INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Nigeria: The Supreme Court on Trial
Published
1 year agoon
By
Editor
By Chidi Amuta
The Presidential Election Petitions Tribunal has since reaffirmed the declaration of Mr. Bola Tinubu as our duly elected president. In response, the two major contenders Peter Obi and Atiku Abubakar of the Labour Party and Peoples Democratic Party respectively have scaled up their legal objections to the Supreme Court. It is more like a slovenly walk up the ladder of judicial correctness, not a legal battle to assert a right or claim an entitlement. The opposition politicians are probably more preoccupied with adherence to the rule of law and a commitment to order and due judicial process. That is a minimum requirement of responsible democratic conduct.
Without prejudice to the wisdom of the Supreme Court, the high possibility is that they are likely to affirm the ruling of the Tribunal, It will do so for a different set of reasons that run contrary to conventional street wisdom. It will not be because the judges are under corrupt influence. It will not be because the judges are compromised or cowardly. On the contrary, it will be because the existing laws leave them no room for escape.
Understandably, the incumbent does not seem perturbed by the judicial rituals. He is digging in in terms of ruling Nigeria, making a litany of strategic appointments and flip flopping through a barrage of key policy decisions. The law gives him the head start of waging his legal defenses of his much contested mandate from the comfort place of power incumbency. The other contestants are merely throwing legal stones at the glass house of power from the external wilderness of forlon hope.
On its part, the public is less impressed by the legal drama. The finality of a Supreme Court verdict has since lost its celestial awe. Most Nigerians doubt that the Supreme Court will ever upturn Mr. Tinubu’s incumbency. Public doubt about a judicial outcome from the Supreme Court is embedded in the tradition of skepticism that has come to surround the reputation of the Supreme Court and the Nigerian judiciary in general in recent years.
Rightly or wrongly, ordinary Nigerians doubt the integrity of the Supreme Court let alone expect that it can possibly rule an incumbent out of office at any time in the near future. Common people believe the judges are corrupt, compromised and cowardly. In other words, there is an overwhelming public verdict that neither Peter Obi nor Atiku Abubakar will secure the reliefs they are seeking from the apex court. People have already concluded that the Supreme Court will merely reaffirm the verdict of the PEPT.
To buttress their skepticism and general distrust of the Supreme Court, people cite a string of such verdicts in recent times. Challenges to presidential election outcomes from 1979 to the present have returned verdicts in favour of the incumbent. No one believes this instance will be different. In a few state governorship cases that went up to the Supreme Court, the verdicts have followed the same pattern. It has either been an affirmation of the incumbent or a toppling of the existing order based on disguised partisan pandering. Easily the most embarrassing instance cases is the Supreme Court judgment that chaperoned Mr. Hope Uzodinma into the Government House in Owerri while returning Mr. Emeka Ihedioha to the pool of unemployed privileged citizens.
The adverse estimation of the Supreme Court by the Nigerian public is not necessarily informed by any understanding of the fine points of legality that inform the court’s judgments. It is instead a value judgment by a perceptive and politically conscious pubic on cases that touch on the wider democratic implications of our elections. More often than not, assessments of the judgments of the Supreme Court are value judgments that are mere spillovers of Nigeria’s pervasive corruption rhetoric. A pervasively corrupt culture has bred perennial distrust about the conduct of public officers and functionaries. There is a conventional wisdom out on the streets that the quality of judgment available to those who approach our courts is a function of the quantum of money and other material inducement on offer by litigants.
In this regard, people point to the many cases in which under the Buhari presidency, a number of judges homes were seaarched and huge troves of cash found. Security agencies went after some judges and traced huge sums of money to their bank accounts which could not be accounted for. In other words a trail of corruption follows our judges like their politician patrons who in any case are the financiers of the wealthy judges. In going after the corrupt judges, political leaders were merely seeking to retrieve part of their loot doled out to some judges.
Therefore, the general doubt as to whether the Supreme Court will deliver a contrary verdict from the Presidential Election Tribunal has a constitutional and legislative basis. The Supreme Court and indeed all the courts in the post election court processes have been caged by the existing constitutional stipulations and applicable Electoral law on the matter of post election petitions.
Here is the Constitution: Section 285 (6) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) states that “an election tribunal shall deliver its judgement in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition”. Meanwhile, the petitioners have 21 days after the date of the declaration of the result of elections to file. The law further provides that “an appeal from the decision of an election tribunal or Court of Appeal in an election matter shall be heard and disposed of within 60 days from the date of delivery of judgment of the tribunal or Court of Appeal”. This means that the declared winner would have spent no less than six months in office before the case is concluded.
Since judicial systems hardly rule in favour of potential anarchy, the time lag makes it difficult to upturn a presidential election in which the incumbent has already spent months in office. For as long as this aberration persists, there can hardly be judgments that run counter to the interests of the incumbent at the presidential level at least.
The present aberration plays in favour of the belief that order precedes law. You must have an orderly society that exists in stability before individuals can successfully pursue their legal rights. So in most cases involving the security of the sovereign at the apex level, most Supreme Courts are more likely to rule in favour of an incumbent already in power. The desirable ideal is therefore a situation in which electoral petitions are concluded before the swearing-in of winners as obtains in many African countries.
In Kenya, for instance, the time allowed between the date of declaration of presidential election result and the decision of the Supreme Court on a petition is only three weeks. Article 140 of the 2010 Kenya Constitution provides that the petition should be filed within seven days after the result is declared and “within fourteen days after the filing of a petition, the Supreme Court shall hear and determine the petition and its decision shall be final”.
Over and above technical constitutional and legalistic issues, there is a more fundamental aspect of the reliance on the courts to determine electoral outcomes. An aberration seems to have been accepted as the norm. In a democracy, the essence of periodic judicial interventions in election matters is to promote democratic culture especially the primacy of the rule of law. It is also designed to strengthen the confidence of the people in the process and instill accountability in the political leadership. Reducing our courts, including the Supreme Court, to vote counting stations with Judges now deciding the outcome of elections, allegations of election fixing, deal-making and corruption have become rife.
The increased prominence of and recourse to judicial outcomes in election matters is a dangerous omen for Nigeria’s democracy. Politicians now go into electoral contests uncertain that the electoral body (INEC) will return a free and fair verdict. They therefore prepare to duel in court, believing that tribunals and courts will give them the fairness and justice denied by the electoral body, namely INEC.
It has therefore become axiomatic that INEC declared results will be defective and unfair. Even INEC itself has become content with the recourse to the courts to complete their job, hence the refrain of ‘Go to court”. INEC seems to have transferred confidence in its own technical capacity to the judgment of courts. A democracy in which the umpire or electoral body lacks confidence in its own integrity and technical efficiency and instead transfers the burden of its fairness and integrity to the judiciary has serious fundamental problems.
The virtual transfer of the burden of determining electoral outcomes to the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, has encumbered it with a political responsibility and a moral burden. No one knows what code of conduct regulates the conduct of our Supreme Court judges these days. It remains uncertain whether our Supreme Court judges are barred from receiving material favours from individuals or corporations even where the givers have no case before the affected judge. This is made more problematic by the civil service fixed tenure if our Supreme Court judges. They are appointed and serve according to a pecking at the behest of the president. Their conduct is subject to a loose regulation by the National Judicial Council.
Whatever the latitudes in the present environment, the Judges of Nigerian’s Supreme Court and indeed the entire judiciary establishment now have a huge moral burden. They must first admit that there has been a major erosion of the ethical and professional standards in their fold. Nigerians continue to search in vain for judges of stiff moral and ethical standards who also embodied brilliant professional standards and intellect to earn the epithet “learned”. Nigeria once had Justices Danley Alexander, Kayode Esho, Chukwudifu Oputa, T.S. Elias, Ayo Irikefe, Karibi White etc. These were men of solid conviction, profound intellect and impeccable character and commitment to the highest ethical standards. In their days, Nigerians could swear by the judgments of the Supreme Court. Even the military stood in awe of the moral stature and intellectual sagacity of these men of law and letters. As Chinua Achebe lamented shortly before he passed on, “there was once a nation.”
Our situation contrasts with the United States. Supreme Court judges serve a life tenure. They either sit till they die or voluntarily opt to retire. Every vacancy on the US Supreme Court is filled by a nominee of the president subject to Senate confirmation. More often than not, presidents nominate judges to the Supreme Court based on a combination of professional track record in the field and ideological leaning. You are either a liberal judge or a conservative. This connotes implicit partisanship in broad terms as conservative judges tend to be Republicans and liberal judges are essentially Democrats in tendency. Racial diversity has recently been thrown in as a factor that influences presidential nominations to the Supreme Court. There is no civil service pecking order to observe. It is a meritocratic system.
Given the life tenure of US Supreme Court judges, their ethical code is more or less left to their individual moral judgments as well as the perception of the public. Generally, the system frowns at Supreme Court Judges hitching a free ride in a private jet owned by a party financier or Wall Street influencer. Even enjoying a courtesy vacation or renting property as a favour from individuals or corporations with known political or business clout in Washington poses serious ethical problems.
Currently, the only black judge on the Supreme Court, Mr. Clarence Thomas, is under serious ethical scrutiny. Mr. Harlan Crow, a friend of his and Republican party funder bought a house from justice Thomas and flew him on a private jet and also took him on a cruise. Similarly, Justice Samuel Alito took a ride in a private jet paid for by another Republican donor. Though there is no requirement under US law for these judges to report or disclose these private favours, there has been a public backlash about their conduct. This is against the background of the code of ethics in the US pubic service which bars public servants from receiving gifts in excess of $20!
In contrast, Nigerian Supreme Court judges are known to routinely receive huge gifts from business and political ‘friends’. Some of them have influenced choice public appointments for their family members and wards. Others have reportedly received holiday flight tickets and luxury hotel bookings from political and business figures in return for undisclosed judicial favours. It was rumoured that a Chief Justice of the federation was retired prematurely for fiddling with official funds to the tune of billions of Naira.
Another was similarly investigated, briefly prosecuted and then compulsorily retired because officialdom found an incredible balance in his personal bank account. One judge who became Chief Justice of the federation was so much in the back pocket of a former Governor that the governor would travel and bring back for the judge several suitcases full of shoes of different colours. While the judge was entitled to have friends, the problem was that the governor in question had numerous requests for judicial intervention for which he demanded the help of the shoe -loving judge. In an ecosystem where the definition of corruption is rather elastic, it becomes even harder to exonerate our judges from charges of possible graft.
On these post election cases, there is a need to urgently rescue the Supreme Court from imminent irrelevance and oblivion. The challenge is to unfetter the courts by reviewing the constitutional provisions and legislative enablement that relate to the timing and completion of post election petitions. Once we can free post election judicial processes from the burden of incumbency, then the judiciary will be free to dispense justice according to law and in pursuit of natural justice and fairness to all. Thus freed from the encumbrance and blackmail of incumbent power, all aggrieved contestants can approach the law in meekness as equal seekers for justice.
But the most important route to save the judiciary from being killed by politics is to focus attention on evolving a foolproof electoral system. When election outcomes determined by INEC become impeccably reliable, there will be little or need for recourse to judicial absolutism. The judges will regain their integrity and the Supreme Court will reclaim its faded glory.
Dr. Amuta, a Nigerian journalist, intellectual and literary critic, was previously a senior lecturer in literature and communications at the universities of Ife and Port Harcourt.
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Fighting between the DRC’s armed forces and the M23 rebel group has reached new levels of intensity in the eastern part of the country, with claims and counter-claims about which one controls the region’s biggest city, Goma. Judith Verweijen and Michel Thill argue that the government in Kinshasa has made some poor strategic decisions about the country’s armed forces, among them steps taken three years ago to create a reserve army out of more than 100 armed groups. They set out why it was always doomed to fail.
After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has only intensified. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion – which claims to control the main eastern DRC city of Goma since January 26 – has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.
A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum started in 2022 when the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.
The creation of the reserve army – which remains on paper at this stage – allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will it actually work? Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons. The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur. This is already happening in anticipation with numerous armed groups stepping up their recruitment. Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them. Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.
The Wazalendo: Eastern DRC’s Predatory Patriots
On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.
As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign. Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.
As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation. This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.
Chequered history of integration
A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.
The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration. Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy. The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.
Hurdles to integration
The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.
This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment. The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups. Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:
Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.
Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.
Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.
Painkiller or cure?
The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.
However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it. Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.
Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.
Judith Verweijen is an Assistant professor, Utrecht University and Michel Thill is Senior Program Officer, University of Basel
Courtesy: The Conversation
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Mozambique’s Cycles of Violence won’t End until Frelimo’s Grip on Power is Broken
Published
3 weeks agoon
January 23, 2025By
Editor
Mozambique’s political history has been defined by violence, authoritarianism and disputed elections – patterns that persist in the wake of the 2024 polls. Mass protests, fuelled by allegations of electoral fraud, and police violence have highlighted the country’s fragility. Researcher Manuel Francisco Sambo explains why Mozambique is trapped in a cycle of instability and what must be done to break it.Mozambique’s political history has been marred by violence, disputed elections and authoritarian control. The pattern continues. As the 2024 elections have shown, Mozambique remains trapped in a cycle of violence and instability. Mass protests due to widespread allegations of electoral fraud and police violence led to the deaths of dozens of people and widescale destruction.
My research on peace and security in east and southern Africa has focused on Mozambique’s post-independence political history. Based on my work, I argue that Mozambique is at an impasse. It is unable to fully embrace authoritarianism – or to build a functioning democracy.
One obstacle to full authoritarian rule is social media. It has reduced the state’s grip on what information is shared, who shares it and what voices are heard. The government has lost the ability to silence critics and dictate what it wants the country to believe.
To appease the international community Mozambique has maintained a democratic posture. But the country hasn’t been able to build a strong democratic state. It’s prevented by the entrenched power of the political, economic and military elites through Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), the ruling party. Frelimo has dominated since the country’s independence in 1975. The result is cycles of violence and political instability.
These cycles will continue unless Mozambique undertakes sweeping economic and political reforms. These would need to include the decentralization of power, dismantling the Frelimo-linked patronage networks that control the economy, establishment of an independent judiciary, and fairer political competition. It is unclear whether the newly inaugurated President Daniel Chapo will dare to ignite these reforms.
Why authoritarianism hasn’t worked
For much of its post-independence history, Mozambique was governed by an authoritarian regime under the single rule of Frelimo. Frelimo came to power in 1975 after leading the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule.
In the 1990s, the country adopted multiparty democracy and a new constitution. The constitution established universal suffrage and periodic elections for the presidency and legislature. It also guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life and protection from torture.
But Frelimo maintained its hold on power. The party did this through political repression, manipulation of electoral processes and patronage systems. The political landscape has changed in the last decade, however. It’s more difficult for the state to maintain – or expand – its authoritarian grip. Authoritarian regimes control opposition and dissent, but the state’s capacity to do this is diminishing. Social media and digital communication tools have made it difficult to suppress ideas. Historically the government relied on state-controlled media to control the narrative and censor opposing views. Smartphones and social media platforms have revolutionised the way information circulates. For instance, news about election irregularities, corruption and violence spreads fast. It often outpaces state censorship.
The ongoing protests after the 2024 elections are a testament to this. While the government has deployed forces to quell dissent, the scale of the protests and the speed at which they spread demonstrate the power of social media. Mozambicans have a platform to build alternative narratives, mobilise and resist.
Retaining international support
Another factor constraining the state has been the need to retain international support. This means maintaining the outward appearance of a democratic system. Mozambique’s economy is highly dependent on external assistance, particularly from western countries and international financial institutions.
Government officials are aware that they could lose foreign aid and investment if the democratic process is abandoned. This would deepen the country’s economic crisis and Frelimo’s challenges.
The withdrawal of aid in 2016 following the hidden debt scandal is evidence of donors’ leverage over Mozambique. Three Mozambican state-owned companies took loans from western donors for national projects that never materialised. As a result of aid suspension, Mozambique was forced to arrest prominent individuals. They included the former head of the secret services and the son of former president Armando Guebuza.
Democracy still a pipe dream
Frelimo’s widespread control has made it resistant to meaningful political change. A genuine democracy would require dismantling these entrenched structures of power. Frelimo has protected the political and economic elites who benefit from its dominance. The party has kept its grip on power through a combination of patronage networks, corruption and control over key sectors of the economy. These elites include business people, military leaders and government officials. All are deeply invested in maintaining the status quo.
A genuine democracy, in which opposition parties could freely compete and challenge Frelimo’s monopoly on power, would threaten their interests. The party has shown time and again that it is willing to manipulate the electoral process, use violence and stifle opposition to maintain its hold on power. Elections are held regularly. Seven general elections have been held since the inception of multiparty democracy constitution. But they often lack transparency and fairness.
What needs to be done
Reforms are needed to break up patronage networks and redistribute power and resources. Frelimo’s leadership has shown little interest in doing this. It would jeopardise their control over state resources and the wealth they’ve accumulated over decades. Mozambique’s political economy further complicates the prospects for democracy. Frelimo-linked elites dominate key sectors, such as natural gas, mining and agriculture, and benefit from favourable policies, state contracts and access to state-owned enterprises. These economic interests are deeply intertwined with the party’s political power. It’s unlikely, therefore, that the elite will willingly relinquish control.
Manuel Francisco Sambo is a PhD candidate, at the Doshisha University
Courtesy: The Conversation
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Reconstructing a Shattered Nation: Ghana’s Path Forward
Published
1 month agoon
January 6, 2025By
Editor
Ghana, often celebrated as a beacon of democracy in Africa, has once again showcased its commitment to democratic principles through free and fair elections. The opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), led by John Mahama, secured a decisive victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections. This shift in political power reflects growing public dissatisfaction with the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP). As Mahama assumes office as the president of the republic of Ghana on January 7, 2025, he inherits a nation in crisis. Baba Yunus Muhammad explores the factors behind the NPP’s defeat, the current state of Ghana, and the formidable challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the incoming administration, incorporating perspectives on environment and climate resilience.
The NPP’s Fall from Grace
The NPP’s electoral defeat is rooted in economic mismanagement, unfulfilled promises, and a growing disconnect with the populace. Ghana’s economy, once a model for regional stability, has faced severe challenges, including soaring debt, inflation, and unemployment.
Economic Missteps
Under President Nana Akufo-Addo, Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached an alarming 82.9% (IMF) by the end of 2024, driven by extensive external borrowing to fund infrastructure projects. Coupled with the global economic slowdown and decreased demand for key exports like cocoa, gold, and oil, the economy struggled to regain momentum. Inflation escalated from 10.4% in 2021 to over 38% in 2024, severely eroding purchasing power. Unemployment reached 13%, with youth unemployment exceeding 20%. These statistics highlight the deteriorating living standards for millions of Ghanaians.
The NPP’s reliance on IMF-prescribed austerity measures, including salary freezes, tax hikes, and subsidy cuts, further alienated the working and middle classes. The perceived prioritization of urban centers over rural communities compounded this disenchantment, especially in the underserved northern regions.
Political Missteps
Corruption scandals and accusations of nepotism plagued the NPP’s tenure. Mismanagement in the energy sector and opaque procurement deals eroded public trust. Additionally, the party’s inability to fulfill promises—such as creating one million jobs and improving education and healthcare—undermined its credibility. This dissatisfaction fueled the NDC’s campaign, which resonated with marginalized groups seeking change.
Ghana’s Current State: A Nation in Crisis
Economic Challenges
Ghana’s cedi depreciated by over 50% against the US dollar in three years, driving up import costs and inflation. Servicing public debt consumes over 60% of government revenue, leaving little for essential social investment. The rising cost of living has reversed years of progress in poverty reduction, leaving millions vulnerable.
Environmental Vulnerabilities
Climate change exacerbates Ghana’s challenges. Rising temperatures, deforestation, and erratic rainfall are disrupting agriculture and increasing food insecurity. Coastal erosion and flooding threaten communities and infrastructure, emphasizing the need for urgent climate adaptation and resilience measures.
Political and Social Polarization
The closely contested elections underscore deep divisions within the electorate. While Mahama’s victory signals a demand for change, it also highlights the need for reconciliation and unity. Institutional reforms—especially in electoral transparency and anti-corruption measures—are imperative for restoring trust in governance.
The Task Ahead for John Mahama
Mr. Mahama faces an uphill battle in stabilizing Ghana’s economy, fostering political reconciliation, and rebuilding public trust. As Ghanaians anticipate the new government, they are eagerly awaiting a clear stance on zero tolerance to corruption. It is crucial for the Mahama administration to demonstrate its commitment to rooting out corruption at all levels of government. This could mean not only actively recovering looted public funds but also ensuring that former government officials found guilty of corruption or abuse of office are held accountable. These officials must face legal consequences to reassure citizens that integrity will define the new government’s leadership.
This stance on corruption is essential for rebuilding trust with the people, ensuring that transparency and accountability are at the core of governance. If Mahama’s administration takes bold steps to uphold these principles, it would mark a crucial turning point in Ghana’s fight against corruption. Holding wrongdoers accountable, recovering stolen assets, and implementing new anti-corruption measures could restore public faith and signal a new dawn for effective and ethical governance. Achieving these goals requires inclusive governance and innovative solutions.
Economic Recovery: Balancing Growth and Sustainability
To restore economic stability, the Mahama administration must prioritize sustainable development:
- Diversifying the Economy: Investments in agro-processing, renewable energy, and manufacturing can reduce dependence on traditional exports and create jobs.
- Enhancing Revenue Collection: Strengthening tax systems and closing loopholes can increase government revenue without undue burden on citizens.
- Promoting Fiscal Discipline: Conducting comprehensive audits of government spending can identify inefficiencies and reduce waste.
- Green Transition: Climate adaptation and renewable energy initiatives can position Ghana as a leader in Africa’s green economy, ensuring long-term resilience and sustainability.
Environmental Sustainability as a Cornerstone
Addressing climate change must be a central pillar of Ghana’s recovery. As one of the nations most vulnerable to climate impacts, Ghana should:
- Implement reforestation programs to combat deforestation.
- Invest in clean energy solutions, such as solar and wind, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
- Promote sustainable agricultural practices to boost productivity while conserving resources.
- Strengthen disaster preparedness systems to protect communities from flooding and other climate-related threats.
Political Reconciliation and Institutional Reform
In a polarized political environment, fostering unity is paramount. Mahama’s administration should focus on:
- Electoral Transparency: Enhancing the independence and capacity of the Electoral Commission.
- Anti-Corruption Measures: Establishing independent agencies to investigate corruption, regardless of political affiliation.
- Decentralization: Empowering local governments to address regional disparities and bring governance closer to the people.
Strengthening Social Infrastructure
Addressing the immediate needs of Ghanaians requires significant investments in education, healthcare, and housing:
- Universal Healthcare: Expanding the National Health Insurance Scheme to ensure comprehensive coverage.
- Educational Reforms: Emphasizing vocational training and STEM education to equip the youth for emerging industries.
- Affordable Housing: Partnering with private investors to reduce the housing deficit.
Lessons from the Past: Rethinking External Dependence
Ghana’s reliance on IMF-led programs often exacerbates inequality and undermines sovereignty. For instance, the 2014 IMF bailout program required Ghana to implement austerity measures such as subsidy removals and public sector wage freezes, which disproportionately impacted the poor and stoked public dissent. To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Mahama administration should:
- Develop Homegrown Policies: Leverage Ghana’s resources and potential to craft context-specific solutions.
- Engage Regional Partners: Strengthen trade and collaboration within ECOWAS to build a resilient economic bloc.
- Pursue Diverse Partnerships: Balance relationships with development partners, including China and the European Union, to maintain strategic autonomy.
A New Path Forward
Ghana stands at a critical juncture. The electorate’s demand for change reflects widespread yearning for economic relief and governance reforms. Mahama’s leadership will define Ghana’s trajectory in the years to come. By prioritizing sustainability, inclusivity, and innovation, Ghana can rebuild itself as a beacon of resilience and progress on the African continent. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but with decisive action and visionary policies, Mahama’s administration has the potential to restore hope and create lasting prosperity for all Ghanaians

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