, tells Newsweek that “we cannot talk about a final Syrian victory unless the entire Syrian land is liberated, as we still have parts of our country occupied by American and Turkish powers.”
The Syrian Perspective
Shaaban’s tenure in the Syrian government dates back to the days of Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, who assumed the presidency in 1971, beginning a half a century of dynastic rule that continues to this day. Relations with the West were mostly strained under the elder Assad, a traditional adherent to the Baathist ideology, which blends socialism and Arab nationalism. His son, Bashar, was an aspiring ophthalmologist studying in the United Kingdom when his older brother’s death made him the heir apparent. He initially ushered in a new era, more cosmopolitan on its face, when he assumed the presidency after his father’s death in 2000.
Undated picture shows Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and his wife Anisseh posing for a family picture with his children (Bashar is in the top row, second from the left).
U.S.-Syria relations frayed throughout the first decade of the 21st century, however, and ultimately collapsed with the onset of the civil war in 2011. As for any U.S.-Syrian ties today, Shaaban tells Newsweek “we cannot talk about any new intentions until we see the U.S. withdrawing its troops from Syria.”
But she does see value in other nations building bridges with Syria, and maintains that many countries have come to support the Syrian government throughout the course of the conflict. She believes these actions are consistent with a worldwide decline in U.S. power and influence.
“The lack of confidence and the lack of credibility of U.S. policies during different administrations over the last decades, besides its continuous violation of international law and of international agencies, and its efforts to create conflicts in many countries, all these led to the deterioration of the position and role of the U.S. in the world,” Shaaban says. “Not only countries who have different points of views with the U.S., but even allies of the U.S. started to lose confidence in U.S. policies.”
She characterizes the Syrian conflict thus far as a win over the West and what it tried to prove to the world.
“The first message the war on Syria has proven is that all Western propaganda about this war was groundless,” Shaaban says. “Western media portrayed what happened in Syria as an uprising against the president of Syria and the war as a civil war. A reality check proves that no president can remain in power if his people are against him, especially as terrorism was supported and financed by so many countries in the world.”
Syrian senior presidential advisor Buthaina Shaaban answers journalists’ questions on Syrian peace talks at the United Nations on January 29, 2014 in Geneva.
Shabaan’s message resonates in Syria beyond government halls, and its ramifications are global. One Syrian observer who has personally experienced and closely followed the events of the war tells Newsweek that the coalescing of U.S. foes in Syria means that countries like Russia, Iran and China may seek to block U.S. actions elsewhere too.
“The message is clear, the U.S. can be defeated, or at least stopped, as in Syria today,” says the observer, who asked to remain anonymous due to the country’s sensitive security situation. “From now on, U.S. foes won’t let what happened in Iraq and Libya happen again. The U.S. is not weaker, militarily or economically, but its enemies are getting stronger and so is their will to work together.”
This observer recognizes the uprising against Assad was launched by Syrians, but says the campaign to save him also had indigenous roots. “You can win a war against any regime in the world, but you can never win war against people,” the observer says. “It was the Syrian people who rose against Assad, but it was also the Syrian people who defended him.”
Existential Threats
Syrians on both sides of the civil war didn’t work alone. Just as volunteers from a multitude of countries joined the rebellion against the Syrian government over the course of the conflict, so foreign fighters also intervened on its behalf. Among those who mobilized with Iran’s backing to support Assad in Syria in 2013 was neighboring Iraq’s Hezbollah al-Nujaba Movement, part of a self-proclaimed, mostly Shiite Muslim “Axis of Resistance” that opposes the actions of Washington and its partners in the region. Nasr al-Shammary, the group’s deputy secretary-general and spokesperson, describes in detail images of beheadings and eviscerations carried out by al-Qaeda that would soon rebrand as the Islamic State militant group (ISIS), and says the decision to intervene was rooted in such atrocities, which were accompanied by threats to the region’s Shiite Muslims, a minority in Syria.
“You can imagine what would happen if these terrorist groups took control of Syria. God forbid!” Shammary tells Newsweek. was focused on other grisly images, such as barrel bombs falling from government aircraft on Syrian cities and reports of the systematic torture and murder of thousands of Assad’s enemies in secret prisons throughout the country. Allegations of Syrian government war crimes involving such banned weapons also continued, including the use of nerve gas to kill 1,400 citizens of Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus, in 2013. All told, the conflict has made Syria the world leader in creating refugees and asylum seekers, with more than 6.6 million having fled the country, and even more internally displaced, according to figures shared by the U.N.
Corpses of men and children killed by nerve gas after a suspected chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, in August 21, 2013.
And as the fighting intensified, Syrian jets and Russian allies in the air stood accused of bombing hospitals, schools and even religious institutions, ensuring nothing was sacred in such an unholy combat. The mounting reports prompted international investigations on behalf of the powers that still hoped to see Assad dethroned. The opportunity presented itself for an ultimatum among a nation desperate for victory but war-weary all the same. After quietly funding an insurgency, the U.S. mapped out potential plans to bring the hammer down on Assad.
President Barack Obama had famously set a “red line” on the use of chemical weapons, meaning that their use would cross an internal threshold that triggered a U.S. military response. He even sought congressional approval for U.S. intervention. The president backed down, however, amid an international deal to disarm Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile.
A survivor of the Assad government’s suspected chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun town of Idlib district, receives treatment at an hospital in Idlib, Syria on April 05, 2017.
But reports of abuses persisted, as did the ruthlessness of ISIS and other hard-line groups that overpowered and consumed the ranks of the “moderate” Free Syrian Army. Washington was coming to realize that the Syrian opposition was doomed to self-destruction. The Pentagon saw a new protagonist in Syria’s indefatigable Kurdish community, which had always sought more autonomy from Assad’s Arab-oriented rule but now, like other minorities, faced a genocidal threat from jihadis.
Beyond the American Century
Shammary believes there are two causes for what he sees as the decline of U.S. power and influence. The first one, he says, is internal: “The United States today is no longer what it was before, and the main reason is the intransigent American policies that completely ignore the will of the peoples, their cultural heritage and their social fabric, the mistrust for the peoples in the region, the continuous abandonment of allies and the complete disregard of the interests of the countries of the region before American interests.”
Additionally, he argues, U.S. competitors have grown more capable and adaptable. “The second reason,” he says, “is the growing ability and strength of America’s competitors in the world—such as Russia, China and Iran—and the confidence of their allies in them and the positions of some of the mentioned countries that support and are loyal to these allies without any assumptions or interference in the values of peoples or their social fabric.”
And around the same time that the U.S. officially switched sides to back the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in October 2015, the skies over Syria were overwhelmed with the roar of Russian Air Force jets. “Assad was in some views a dictator, a monster, but he was Russia’s ally,” Evgeny Buzhinskiy, a retired lieutenant general of the Russian military who is now chairman of the executive board at the Russian International Affairs Council, tells Newsweek. “When Russia intervened in the year 2015, Assad was on the verge of collapse. Russia saved him.”
The beleaguered Syrian Arab Army, beset by death and defection, was reinvigorated by a great power partner that turned the tables in the skies and on the battlefield. And Russia, which had worked with China since 2011 to ensure Assad did not suffer the same fate as Qaddafi by vetoing international action in Syria, now coordinated closely with Tehran and its allies to keep a mutual friend in power.
“There was a division of labor,” Buzhinskiy says, “Russia acts from the sky, bombing and delivering missile strikes, and Iran is acting on the ground, in cooperation with the Syrian Armed Forces, simultaneously.”
Smoke rises after a warplane belonging to the Russian Armed Forces bombed a residential area in the Darat Izza neighborhood of Aleppo, Syria on October 4, 2016.
Buzhinskiy confirms that Moscow’s approach proved “a model” of sorts for successful intervention for Russia and its partners. This killer choreography not only kept Assad’s forces afloat, but, as Syrian Democratic Forces head of media operations Farhad Shami acknowledges, staved off desertions from the embattled Syrian Arab Army.
“Direct Russian and Iranian support were crucial to Assad’s survival in power,” Shami tells Newsweek. “Assad benefited greatly from Russian support in getting rid of his opponents and reducing their control over regions of Syria. And most importantly, it reduced the chances of defecting for many of those who complained about him, whether they were politicians or soldiers who are still now within the institutions of the system.”
But he warns that Assad has “not once and for all survived the fall and faces many dangers if he does not achieve a sufficient degree of openness to society and change his behavior and mentality.”
Losing Wars, Choosing Battles
U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces continues, though it is limited to defeating the remnants of ISIS. As Russia stepped up its own presence across Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces’ political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council, opened a line to Moscow as well in the hopes that the U.S. and Russia could work together to secure an agreement between them and Damascus.
“We are pretty interested in direct talks with Assad, with the Syrian government,” Syrian Democratic Council co-chair Elham Ahmad told a small gathering of journalists in Washington earlier this month. “We asked our partners to play a positive role in getting us to find a solution between us and the Syrian government.”
An Anti-Assad Syrian demonstration held in Whitehall, Central London.
Progress has been slow, however, and a lack of results has led to some second guessing at times, even among the U.S.-partnered force.
“From time to time, when we don’t see any physical or any real change, we try to recalculate our ideas,” Ahmad says, expressing hope that this visit to the U.S. capital may produce “something different” from prior experiences.
As for Ford, the former ambassador, he resigned from the State Department in 2014, frustrated by what he saw as a slow and misguided approach to the war in Syria. Today, he frequently discusses what went wrong for the U.S., but ultimately he emphasizes that the government in Washington was never in a primary position to steer the course of the conflict in Syria.
“For sure our credibility took a hit,” Ford says. “But I think what your readers really need to understand is that the Americans did not control the path of events in Syria. We did not expend the resources to change the course of events there, and even if we had vastly increased the number of resources, I’m not sure that we would have come out where we wanted to.”
He acknowledges the limitations of U.S. involvement in Syria, which he said falls far more readily within Tehran and Moscow’s sphere of influence than that of Washington.
“The Americans got involved in something that was much bigger than what the United States was about in the Middle East, and in a sense we ended up just being one player among many,” he says. “And when you’re one player among many, the single player does not control it, Iran does not control it, Russia by itself does not control it, even Assad himself does not control it, the Turks don’t. It’s a really complex interplay.”
And sometimes, he argues, it is best for the U.S. to stay out of the mix altogether, especially in countries where rivals have more interest, influence and the willingness to apply both.
Says Ford, “The Americans really do need to pick and choose their battles carefully.”
Fighting between the DRC’s armed forces and the M23 rebel group has reached new levels of intensity in the eastern part of the country, with claims and counter-claims about which one controls the region’s biggest city, Goma. Judith Verweijen and Michel Thill argue that the government in Kinshasa has made some poor strategic decisions about the country’s armed forces, among them steps taken three years ago to create a reserve army out of more than 100 armed groups. They set out why it was always doomed to fail.
After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has only intensified. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion – which claims to control the main eastern DRC city of Goma since January 26 – has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.
A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum started in 2022 when the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.
The creation of the reserve army – which remains on paper at this stage – allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will it actually work? Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons. The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur. This is already happening in anticipation with numerous armed groups stepping up their recruitment. Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them. Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.
The Wazalendo: Eastern DRC’s Predatory Patriots
On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.
As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign. Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.
As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation. This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.
Chequered history of integration
A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.
The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration. Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy. The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.
Hurdles to integration
The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.
This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment. The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups. Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:
Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.
Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.
Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.
Painkiller or cure?
The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.
However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it. Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.
Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.
Judith Verweijen is an Assistant professor, Utrecht University and Michel Thill is Senior Program Officer, University of Basel
Mozambique’s political history has been defined by violence, authoritarianism and disputed elections – patterns that persist in the wake of the 2024 polls. Mass protests, fuelled by allegations of electoral fraud, and police violence have highlighted the country’s fragility. Researcher Manuel Francisco Sambo explains why Mozambique is trapped in a cycle of instability and what must be done to break it.Mozambique’s political history has been marred by violence, disputed elections and authoritarian control. The pattern continues. As the 2024 elections have shown, Mozambique remains trapped in a cycle of violence and instability. Mass protests due to widespread allegations of electoral fraud and police violence led to the deaths of dozens of people and widescale destruction.
My research on peace and security in east and southern Africa has focused on Mozambique’s post-independence political history. Based on my work, I argue that Mozambique is at an impasse. It is unable to fully embrace authoritarianism – or to build a functioning democracy.
One obstacle to full authoritarian rule is social media. It has reduced the state’s grip on what information is shared, who shares it and what voices are heard. The government has lost the ability to silence critics and dictate what it wants the country to believe.
To appease the international community Mozambique has maintained a democratic posture. But the country hasn’t been able to build a strong democratic state. It’s prevented by the entrenched power of the political, economic and military elites through Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), the ruling party. Frelimo has dominated since the country’s independence in 1975. The result is cycles of violence and political instability.
These cycles will continue unless Mozambique undertakes sweeping economic and political reforms. These would need to include the decentralization of power, dismantling the Frelimo-linked patronage networks that control the economy, establishment of an independent judiciary, and fairer political competition. It is unclear whether the newly inaugurated President Daniel Chapo will dare to ignite these reforms.
Why authoritarianism hasn’t worked
For much of its post-independence history, Mozambique was governed by an authoritarian regime under the single rule of Frelimo. Frelimo came to power in 1975 after leading the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule.
In the 1990s, the country adopted multiparty democracy and a new constitution. The constitution established universal suffrage and periodic elections for the presidency and legislature. It also guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life and protection from torture.
But Frelimo maintained its hold on power. The party did this through political repression, manipulation of electoral processes and patronage systems. The political landscape has changed in the last decade, however. It’s more difficult for the state to maintain – or expand – its authoritarian grip. Authoritarian regimes control opposition and dissent, but the state’s capacity to do this is diminishing. Social media and digital communication tools have made it difficult to suppress ideas. Historically the government relied on state-controlled media to control the narrative and censor opposing views. Smartphones and social media platforms have revolutionised the way information circulates. For instance, news about election irregularities, corruption and violence spreads fast. It often outpaces state censorship.
The ongoing protests after the 2024 elections are a testament to this. While the government has deployed forces to quell dissent, the scale of the protests and the speed at which they spread demonstrate the power of social media. Mozambicans have a platform to build alternative narratives, mobilise and resist.
Retaining international support
Another factor constraining the state has been the need to retain international support. This means maintaining the outward appearance of a democratic system. Mozambique’s economy is highly dependent on external assistance, particularly from western countries and international financial institutions.
Government officials are aware that they could lose foreign aid and investment if the democratic process is abandoned. This would deepen the country’s economic crisis and Frelimo’s challenges.
The withdrawal of aid in 2016 following the hidden debt scandal is evidence of donors’ leverage over Mozambique. Three Mozambican state-owned companies took loans from western donors for national projects that never materialised. As a result of aid suspension, Mozambique was forced to arrest prominent individuals. They included the former head of the secret services and the son of former president Armando Guebuza.
Democracy still a pipe dream
Frelimo’s widespread control has made it resistant to meaningful political change. A genuine democracy would require dismantling these entrenched structures of power. Frelimo has protected the political and economic elites who benefit from its dominance. The party has kept its grip on power through a combination of patronage networks, corruption and control over key sectors of the economy. These elites include business people, military leaders and government officials. All are deeply invested in maintaining the status quo.
A genuine democracy, in which opposition parties could freely compete and challenge Frelimo’s monopoly on power, would threaten their interests. The party has shown time and again that it is willing to manipulate the electoral process, use violence and stifle opposition to maintain its hold on power. Elections are held regularly. Seven general elections have been held since the inception of multiparty democracy constitution. But they often lack transparency and fairness.
What needs to be done
Reforms are needed to break up patronage networks and redistribute power and resources. Frelimo’s leadership has shown little interest in doing this. It would jeopardise their control over state resources and the wealth they’ve accumulated over decades. Mozambique’s political economy further complicates the prospects for democracy. Frelimo-linked elites dominate key sectors, such as natural gas, mining and agriculture, and benefit from favourable policies, state contracts and access to state-owned enterprises. These economic interests are deeply intertwined with the party’s political power. It’s unlikely, therefore, that the elite will willingly relinquish control.
Manuel Francisco Sambo is a PhD candidate, at the Doshisha University
Ghana, often celebrated as a beacon of democracy in Africa, has once again showcased its commitment to democratic principles through free and fair elections. The opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), led by John Mahama, secured a decisive victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections. This shift in political power reflects growing public dissatisfaction with the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP). As Mahama assumes office as the president of the republic of Ghana on January 7, 2025, he inherits a nation in crisis. Baba Yunus Muhammad explores the factors behind the NPP’s defeat, the current state of Ghana, and the formidable challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the incoming administration, incorporating perspectives on environment and climate resilience.
The NPP’s Fall from Grace
The NPP’s electoral defeat is rooted in economic mismanagement, unfulfilled promises, and a growing disconnect with the populace. Ghana’s economy, once a model for regional stability, has faced severe challenges, including soaring debt, inflation, and unemployment.
Economic Missteps
Under President Nana Akufo-Addo, Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached an alarming 82.9% (IMF) by the end of 2024, driven by extensive external borrowing to fund infrastructure projects. Coupled with the global economic slowdown and decreased demand for key exports like cocoa, gold, and oil, the economy struggled to regain momentum. Inflation escalated from 10.4% in 2021 to over 38% in 2024, severely eroding purchasing power. Unemployment reached 13%, with youth unemployment exceeding 20%. These statistics highlight the deteriorating living standards for millions of Ghanaians.
The NPP’s reliance on IMF-prescribed austerity measures, including salary freezes, tax hikes, and subsidy cuts, further alienated the working and middle classes. The perceived prioritization of urban centers over rural communities compounded this disenchantment, especially in the underserved northern regions.
Political Missteps
Corruption scandals and accusations of nepotism plagued the NPP’s tenure. Mismanagement in the energy sector and opaque procurement deals eroded public trust. Additionally, the party’s inability to fulfill promises—such as creating one million jobs and improving education and healthcare—undermined its credibility. This dissatisfaction fueled the NDC’s campaign, which resonated with marginalized groups seeking change.
Ghana’s Current State: A Nation in Crisis
Economic Challenges
Ghana’s cedi depreciated by over 50% against the US dollar in three years, driving up import costs and inflation. Servicing public debt consumes over 60% of government revenue, leaving little for essential social investment. The rising cost of living has reversed years of progress in poverty reduction, leaving millions vulnerable.
Environmental Vulnerabilities
Climate change exacerbates Ghana’s challenges. Rising temperatures, deforestation, and erratic rainfall are disrupting agriculture and increasing food insecurity. Coastal erosion and flooding threaten communities and infrastructure, emphasizing the need for urgent climate adaptation and resilience measures.
Political and Social Polarization
The closely contested elections underscore deep divisions within the electorate. While Mahama’s victory signals a demand for change, it also highlights the need for reconciliation and unity. Institutional reforms—especially in electoral transparency and anti-corruption measures—are imperative for restoring trust in governance.
The Task Ahead for John Mahama
Mr. Mahama faces an uphill battle in stabilizing Ghana’s economy, fostering political reconciliation, and rebuilding public trust. As Ghanaians anticipate the new government, they are eagerly awaiting a clear stance on zero tolerance to corruption. It is crucial for the Mahama administration to demonstrate its commitment to rooting out corruption at all levels of government. This could mean not only actively recovering looted public funds but also ensuring that former government officials found guilty of corruption or abuse of office are held accountable. These officials must face legal consequences to reassure citizens that integrity will define the new government’s leadership.
This stance on corruption is essential for rebuilding trust with the people, ensuring that transparency and accountability are at the core of governance. If Mahama’s administration takes bold steps to uphold these principles, it would mark a crucial turning point in Ghana’s fight against corruption. Holding wrongdoers accountable, recovering stolen assets, and implementing new anti-corruption measures could restore public faith and signal a new dawn for effective and ethical governance. Achieving these goals requires inclusive governance and innovative solutions.
Economic Recovery: Balancing Growth and Sustainability
To restore economic stability, the Mahama administration must prioritize sustainable development:
Diversifying the Economy: Investments in agro-processing, renewable energy, and manufacturing can reduce dependence on traditional exports and create jobs.
Enhancing Revenue Collection: Strengthening tax systems and closing loopholes can increase government revenue without undue burden on citizens.
Promoting Fiscal Discipline: Conducting comprehensive audits of government spending can identify inefficiencies and reduce waste.
Green Transition: Climate adaptation and renewable energy initiatives can position Ghana as a leader in Africa’s green economy, ensuring long-term resilience and sustainability.
Environmental Sustainability as a Cornerstone
Addressing climate change must be a central pillar of Ghana’s recovery. As one of the nations most vulnerable to climate impacts, Ghana should:
Implement reforestation programs to combat deforestation.
Invest in clean energy solutions, such as solar and wind, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
Promote sustainable agricultural practices to boost productivity while conserving resources.
Strengthen disaster preparedness systems to protect communities from flooding and other climate-related threats.
Political Reconciliation and Institutional Reform
In a polarized political environment, fostering unity is paramount. Mahama’s administration should focus on:
Electoral Transparency: Enhancing the independence and capacity of the Electoral Commission.
Anti-Corruption Measures: Establishing independent agencies to investigate corruption, regardless of political affiliation.
Decentralization: Empowering local governments to address regional disparities and bring governance closer to the people.
Strengthening Social Infrastructure
Addressing the immediate needs of Ghanaians requires significant investments in education, healthcare, and housing:
Universal Healthcare: Expanding the National Health Insurance Scheme to ensure comprehensive coverage.
Educational Reforms: Emphasizing vocational training and STEM education to equip the youth for emerging industries.
Affordable Housing: Partnering with private investors to reduce the housing deficit.
Lessons from the Past: Rethinking External Dependence
Ghana’s reliance on IMF-led programs often exacerbates inequality and undermines sovereignty. For instance, the 2014 IMF bailout program required Ghana to implement austerity measures such as subsidy removals and public sector wage freezes, which disproportionately impacted the poor and stoked public dissent. To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Mahama administration should:
Develop Homegrown Policies: Leverage Ghana’s resources and potential to craft context-specific solutions.
Engage Regional Partners: Strengthen trade and collaboration within ECOWAS to build a resilient economic bloc.
Pursue Diverse Partnerships: Balance relationships with development partners, including China and the European Union, to maintain strategic autonomy.
A New Path Forward
Ghana stands at a critical juncture. The electorate’s demand for change reflects widespread yearning for economic relief and governance reforms. Mahama’s leadership will define Ghana’s trajectory in the years to come. By prioritizing sustainability, inclusivity, and innovation, Ghana can rebuild itself as a beacon of resilience and progress on the African continent. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but with decisive action and visionary policies, Mahama’s administration has the potential to restore hope and create lasting prosperity for all Ghanaians