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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

How Poland Could Bring Down the EU

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Poland’s relationship with the EU has often been tense, but recently there’s been a turn for the worse. On 7 October, the country’s Supreme Court did something scandalous. It ruled that Poland’s constitution takes precedent over EU law.

Inevitably, Ursula von der Leyen — President of the European Commission — is on the warpath. “This ruling calls into question the foundations of the European Union”, she said, “it is a direct challenge to the unity of the European legal order.” In response, the Commission has threatened to withhold Poland’s share of the EU’s Covid recovery fund.

The Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, has hit back accusing the Commission of “blackmail”. The Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, isn’t too happy either. “It is morally endlessly harmful and not right to link law supremacy principles with financial resources”, he said. “Even if it was legally possible”, it would do “unimaginable harm to European Union unity.” In other words: back off, Ursula!

Yet again, the President of the Commission may be threatening more than she can deliver. Under the dreaded Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty, legal proceedings against Poland would need a four-fifths majority of member states to succeed. If the Eastern Europeans decide to hang together, then the proceedings would fail. 

Let’s not forget what happened the last time Von der Leyen tried to play hardball. It was back in January, when the fiasco of the EU’s vaccine procurement programme was becoming a major embarrassment. The Commission tried to turn the heat onto the hated British by shutting off vaccine exports to the UK. This entailed a move to impose border controls on the island of Ireland — a cunning plan that the Irish government wasn’t consulted on. Inevitably, the whole thing blew up in Von der Leyen’s face and she was lucky to keep her job.   

Thus in regard to Poland, she’d be ill-advised to go nuclear unless she has the full backing of the EU’s most powerful players — the Germans in particular. Of course, this could be the opportunity the Euro-establishment is looking for. The Poles have been acting-up for years and this latest row is the most blatant act of defiance yet. Sooner or later, this needs to be settled.

And yet the Germans might not want to force the issue. For one thing, there is an outside chance that Polexit might actually happen. To lose one member state may be regarded as a misfortune, to lose two looks like carelessness — and for that heads would roll. Though Poland is a net recipient from the EU budget, its departure would be more damaging to the EU than Brexit ever was. 

Polexit would, for example, leave three member states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — physically disconnected from the rest of the EU. Poland is also a bulwark against the expansion of Russian influence and indeed Russia itself. Without the Poles, the idea of a European Army becomes even more pointless than it is already — which won’t please Emmanuel Macron.

Then there’s the nightmare scenario, which is that Poland becomes a corridor for illegal immigration into the EU. Poland’s eastern neighbour, Belarus, is already playing that game — using the flow of migrants as a political weapon. If instead of guarding the EU’s eastern border, as it does now, an alienated Poland serves as a base for people traffickers that would greatly complicate matters. 

Of course, for a friend and neighbour to behave in such a manner would be truly irresponsible. But tell that to the French. At the very least, Poland would use migration as a bargaining chip in any Polexit negotiation with the EU.

The threat of a walk-out isn’t the only reason why Germany won’t want to punish the Poles. Though the Polish court ruling is a massive up yours to the EU, the German Constitutional Court has also asserted the primacy of national law. This was a rather technical case and much more limited in scope than the Polish judgement, but the underlying question is the same: when push-comes-to-shove where does ultimate authority lie — with the nation state or the European Union?

Contrary to Eurosceptic fears and Europhilic dreams, that’s not quite as settled as it might appear.  Sure enough, the supremacy of EU law has been established by the rulings of the European Court of Justice. However, as Stefan Auer and Nicole Scicluna point out in an article for Politico, “no such principle was enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome… or in any subsequent EU treaty”. There was an attempt to incorporate it into the abandoned EU constitution, but it was dropped from the subsequent Lisbon Treaty. 

Looking up from the law books, we should also take the real world into consideration. The fact is that each member of the European Union is a sovereign state, but that the EU itself isn’t. It has acquired some of the qualifying features of sovereignty — like a single currency — but is lacking others. 

Furthermore, each member of the European Union is a democracy, but the same can’t said for the EU. Again it has some of the qualifying features, but others are conspicuously absent. For instance, EU citizens did not vote Von der Leyen into office and they have no right to vote her out. Enough said. 

European liberals support the EU’s actions against Poland and Hungary, because they see the governments of those countries as violating democratic norms. That’s understandable. However, there’s a glaring irony here — which is that the supremacy of EU over national law is based on vesting ultimate power in an entity that is neither a nation nor a democracy. 

Pragmatists within the EU establishment recognise the contradiction. They know that the EU — as distinct from its member states — can never act with legitimate authority unless it becomes truly sovereign and truly democratic. That, however, can only be achieved at the cost of national sovereignty and democracy, for which there is no popular consent. 

The Polish question therefore is just one facet of a much bigger European question — one which the pragmatists would rather not answer. Much better, then, to fudge the smaller question too.

The continued existence of the European Union depends on maintaining the obvious nonsense that EU law is supreme, but that its member states are sovereign. The problem for the pragmatists is that not everyone is willing to play along — and it’s not just the Poles stirring the pot. 

No less an authority than Michel Barnier is pushing back at the assumption of EU supremacy. As a candidate for the French Presidency, he has called for a referendum on the issue of immigration — which he says would act as “constitutional shield” against EU interference. He advances the idea with confidence because he knows just how shaky the authority of the EU really is. France, he believes, must regain its “legal sovereignty in order to no longer be subject to the judgments of the ECJ”. He wouldn’t say that if he didn’t think it was possible. 

Polexit probably won’t happen. But it was never the main threat. The real danger is when mainstream politicians in core countries call the EU’s bluff. I never expected Barnier to be the first, but I’m glad his time with the British wasn’t entirely wasted.

Courtesy: Unherd


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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The War in DRC Explained

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Fighting between the DRC’s armed forces and the M23 rebel group has reached new levels of intensity in the eastern part of the country, with claims and counter-claims about which one controls the region’s biggest city, Goma. Judith Verweijen and Michel Thill argue that the government in Kinshasa has made some poor strategic decisions about the country’s armed forces, among them steps taken three years ago to create a reserve army out of more than 100 armed groups. They set out why it was always doomed to fail.

After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has only intensified. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion – which claims to control the main eastern DRC city of Goma since January 26 – has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum started in 2022 when the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

The creation of the reserve army – which remains on paper at this stage – allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will it actually work? Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons. The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur. This is already happening in anticipation with numerous armed groups stepping up their recruitment. Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them. Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

The Wazalendo: Eastern DRC’s Predatory Patriots

On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign. Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation. This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

Chequered history of integration

A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration. Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy. The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

Hurdles to integration

The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment. The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups. Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

Painkiller or cure?

The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it. Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

Judith Verweijen is an Assistant professor, Utrecht University and Michel Thill is Senior Program Officer, University of Basel

Courtesy: The Conversation


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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Mozambique’s Cycles of Violence won’t End until Frelimo’s Grip on Power is Broken

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Mozambique’s political history has been defined by violence, authoritarianism and disputed elections – patterns that persist in the wake of the 2024 polls. Mass protests, fuelled by allegations of electoral fraud, and police violence have highlighted the country’s fragility. Researcher Manuel Francisco Sambo explains why Mozambique is trapped in a cycle of instability and what must be done to break it.Mozambique’s political history has been marred by violence, disputed elections and authoritarian control. The pattern continues. As the 2024 elections have shown, Mozambique remains trapped in a cycle of violence and instability. Mass protests due to widespread allegations of electoral fraud and police violence led to the deaths of dozens of people and widescale destruction.

My research on peace and security in east and southern Africa has focused on Mozambique’s post-independence political history. Based on my work, I argue that Mozambique is at an impasse. It is unable to fully embrace authoritarianism – or to build a functioning democracy.

One obstacle to full authoritarian rule is social media. It has reduced the state’s grip on what information is shared, who shares it and what voices are heard. The government has lost the ability to silence critics and dictate what it wants the country to believe.

To appease the international community Mozambique has maintained a democratic posture. But the country hasn’t been able to build a strong democratic state. It’s prevented by the entrenched power of the political, economic and military elites through Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), the ruling party. Frelimo has dominated since the country’s independence in 1975. The result is cycles of violence and political instability.

These cycles will continue unless Mozambique undertakes sweeping economic and political reforms. These would need to include the decentralization of power, dismantling the Frelimo-linked patronage networks that control the economy, establishment of an independent judiciary, and fairer political competition.  It is unclear whether the newly inaugurated President Daniel Chapo will dare to ignite these reforms.

Why authoritarianism hasn’t worked

For much of its post-independence history, Mozambique was governed by an authoritarian regime under the single rule of Frelimo. Frelimo came to power in 1975 after leading the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule.

In the 1990s, the country adopted multiparty democracy and a new constitution. The constitution established universal suffrage and periodic elections for the presidency and legislature. It also guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life and protection from torture.

But Frelimo maintained its hold on power. The party did this through political repression, manipulation of electoral processes and patronage systems. The political landscape has changed in the last decade, however. It’s more difficult for the state to maintain – or expand – its authoritarian grip. Authoritarian regimes control opposition and dissent, but the state’s capacity to do this is diminishing. Social media and digital communication tools have made it difficult to suppress ideas. Historically the government relied on state-controlled media to control the narrative and censor opposing views. Smartphones and social media platforms have revolutionised the way information circulates. For instance, news about election irregularities, corruption and violence spreads fast. It often outpaces state censorship.

The ongoing protests after the 2024 elections are a testament to this. While the government has deployed forces to quell dissent, the scale of the protests and the speed at which they spread demonstrate the power of social media. Mozambicans have a platform to build alternative narratives, mobilise and resist.

Retaining international support

Another factor constraining the state has been the need to retain international support. This means maintaining the outward appearance of a democratic system. Mozambique’s economy is highly dependent on external assistance, particularly from western countries and international financial institutions.

Government officials are aware that they could lose foreign aid and investment if the democratic process is abandoned. This would deepen the country’s economic crisis and Frelimo’s challenges.

The withdrawal of aid in 2016 following the hidden debt scandal is evidence of donors’ leverage over Mozambique. Three Mozambican state-owned companies took loans from western donors for national projects that never materialised. As a result of aid suspension, Mozambique was forced to arrest prominent individuals. They included the former head of the secret services and the son of former president Armando Guebuza.

Democracy still a pipe dream

Frelimo’s widespread control has made it resistant to meaningful political change. A genuine democracy would require dismantling these entrenched structures of power. Frelimo has protected the political and economic elites who benefit from its dominance. The party has kept its grip on power through a combination of patronage networks, corruption and control over key sectors of the economy. These elites include business people, military leaders and government officials. All are deeply invested in maintaining the status quo.

A genuine democracy, in which opposition parties could freely compete and challenge Frelimo’s monopoly on power, would threaten their interests. The party has shown time and again that it is willing to manipulate the electoral process, use violence and stifle opposition to maintain its hold on power. Elections are held regularly. Seven general elections have been held since the inception of multiparty democracy constitution. But they often lack transparency and fairness.

What needs to be done

Reforms are needed to break up patronage networks and redistribute power and resources. Frelimo’s leadership has shown little interest in doing this. It would jeopardise their control over state resources and the wealth they’ve accumulated over decades. Mozambique’s political economy further complicates the prospects for democracy. Frelimo-linked elites dominate key sectors, such as natural gas, mining and agriculture, and benefit from favourable policies, state contracts and access to state-owned enterprises. These economic interests are deeply intertwined with the party’s political power. It’s unlikely, therefore, that the elite will willingly relinquish control.

Manuel Francisco Sambo is a PhD candidate, at the Doshisha University

Courtesy: The Conversation


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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Reconstructing a Shattered Nation: Ghana’s Path Forward

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Ghana, often celebrated as a beacon of democracy in Africa, has once again showcased its commitment to democratic principles through free and fair elections. The opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), led by John Mahama, secured a decisive victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections. This shift in political power reflects growing public dissatisfaction with the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP). As Mahama assumes office as the president of the republic of Ghana on January 7, 2025, he inherits a nation in crisis. Baba Yunus Muhammad explores the factors behind the NPP’s defeat, the current state of Ghana, and the formidable challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the incoming administration, incorporating perspectives on environment and climate resilience.

The NPP’s Fall from Grace

The NPP’s electoral defeat is rooted in economic mismanagement, unfulfilled promises, and a growing disconnect with the populace. Ghana’s economy, once a model for regional stability, has faced severe challenges, including soaring debt, inflation, and unemployment.

Economic Missteps

Under President Nana Akufo-Addo, Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached an alarming 82.9% (IMF) by the end of 2024, driven by extensive external borrowing to fund infrastructure projects. Coupled with the global economic slowdown and decreased demand for key exports like cocoa, gold, and oil, the economy struggled to regain momentum. Inflation escalated from 10.4% in 2021 to over 38% in 2024, severely eroding purchasing power. Unemployment reached 13%, with youth unemployment exceeding 20%. These statistics highlight the deteriorating living standards for millions of Ghanaians.

The NPP’s reliance on IMF-prescribed austerity measures, including salary freezes, tax hikes, and subsidy cuts, further alienated the working and middle classes. The perceived prioritization of urban centers over rural communities compounded this disenchantment, especially in the underserved northern regions.

Political Missteps

Corruption scandals and accusations of nepotism plagued the NPP’s tenure. Mismanagement in the energy sector and opaque procurement deals eroded public trust. Additionally, the party’s inability to fulfill promises—such as creating one million jobs and improving education and healthcare—undermined its credibility. This dissatisfaction fueled the NDC’s campaign, which resonated with marginalized groups seeking change.

Ghana’s Current State: A Nation in Crisis

Economic Challenges

Ghana’s cedi depreciated by over 50% against the US dollar in three years, driving up import costs and inflation. Servicing public debt consumes over 60% of government revenue, leaving little for essential social investment. The rising cost of living has reversed years of progress in poverty reduction, leaving millions vulnerable.

Environmental Vulnerabilities

Climate change exacerbates Ghana’s challenges. Rising temperatures, deforestation, and erratic rainfall are disrupting agriculture and increasing food insecurity. Coastal erosion and flooding threaten communities and infrastructure, emphasizing the need for urgent climate adaptation and resilience measures.

Political and Social Polarization

The closely contested elections underscore deep divisions within the electorate. While Mahama’s victory signals a demand for change, it also highlights the need for reconciliation and unity. Institutional reforms—especially in electoral transparency and anti-corruption measures—are imperative for restoring trust in governance.

The Task Ahead for John Mahama

Mr. Mahama faces an uphill battle in stabilizing Ghana’s economy, fostering political reconciliation, and rebuilding public trust. As Ghanaians anticipate the new government, they are eagerly awaiting a clear stance on zero tolerance to corruption. It is crucial for the Mahama administration to demonstrate its commitment to rooting out corruption at all levels of government. This could mean not only actively recovering looted public funds but also ensuring that former government officials found guilty of corruption or abuse of office are held accountable. These officials must face legal consequences to reassure citizens that integrity will define the new government’s leadership.

This stance on corruption is essential for rebuilding trust with the people, ensuring that transparency and accountability are at the core of governance. If Mahama’s administration takes bold steps to uphold these principles, it would mark a crucial turning point in Ghana’s fight against corruption. Holding wrongdoers accountable, recovering stolen assets, and implementing new anti-corruption measures could restore public faith and signal a new dawn for effective and ethical governance. Achieving these goals requires inclusive governance and innovative solutions.

Economic Recovery: Balancing Growth and Sustainability

To restore economic stability, the Mahama administration must prioritize sustainable development:

  1. Diversifying the Economy: Investments in agro-processing, renewable energy, and manufacturing can reduce dependence on traditional exports and create jobs.
  2. Enhancing Revenue Collection: Strengthening tax systems and closing loopholes can increase government revenue without undue burden on citizens.
  3. Promoting Fiscal Discipline: Conducting comprehensive audits of government spending can identify inefficiencies and reduce waste.
  4. Green Transition: Climate adaptation and renewable energy initiatives can position Ghana as a leader in Africa’s green economy, ensuring long-term resilience and sustainability.

Environmental Sustainability as a Cornerstone

Addressing climate change must be a central pillar of Ghana’s recovery. As one of the nations most vulnerable to climate impacts, Ghana should:

  • Implement reforestation programs to combat deforestation.
  • Invest in clean energy solutions, such as solar and wind, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
  • Promote sustainable agricultural practices to boost productivity while conserving resources.
  • Strengthen disaster preparedness systems to protect communities from flooding and other climate-related threats.

Political Reconciliation and Institutional Reform

In a polarized political environment, fostering unity is paramount. Mahama’s administration should focus on:

  1. Electoral Transparency: Enhancing the independence and capacity of the Electoral Commission.
  2. Anti-Corruption Measures: Establishing independent agencies to investigate corruption, regardless of political affiliation.
  3. Decentralization: Empowering local governments to address regional disparities and bring governance closer to the people.

Strengthening Social Infrastructure

Addressing the immediate needs of Ghanaians requires significant investments in education, healthcare, and housing:

  • Universal Healthcare: Expanding the National Health Insurance Scheme to ensure comprehensive coverage.
  • Educational Reforms: Emphasizing vocational training and STEM education to equip the youth for emerging industries.
  • Affordable Housing: Partnering with private investors to reduce the housing deficit.

Lessons from the Past: Rethinking External Dependence

Ghana’s reliance on IMF-led programs often exacerbates inequality and undermines sovereignty. For instance, the 2014 IMF bailout program required Ghana to implement austerity measures such as subsidy removals and public sector wage freezes, which disproportionately impacted the poor and stoked public dissent. To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Mahama administration should:

  • Develop Homegrown Policies: Leverage Ghana’s resources and potential to craft context-specific solutions.
  • Engage Regional Partners: Strengthen trade and collaboration within ECOWAS to build a resilient economic bloc.
  • Pursue Diverse Partnerships: Balance relationships with development partners, including China and the European Union, to maintain strategic autonomy.

A New Path Forward

Ghana stands at a critical juncture. The electorate’s demand for change reflects widespread yearning for economic relief and governance reforms. Mahama’s leadership will define Ghana’s trajectory in the years to come. By prioritizing sustainability, inclusivity, and innovation, Ghana can rebuild itself as a beacon of resilience and progress on the African continent. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but with decisive action and visionary policies, Mahama’s administration has the potential to restore hope and create lasting prosperity for all Ghanaians


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