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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Museveni then and Now

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By Dr Chidi Amuta

Within the diverse pantheon of African rulership, something curious is emerging.  In many ways, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda is fast emerging as a model of the transformation of democracy into authoritarianism in Africa. While Museveni has retained his nationalist streak in the fight against the global LGBTQ epidemic as well as his isolated battles against Western multinational exploitation and blackmail, his practice of democracy and adherence to the rule of law would disappoint pundits of African democratic enlightenment.

He has repressed basic freedoms, violated the rights of his political opponents, bludgeoned opposition political figures and jailed those who disagree with him. He has enthroned what is easily a personality cult of leadership that is easily a combination of draconian military dictatorship and crass authoritarianism. That is not strange in a continent that has produced the likes of Nguema, the Bongos and Paul Biya.

In addition, Museveni  now displays some of the worst excesses of Africa’s famed authoritarianism, dictatorial indulgence and the dizzy materialism of its leadership. For instance, the president is reported to travel around with an interminable motorcade that includes a luxury airconditioned toilet.  Worse for Uganda’s democracy are the recent stories of  Museveni’s manouvres towards self succession. Specifically, he has appointed his son as Chief of the army, a move which many observers of Uganda see as a pointer to his succession plan.

For me,  the unfolding Museveni  authoritarianism is a classic instance of the transformation of African leaders from revolutionary nationalists  to authoritarian emperors. I once met and spoke with the early Museveni. He had emerged from a bush war as a liberator and valiant popular soldier that was heralded into Kampala as a liberators. He came to mend a broken nation from the locust ears of Idi Amin and Milton Obote.

The Museveni that I sat and conversed with in the early 1990s  was a committed socialist. He was an African nationalist. He was a social democratic politician  with a strong social science background. His primary constituency was the people most of whom fired his liberation movement in the countryside. We exchanged ideas freely on the thoughts of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels,  Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney and Amilcar Cabral among others.

As the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the new Daily Times under Yemi Ogunbiyi, I initiated and conducted a one on one interview with Yoweri Museveni in his early days after the overthrow of Obote with the backdrop of the Idi Amin carnage. What follows is both a travelogue and a reminiscence of the Museveni before now. Is it the same Museveni or are there two Musevenis?

In 1991, I scheduled a trip was to Kampala to interview Yoweri Museveni. I travelled alone through Addis Ababa and Nairobi. In those days, inter African flight connections were a nightmare of stops and delayed connections. I arrived Kampala and found my long standing friend, Dr. Manfred Nwogwugwu,  a demographer who was based in Kampala as head of the United Nations Population Commission. We had been together at Ife where he and his lovely wife, Ngozi, hosted me for the weeks it took me to find my own accommodation as an apprentice academic at Ife.  He took me on a tourist trip around Kampala. The city was broken and bore fresh bullet holes and bomb craters, the marks of war. From Biafra, I knew this ugly face well enough. Kampala had just been liberated by Museveni’s forces after ousting Milton Obote and remnants of Idi Amin.

I knew as a background that Mr. Museveni had been helped in his guerilla campaign by both M.K.O Abiola and General Ibrahim Babangida, then president of Nigeria. He therefore had a very favourable disposition towards Nigeria. He was also quite influential with African leaders from whom Nigeria was seeking support as General Obasanjo was lobbying to become United Nations Secretary General when it was deemed to be the turn of Africa. As a matter of fact, I was joined at the Museveni interview by Obasanjo’s media point man, Mr. Ad Obe Obe, who had come to interview Museveni as part of the Obasanjo campaign.

Museveni’s Press Secretary, a pleasant but tough woman called Hope Kakwenzire, kept in touch while I waited in Kampala for my appointment. She was sure the interview would hold but wanted to secure a free slot on the President’s choked schedule. She promised to call me at short notice to head for the venue.

When she eventually called, it turned out that the interview venue had just been switched from the Kampala State House to a government guest house in Entebbe, close to the airport and by the banks of Lake Victoria. Entebbe brought back memories of the famous Mossad raid to free hostages of a Palestinian hijack of an Israaeli plane. At the appointed time, I was picked up from my friend’s residence. As we headed for Entebbe, memories of the dramatic Israeli commando rescue of airline hostages at Entebbe during the Amin days kept flashing through my mind. When I arrived Entebbe airport on my way in, I was shown the warehouse where the hostages were kept ahead of their dramatic rescue. The rescue had made world headlines in those days. It reinforced Israel’s military prowess and the intelligence dexterity and detailed planning  of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) but the operational dexterity and intelligence excellence of Mossad in particular.

We arrived a nondescript white bungalow tucked amidst trees and vegetation. It was a colonial type sprawling white bungalow.  The entrance gate was a long drive from the building itself. When your car is cleared through the first gate, you drive along a bushy drive way towards the building. The first gate has normal military sentry who already know you are expected. As you drive along the bushy driveway, some surprise awaits you. Suddenly some small figures in full combat gear dart onto the drive way and wave your vehicle to a sudden stop at gun point. They are too young and too small to be regular  soldiers. But their moves are rather professional and smart. They are ‘child soldiers’ or rather ‘baby soldiers’ who had fought alongside Museveni’s liberation forces in the bush war that led to the freedom of Uganda. No emotions, No niceties. They screen the vehicle scrupulously for explosives. These small men  have apparently been trained to trust no one. They ignore the escort and Press Secretary both of whom are familiar faces. They insist I answer their questions for myself. I explain I have an interview appointment with the President. They briefly return to their tent at the wayside and briefly confer by radio communication.

They wave us through to the building.  I am taken through a rather unassuming hallway and a colonial looking living room and dining areas that opens into a simple sit out at the back of the building. The sit out at the back of the building opens into a vast courtyard with well manicured green gardens. The extreme end of the green is Lake Victoria. At its banks, there are tents with simple garden chairs. The serenity of the location is striking. Even more chilling is the eerie silence of the location except for the flapping of the wings of flamingos and pelicans playing by the lakeside. I quickly framed it in my mind: “Conversations by Lake Victoria!”

Seated alone in one of the tents is President Yoweri Museveni, the new strongman of Uganda. His simplicity beleis hthe mystique of courage and valour that now define his reputation. He was a leading figure in Africa’s then latest  mode of political ascension: the strong man who wages a guerilla movement in the countryside and marches from the forest into the city center of the capital after toppling an unpopular sitting dictator and his government with its demoralized army . After him, Joseph Kabilla of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Charles Taylor of Liberia followed the same pathway of political ascension but with differing outcomes.

The man in the tent was dressed in a simple black suit. He welcomed me very casually and warmly. “Nigeria is a long way from here, I imagine!”, he said jovially as he ushered me to take a seat. As we settled down to exchange views, it turned out that our exchange would be more than an interview. It was more of a radical social science conversation.

We compared notes on the class struggle in Africa, the burden of the political elite far removed from the masses, the alienation of the rural masses, the working class in Africa’s imperialist inspired industrialization. Museveni was very knowledgeable and sharp. His intellectual exposure was impeccable. He knew a lot about  Nigeria, about our cities and the structure and general disposition of our elite. He had very kind words about M.K.O Abiola and his commitment to African unity and liberation which he was supporting with his vast resources. In particular, he supported Abiola’s ongoing campaign for reparations from the West to Africa for the decades of pillage during the slave trade and the subsequent colonial expropriation and haemorrhage of resources.

I still managed to pierce through his armour of social science and dialectical materialist analysis to ask him a few worrying questions about Uganda and Africa’s political future. He was generally optimistic about the turnaround of Uganda after the devastation of war and the rampaging carnage of dictators.

He added that he was facing the tasks of reconciliation among Ugandans after decades of division and distrust just like Nigeria did after our own civil war. He invited me to return to Kampala a few months hence to witness what the will of a determined people can do towards post war reconstruction. He told me he was out to fix not only the broken landscape of the city but more importantly the destroyed lives of many poor Ugandans. When I mentioned what I had seen of the devastation of AIDS in the countryside, he nearly shed tears but sternly reassured me that he would contain the scourge of the epidemic by all means.

I left Museveni on a note of optimism on the prospects of Africa’s comeback after the days of the Mobutus, Amins, Obotes and Bokasas. Given my own left leaning ideas, I found Museveni a kindred spirit and an unusually enlightened and progressive African statesman. He questioned everything: African traditions, beliefs, the assumptions of African history, the political legacy of the colonialists and the neo colonial state. He discussed pathways to Africa’s future economic development  and the urgent need to question and possibly jettison old development models being peddled by the West through the World Bank and the IMF.

That was Museveni back in 1990-91.

Dr. Amuta, a Nigerian journalist, intellectual and literary critic, was previously a senior lecturer in literature and communications at the universities of Ife and Port Harcourt.


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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Russia-Ukraine War: A Delicate Pause Amid Geopolitical Maneuvering

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B.Y. Muhammad

In a surprising development, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has agreed to a mutual pause in attacks on energy infrastructure with Russia for 30 days, marking a potential step toward a broader cease-fire. The agreement, facilitated through a phone conversation with former U.S. President Donald Trump, underscores the shifting dynamics of international involvement in the ongoing conflict.

The Cease-Fire Agreement: Tactical or Strategic?

While the 30-day truce is being framed as a diplomatic breakthrough, there are indications that the Kremlin has not deviated from its broader objectives in Ukraine. Russia’s agreement to pause strikes on energy infrastructure, participate in prisoner exchanges, and discuss security in the Black Sea has been presented as a concession. However, these elements align with longstanding Russian interests, making it unclear whether the Kremlin has genuinely altered its stance or is simply buying time.

Zelensky, while agreeing to the deal, expressed skepticism regarding Russia’s commitment, emphasizing the need for U.S. monitoring. “Just the assertion and the word of Putin that he will not strike energy sites is too little,” he remarked, underscoring the deep mistrust between Kyiv and Moscow.

Russian Strategy and Western Concerns

Western analysts argue that the Kremlin’s approach remains fundamentally unchanged. Putin’s overarching demand—a complete cessation of foreign military and intelligence support for Ukraine—would, if met, leave Kyiv vulnerable to Russian dominance. While Trump denied discussing aid with Putin, the Kremlin’s statement suggested otherwise, raising questions about the true nature of their discussions.

This development has heightened fears that Moscow is merely playing for time, anticipating that the U.S. may eventually disengage from Ukraine. The timing of this cease-fire agreement, coupled with Russia’s battlefield momentum and growing Western fatigue, suggests that Moscow might be maneuvering for a strategic advantage rather than pursuing genuine peace.

U.S. and Russian Diplomatic Calculations

Trump’s involvement in the negotiations signals a potential shift in U.S. policy. The former president has historically expressed skepticism toward Ukraine’s strategic importance, and his willingness to engage with Putin could indicate a broader recalibration of Washington’s stance. Russia, in turn, appears eager to leverage this opportunity to normalize relations with the U.S. without making significant concessions on Ukraine.

Moscow has already floated the prospect of economic cooperation with American firms, particularly in the rare earth metals and energy sectors. Additionally, discussions have included cultural engagements, such as a proposed U.S.-Russia hockey tournament—seemingly trivial, yet indicative of Russia’s broader attempt to reframe its relationship with Washington beyond the Ukraine conflict.

Implications for Ukraine and the Global Order

For Ukraine, the stakes remain high. While a temporary cessation of hostilities on energy infrastructure provides some relief, the country remains in a precarious position. The prospect of losing its principal backer, the U.S., could force Kyiv into unfavorable compromises that undermine its sovereignty.

For the broader international community, the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to reflect a contest not only between two nations but between geopolitical blocs vying for influence. Russia seeks to restore its sphere of control, while the West struggles to maintain a unified front in supporting Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Islamic world, with its historical ties to both Russia and Ukraine, watches closely, balancing economic interests and diplomatic relations in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

While the 30-day cease-fire offers a temporary reprieve, it is far from a definitive step toward peace. The agreement highlights the ongoing complexities of diplomacy in wartime, the strategic calculations of global powers, and the uncertain future of Ukraine’s sovereignty. As negotiations continue, the world waits to see whether this pause will serve as a bridge to lasting peace or merely as a tactical interlude in a protracted conflict.

 


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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Russia-US Negotiations Open the Next Phase Of Restructuring the World

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From 1945 until the early 1990s, the global order was based on the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an order filled with conflict, danger and ideological discord, as all such orders are, but there was at least a system of organization based around the two powers. After the Soviet Union fell, Russia, though intact, was in a state of disarray in no small part because it had lost the satellite states that had insulated it from its enemies in Europe – NATO and the United States. The war in Ukraine was initiated largely to reclaim these buffer states. But it was also undertaken to resurrect the Russian state and rehabilitate it as a global power.

The war has been a failure. Moscow has taken only about 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, thus failing to rebuild a decisive buffer. It has weakened the Russian economy. And it imperiled the regime by sparking unrest and coup attempts, which Moscow successfully suppressed. Russia has done what it does best: It has failed but survived. It must now devise a strategy for the future that is more than just survival.

On Feb. 11, the U.S. and Russia exchanged prisoners after President Vladimir Putin said U.S.-Russia relations were in danger of collapsing. For his part, President Donald Trump said phone calls between them were constant. Rumors of summit planning were in the air and have since been validated by reports that Trump and Putin spoke on the phone, with both agreeing to start negotiations to end the war. (Trump spoke later with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.) This is all a fairly normal negotiation process: One side threatens to leave the table, the other side displays patience, and both sides ultimately reach small agreements. In order to understand the geopolitical meaning of all this, we must consider the positions and strategies of both Russia and the United States in these negotiations.

Russia is in the process of redefining its relations with the rest of the world while preserving the state, building a healthy economy and wielding foreign influence. Strategically, Russia’s problem is that it is a vast country vulnerable to potential adversaries. The nation could not regain its position without unity, and unity required a powerful military and economic center. Throughout history, the government has been stable, but it had limited options, which forced it into strategies it did not have the resources to execute.

Russia’s failure to conquer Ukraine has created an economic – and even military – threat from Europe. To its east, Russia faces China, which is a historical Russian enemy with which it fought border wars even when both were communist states. China did not vote to support Russia in its invasion of Ukraine at the first United Nations meeting on the matter. (It abstained.) China was far more interested in relations with the United States and Europe than anything Russia had to offer. Strategically, Russia had to win the war outright to demonstrate its power. It failed, and now it has no strategic ally with an interest in supporting it. In other words, Russia has no strategic counterweight.

Russia’s long-term adversary is the United States, which thwarted Russia’s strategy in Ukraine. The U.S. has no existential threat facing it. Europe is divided. China has significant economic and internal problems, and its military is currently in no position to challenge the United States. Russia therefore must accept its current weakened position or deal with the United States.

The U.S. has a history of getting into unthinkable alliances with former enemies. U.S. grand strategy is founded on opportunism and flexibility, its passions reserved for domestic conceptions. Trump has demonstrated systematic unpredictability, which means that he has given himself maximum flexibility in negotiating with Russia. That the U.S. is fundamentally unthreatened on the world stage gives it options in negotiations. In stating – during his election campaign – that Ukraine was a European war and not an American war, Trump told Russia that it could deal with the U.S. For Washington, the fear was that Russia would, under Soviet rule, dominate Europe and thus radically shift the balance of power in the global system. If that was still a concern before 2022, Russia’s subsequent failure has put it to rest.

Without a sufficient military that is able to fully defeat Ukraine militarily, Russia is left to focus on economic development to return to power. This is a very long and potentially dangerous path as it leaves Russia militarily exposed. The other option is to reach an accommodation with the United States. Washington has no moral qualms in overlooking ideology and behavior to form worthwhile relationships. If an understanding were reached, the U.S. would be free of its responsibility for European security, eliminating China’s already vain hope of establishing an alliance with a powerful ally, and giving it more room to tend to its own interests. National interest rules all, and national interest is determined by power.

Ending a war is easier if one side has won and the other side has lost. It’s much trickier if the goal is to create long-term peace, rather than a brief suspension, absent a decisive outcome. That is the issue now. Russia, like Germany after World War II, must demand economic growth in which the U.S. would likely participate. (Russia is Russia, of course, so caution must be exercised as it recovers.) The negotiations will seem painful and filled with insults, breakdowns and threats. And hanging over all of this is the threat of nuclear weapons, which I believe are irrelevant to the negotiations; mutually assured destruction means that whoever attacks will be dead with his family within the hour. But, in time, the negotiations will bear the fruit that the diplomats will take credit for, even though it was raw power that decided the outcome.

George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures.

Courtesy: Geopolitical Futures


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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Trump’s Gaza Plan: A Test for Arab Leaders

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Hilal Khashan

Earlier this month, U.S. President Donald Trump announced during a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu his plan to take over the Gaza Strip and resettle its residents iEgypt and Jordan. A week later, he reiterated his intention during a press briefing in Washington with Jordanian King Abdullah II, who appeared uncomfortable listening to Trump’s proposal but avoided challenging the president on the matter. Fearing a similarly embarrassing situation, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi canceled his own visit to Washington set for Feb. 18.

The Palestinian question was the focal point of Arab foreign policy until the 1967 Six-Day War. Since then, Arab countries have sought various peace treaties with Israel and grown dependent on U.S. protection for their survival. Though they cannot endorse Trump’s plan to evict Palestinians from Gaza and transform the strip into a “Riviera of the Middle East,” neither can they simply dismiss his assertions. Trump has challenged Arab leaders to come up with an alternative plan for Gaza, knowing they likely cannot.

Resettlement Revisited

Many observers have compared Trump’s proposal to resettle Palestinians in neighboring countries to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s willingness to host them in Sinai in the early 1950s. But the conditions that led Nasser to favor the resettlement of Gazan refugees differ fundamentally from the situation in the region today. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, it was the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) that proposed resettling refugees who had fled to Gaza during the conflict, in accordance with U.N. General Assembly resolution 194. The initiative would not have affected the 80,000 Gaza residents who were living there before the war. Arabs generally viewed it as a humanitarian endeavor, given the wide range of relief services the agency provided, rather than a liquidation plan, as opponents of Trump’s proposal see it.

However, even the U.N.-sponsored initiative ultimately collapsed. In 1953, UNRWA and Egypt, under Nasser, signed a plan to resettle 120,000 refugees from Gaza. Two years later, they agreed that the Egyptian town of Qantara, located east of Suez and 220 kilometers (140 miles) southwest of Gaza, would be the location of a new settlement for the refugees. But in retaliation for the United States and Britain’s refusal to fund the construction of the Aswan High Dam, Nasser withdrew his support from the project.

Arab Reactions

The Palestinian issue has long been a sensitive topic in the Arab world, so Arab governments know they cannot be seen as supportive of a U.S. plan to remove Palestinians from Gaza. Still, Arab countries’ responses to the proposal have been weak and indecisive. They even postponed an emergency Arab League summit scheduled for the end of this month to discuss an alternative plan for Gaza, under the pretext that some Arab heads of state had prior commitments.

El-Sissi launched a fierce media campaign to try to convince the Egyptian public that Cairo will not give in to threats and blackmail. (Pentagon officials had hinted to Egyptian officials that military aid, including repairs to equipment and spare parts, could be affected by Egypt’s position on the Trump plan.) Egyptian officials also helped organize demonstrations against the proposal, hoping to convey a message to Washington that the Egyptian people (and not just the government) rejected the relocation plan. Egypt’s top mufti called the proposal irresponsible and provocative and said it violates international norms and humanitarian standards – sentiments Arab leaders dare not say themselves.

El-Sissi has erroneously claimed that the relocation of Gazans to Egypt would be a direct threat to his regime, as Palestinians would disseminate a culture of resistance and promote their own interests inside Egypt. In a public address, el-Sissi described the displacement of Palestinians as an injustice in which Cairo cannot participate and insisted that he would not tolerate any actions that harm Egyptian national security, without specifying how resettling Gazans in Sinai would do so. But he also reiterated his determination to work with Trump and said the U.S. president still wants to achieve a two-state solution. Despite believing that Israel will not allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, Egypt at least officially continues to focus on the importance of cooperation with the United States to achieve a just peace between the Palestinians and Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Egyptian officials told the U.S. director of national intelligence that Cairo will cancel its peace agreement with Israel if the Trump administration continues to push to displace Gaza residents or stops the flow of U.S. aid. However, the most el-Sissi can do is temporarily suspend the Camp David Accords, knowing the consequences of fully repealing the treaty would be intolerable for Cairo. The Egyptians fear that Trump’s global ambitions go beyond annexing Canada and Greenland and acquiring Ukraine’s mineral resources. They believe he could be eyeing the Sinai Desert, given its strategic location, abundance of natural resources and tourist attractions.

Egypt has learned the lessons of the 1967 war. It is not serious about a military confrontation with Israel, no matter what happens to Palestinians in Gaza, and it will not create the conditions for another disastrous conflict, despite the uproar. The Egyptian government even released a statement saying the Egyptian and U.S. presidents agreed on a number of topics during a recent call, avoiding any mention of Trump’s Gaza proposal.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, most Arab countries, including Jordan, issued perfunctory statements rejecting Trump’s calls to displace people from Gaza. But they failed to announce any measures to counter the plan. Their responses likely won’t go beyond verbal denunciations, a time-honored practice for Arab officials.

Egypt’s Proposal

Cairo has said it is preparing a plan to reconstruct Gaza within three to five years without displacing its residents. For several reasons, however, the proposal is impractical and would be difficult to implement. Experts say reconstruction could take more than a decade. It would be nearly impossible to reconstruct Gaza with Palestinians remaining in the strip because it is such a small area. Though the destruction is valued at more than $100 billion, Egypt says reconstruction will cost half that amount. Arab Gulf countries have promised to contribute $20 billion, but their commitment is doubtful considering they have broken many promises in the past. The biggest question is where the rest of the money, more than $30 billion, will come from. It’s unlikely the Trump administration will provide all or part of it, especially in light of its move to suspend much of its foreign aid.

Meanwhile, Egypt is suffering from a worsening economic crisis. Since el-Sissi took power after his 2013 coup d’etat, his policies have triggered high inflation, multiple currency devaluations, soaring foreign debt and high unemployment. Internal discontent is high, and social unrest looms on the horizon. The urgent need for U.S. aid will likely lead el-Sissi to comply with Trump’s plan for Gaza, though he will continue to resist to secure more economic benefits from Trump.

Trump exempted Egypt from his recent decision to cut off foreign aid to many countries. Earlier this month, the U.S. approved two deals to sell arms to Egypt, worth about $930 million. In addition, the only Arab rulers Trump has invited to the White House so far are the Jordanian king and the Egyptian president. He also expressed interest in mediating the 15-year conflict between Cairo and Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

But Trump does not need to motivate el-Sissi or King Abdullah to accept his plan because he knows they can’t reject it, despite their public statements and the media fanfare. Trump knows that the Arab regimes are oppressive dictatorships that depend on U.S. approval and protection for their survival.

El-Sissi has no empathy for the Palestinians and views Hamas as an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood. Shortly after the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, el-Sissi proposed relocating the people of Gaza to the radioactively contaminated Negev Desert until Israel finishes eliminating Hamas. He also suggested a peace deal between Arab states and Israel in 2017, three years before Trump announced the Abraham Accords, even though he later denied doing so. There is a big gap between what el-Sissi says, mainly for local public consumption, and what he means. Trump’s statements, meanwhile, are often meant to intimidate and shouldn’t be interpreted as concrete policy. But regardless of where his Gaza plan ultimately settles, Arab leaders wouldn’t dare challenge him on it.

Hilal Khashan is a contributing analyst at Geopolitical Futures, and a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon

Courtesy: Geopolitical Science


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