Connect with us

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Geopolitical Influence: Russian Flags, Wagner Group and Burkina Faso in the Sahel Region

Published

on

Spread the love


By  Kester Kenn Klomegah

Emerging from the second U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit held in Washington, the most leading global media including Associated Press (AP), Cable News Network (CNN), Agence France-Presse (AFP), British Broadcasting (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), Reuters, Al Jazeera and many others, well-noted for their comprehensive and verified coverage of geopolitical changes and developments shaping or affecting daily lives in the world, performed their legitimate role to inform the public about Wagner Group being hired or deployed in Burkina Faso.

The Wagner group is a private military contractor with close ties to the Kremlin. Its forces are known to be fighting in parts of Ukraine. Paris and its European allies pulled thousands of troops countering Islamist militants in neighbouring Mali earlier this year as relations deteriorated with the military junta after it agreed a deal with Wagner, which is staffed by Russian army veterans, to operate in the country.

In all the reports, the main message concerns the indelible fact Burkina Faso contracts shadowy Russian mercenaries to fight against jihadist insurgency. Across the Sahel region, neighbours feared the jihadist insurgency might spread further down from Burkina Faso to coastal neighbours including Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin. Nigeria is already consistently fighting Boko Haram and other militant groups.

According to several media reports, Burkina Faso has allegedly made an agreement with Russia’s Wagner Group in which the shadowy mercenary outfit will help the west African country deal with surging jihadi violence in exchange for a mine. Russia has, during its past two decades of raising its economic influence and fight French neo-colonial tendencies, bartered military equipment to have complete access into mineral resources in Central African Republic, Guinea, Mali and Chad. There are similar cases in Sudan and Libya.

Long before the start of the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, reports indicated that a number of African leaders would not be in Washington. The White House explained that U.S. President Joe Biden did not invite Sudan, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso because they are currently suspended by the African Union following coups and counter coups in the West Africa. These countries are not in good standing with the Africa Union so were not invited.

That gathering described as an irreversible historical landmark, however brought 49 African leaders + the African Union. Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo made a genuine claim about neighbouring Burkina Faso during his visit to the US-Africa Leaders summit, during the panel discussions on Peace, Seurity and Governance in Washington this December.

Speaking about the growing violence linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group in the west African region, Akufo-Addo said Burkina Faso allocated a mine to the Wagner Group as a form of payment for its deployment of fighters in the country. “To have (Wagner) operating on our northern border is particularly distressing for us in Ghana,” a former Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Ghanaian leader Nana Akufo-Addo informed at the summit.

“Today, Russian mercenaries are on our northern border. Burkina Faso has now entered into an arrangement to go along with Mali in employing the Wagner forces there,” he said, added that Burkina Faso had ceded a mine, reportedly with gold reserves, near the border with Ghana in exchange for the group’s services to deal with the militant insurgency that began in 2015. In recent weeks, hundreds of people fleeing militants attacks in Burkina Faso have crossed the border into northern Ghana.

Burkina Faso has summoned the Ghanaian ambassador for ‘explanations’ after Ghana’s president alleged that Burkina Faso had hired the Russian mercenary group Wagner, according to reports from Burkina’s Foreign Ministry. Burkina Faso has further recalled its ambassador from Ghana for a meeting, a spokesperson at the ministry told Reuters.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Anne-Claire Legendre told a news conference that Paris and its European partners continued to be available to cooperate with Burkinabe authorities if they wished and without ambiguity in what she described as a worsening security and humanitarian situation.

“With regard to Wagner, our message is well known, Wagner has distinguished itself in Africa by a policy of predation, a policy of plundering, which harms the sovereignty of states,” she said, Reuters reported from Paris. “The Wagner militia has distinguished itself particularly in Mozambique, the Central African Republic, and Mali; this is obviously known to the Burkinabè authorities.”

The prospect of Wagner expanding its presence in Africa has troubled Western powers such as France and the United States, who say the group exploits mineral resources and commits human rights abuses in countries where it operates.

The pace of Islamic extremist violence is increasing in Burkina Faso and getting closer to the capital, Ouagadougou, which could make the desperate junta welcome support from the Russian mercenaries, said Laith Alkhouri, CEO of Intelonyx Intelligence Advisory. “This could have significant negative implications for Burkina Faso and the region,” he said. “Wagner mercenaries have operated with impunity and they are unlikely to be held accountable for any human rights violations.”

Nana Akufo-Addo’s comments came on the heels of a trip to Moscow by Burkina Faso’s Prime Minister, Apollinaire Joachim Kyelem de Tambela, to further strengthen Russia-Burkina relations. The visit was planned to “consolidate the international community’s efforts in combating the terrorist threat” in the region, said a statement made available on the official website by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Earlier this month a new mining concession was given to Nordgold, a Russian mining company, which has been operating in Burkina Faso for more than a decade. A permit for industrial exploration was granted to the Nordgold Yimiougou SA company in Sanmatenga province, said a statement from Burkina Faso’s Council of Ministers.

The four-year agreement is estimated to contribute some $8 billion (£6.5bn) to the state budget. Burkina Faso is one of the largest gold producers on the continent. Both Nordgold and the Wagner Group are Russian companies, although there is no known connection between them.

For several years Burkina Faso has been struggling to stem jihadi violence that has killed thousands, displaced nearly two million people and made swaths of land inaccessible. Lack of faith in the Burkina Faso government’s ability to contain the jihadi insurgency has led to two coups this 2022.

After the latest coup in September, the Wagner Group was among the first to congratulate the new junta leader, Ibrahim Traore, raising questions about his relationship with Russia and how big a role it played in catapulting him to power. People with close ties to Burkina Faso’s ruling junta said pressure had been mounting on the leader of the first coup, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba, for months to work more closely with Russia but he had refused.

Edward Lozansky, President of the American University in Moscow and professor of World Politics at Moscow State University, wrote in an email interview that “there has not been too much information about Russia’s activities in Africa, but the Western media is saturated with the scary stories about Russia’s efforts to bolster its presence in at least 14 countries across Africa by building relations with existing rulers, striking military deals, and grooming a new generation of leaders and undercover agents.”

Further to the narratives, Russia has now embarked on fighting “neo-colonialism” which it considers as a stumbling block on its way to regain a part of the Soviet-era multifaceted influence in Africa. Russia has sought to convince Africans over the past years of the likely dangers of neocolonial tendencies perpetrated by the former colonial countries and the scramble for resources on the continent. But all such warnings largely seem to fall on deaf ears as African leaders choose development partners with funds to invest in the economy.

Vedomosti, a Russian daily Financial and Business newspaper, reported that Russia is interested in offering Sahel countries military equipment in exchange for exploiting the untapped minerals resources. Worth noting here that Russia, in its strategy on Africa is reported looking into building military bases in the continent.

Late October, President Vladimir Putin participated in the final plenary session of the 19th meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, the focus was on matters related to the changing geopolitics, the new world order and its future developments. He discussed, at considerable length, so many controversial questions.

According to him, Russia still have friends around the world, mentioned that in central America and Africa, the ‘Russian flags’ are flying everywhere. Putin, along the line, argued that the support for multipolar order largely exists in the Global South, appreciated Africa’s struggle for independence and noe rising against growing neo-colonialism. Russia has good relations with African countries, these absolutely unique relations were forged during the years when the Soviet Union and Russia supported African countries in their fight for freedom.

Despite this widely published allegations about Burkina Faso, Russia has demonstrated wide interests making drastic steps toward penetrating into the G5 Sahel in West Africa. The G5 Sahel are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Russia is broadening its geography of military diplomacy covering poor African countries and especially fragile States that need Russia’s military assistance.

Russian Foreign Ministry has oftentimes explained in statements released on its website, that Russia’s military-technical cooperation with African countries is primarily directed at settling regional conflicts and preventing the spread of terrorist threats and to fight the growing terrorism in the continent.

Over the past several years, strengthening military-technical cooperation has been the key part of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia has signed bilateral military-technical cooperation agreement nearly with 14 African countries.

The United Nations (UN), The African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the entire international community have expressed collective concerns about any use of private mercenary forces, instead of well-constituted regional forces approved by regional blocs, as a means to address conflicts in Africa.

The G5 Sahel are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. And Burkina Faso, per well-known geographical description, is a landlocked country in West Africa with an area of 274,200 km2, bordered by Mali to the northwest, Niger to the northeast, Benin to the southeast, Togo and Ghana to the south, and Ivory Coast to the southwest.

Courtesy: Modern Diplomacy


Spread the love
Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The War in DRC Explained

Published

on

By

Spread the love

Fighting between the DRC’s armed forces and the M23 rebel group has reached new levels of intensity in the eastern part of the country, with claims and counter-claims about which one controls the region’s biggest city, Goma. Judith Verweijen and Michel Thill argue that the government in Kinshasa has made some poor strategic decisions about the country’s armed forces, among them steps taken three years ago to create a reserve army out of more than 100 armed groups. They set out why it was always doomed to fail.

After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has only intensified. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion – which claims to control the main eastern DRC city of Goma since January 26 – has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum started in 2022 when the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

The creation of the reserve army – which remains on paper at this stage – allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will it actually work? Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons. The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur. This is already happening in anticipation with numerous armed groups stepping up their recruitment. Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them. Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

The Wazalendo: Eastern DRC’s Predatory Patriots

On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign. Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation. This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

Chequered history of integration

A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration. Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy. The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

Hurdles to integration

The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment. The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups. Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

Painkiller or cure?

The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it. Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

Judith Verweijen is an Assistant professor, Utrecht University and Michel Thill is Senior Program Officer, University of Basel

Courtesy: The Conversation


Spread the love
Continue Reading

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Mozambique’s Cycles of Violence won’t End until Frelimo’s Grip on Power is Broken

Published

on

By

Spread the love

Mozambique’s political history has been defined by violence, authoritarianism and disputed elections – patterns that persist in the wake of the 2024 polls. Mass protests, fuelled by allegations of electoral fraud, and police violence have highlighted the country’s fragility. Researcher Manuel Francisco Sambo explains why Mozambique is trapped in a cycle of instability and what must be done to break it.Mozambique’s political history has been marred by violence, disputed elections and authoritarian control. The pattern continues. As the 2024 elections have shown, Mozambique remains trapped in a cycle of violence and instability. Mass protests due to widespread allegations of electoral fraud and police violence led to the deaths of dozens of people and widescale destruction.

My research on peace and security in east and southern Africa has focused on Mozambique’s post-independence political history. Based on my work, I argue that Mozambique is at an impasse. It is unable to fully embrace authoritarianism – or to build a functioning democracy.

One obstacle to full authoritarian rule is social media. It has reduced the state’s grip on what information is shared, who shares it and what voices are heard. The government has lost the ability to silence critics and dictate what it wants the country to believe.

To appease the international community Mozambique has maintained a democratic posture. But the country hasn’t been able to build a strong democratic state. It’s prevented by the entrenched power of the political, economic and military elites through Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), the ruling party. Frelimo has dominated since the country’s independence in 1975. The result is cycles of violence and political instability.

These cycles will continue unless Mozambique undertakes sweeping economic and political reforms. These would need to include the decentralization of power, dismantling the Frelimo-linked patronage networks that control the economy, establishment of an independent judiciary, and fairer political competition.  It is unclear whether the newly inaugurated President Daniel Chapo will dare to ignite these reforms.

Why authoritarianism hasn’t worked

For much of its post-independence history, Mozambique was governed by an authoritarian regime under the single rule of Frelimo. Frelimo came to power in 1975 after leading the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule.

In the 1990s, the country adopted multiparty democracy and a new constitution. The constitution established universal suffrage and periodic elections for the presidency and legislature. It also guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life and protection from torture.

But Frelimo maintained its hold on power. The party did this through political repression, manipulation of electoral processes and patronage systems. The political landscape has changed in the last decade, however. It’s more difficult for the state to maintain – or expand – its authoritarian grip. Authoritarian regimes control opposition and dissent, but the state’s capacity to do this is diminishing. Social media and digital communication tools have made it difficult to suppress ideas. Historically the government relied on state-controlled media to control the narrative and censor opposing views. Smartphones and social media platforms have revolutionised the way information circulates. For instance, news about election irregularities, corruption and violence spreads fast. It often outpaces state censorship.

The ongoing protests after the 2024 elections are a testament to this. While the government has deployed forces to quell dissent, the scale of the protests and the speed at which they spread demonstrate the power of social media. Mozambicans have a platform to build alternative narratives, mobilise and resist.

Retaining international support

Another factor constraining the state has been the need to retain international support. This means maintaining the outward appearance of a democratic system. Mozambique’s economy is highly dependent on external assistance, particularly from western countries and international financial institutions.

Government officials are aware that they could lose foreign aid and investment if the democratic process is abandoned. This would deepen the country’s economic crisis and Frelimo’s challenges.

The withdrawal of aid in 2016 following the hidden debt scandal is evidence of donors’ leverage over Mozambique. Three Mozambican state-owned companies took loans from western donors for national projects that never materialised. As a result of aid suspension, Mozambique was forced to arrest prominent individuals. They included the former head of the secret services and the son of former president Armando Guebuza.

Democracy still a pipe dream

Frelimo’s widespread control has made it resistant to meaningful political change. A genuine democracy would require dismantling these entrenched structures of power. Frelimo has protected the political and economic elites who benefit from its dominance. The party has kept its grip on power through a combination of patronage networks, corruption and control over key sectors of the economy. These elites include business people, military leaders and government officials. All are deeply invested in maintaining the status quo.

A genuine democracy, in which opposition parties could freely compete and challenge Frelimo’s monopoly on power, would threaten their interests. The party has shown time and again that it is willing to manipulate the electoral process, use violence and stifle opposition to maintain its hold on power. Elections are held regularly. Seven general elections have been held since the inception of multiparty democracy constitution. But they often lack transparency and fairness.

What needs to be done

Reforms are needed to break up patronage networks and redistribute power and resources. Frelimo’s leadership has shown little interest in doing this. It would jeopardise their control over state resources and the wealth they’ve accumulated over decades. Mozambique’s political economy further complicates the prospects for democracy. Frelimo-linked elites dominate key sectors, such as natural gas, mining and agriculture, and benefit from favourable policies, state contracts and access to state-owned enterprises. These economic interests are deeply intertwined with the party’s political power. It’s unlikely, therefore, that the elite will willingly relinquish control.

Manuel Francisco Sambo is a PhD candidate, at the Doshisha University

Courtesy: The Conversation


Spread the love
Continue Reading

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Reconstructing a Shattered Nation: Ghana’s Path Forward

Published

on

By

Spread the love

Ghana, often celebrated as a beacon of democracy in Africa, has once again showcased its commitment to democratic principles through free and fair elections. The opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), led by John Mahama, secured a decisive victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections. This shift in political power reflects growing public dissatisfaction with the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP). As Mahama assumes office as the president of the republic of Ghana on January 7, 2025, he inherits a nation in crisis. Baba Yunus Muhammad explores the factors behind the NPP’s defeat, the current state of Ghana, and the formidable challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the incoming administration, incorporating perspectives on environment and climate resilience.

The NPP’s Fall from Grace

The NPP’s electoral defeat is rooted in economic mismanagement, unfulfilled promises, and a growing disconnect with the populace. Ghana’s economy, once a model for regional stability, has faced severe challenges, including soaring debt, inflation, and unemployment.

Economic Missteps

Under President Nana Akufo-Addo, Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached an alarming 82.9% (IMF) by the end of 2024, driven by extensive external borrowing to fund infrastructure projects. Coupled with the global economic slowdown and decreased demand for key exports like cocoa, gold, and oil, the economy struggled to regain momentum. Inflation escalated from 10.4% in 2021 to over 38% in 2024, severely eroding purchasing power. Unemployment reached 13%, with youth unemployment exceeding 20%. These statistics highlight the deteriorating living standards for millions of Ghanaians.

The NPP’s reliance on IMF-prescribed austerity measures, including salary freezes, tax hikes, and subsidy cuts, further alienated the working and middle classes. The perceived prioritization of urban centers over rural communities compounded this disenchantment, especially in the underserved northern regions.

Political Missteps

Corruption scandals and accusations of nepotism plagued the NPP’s tenure. Mismanagement in the energy sector and opaque procurement deals eroded public trust. Additionally, the party’s inability to fulfill promises—such as creating one million jobs and improving education and healthcare—undermined its credibility. This dissatisfaction fueled the NDC’s campaign, which resonated with marginalized groups seeking change.

Ghana’s Current State: A Nation in Crisis

Economic Challenges

Ghana’s cedi depreciated by over 50% against the US dollar in three years, driving up import costs and inflation. Servicing public debt consumes over 60% of government revenue, leaving little for essential social investment. The rising cost of living has reversed years of progress in poverty reduction, leaving millions vulnerable.

Environmental Vulnerabilities

Climate change exacerbates Ghana’s challenges. Rising temperatures, deforestation, and erratic rainfall are disrupting agriculture and increasing food insecurity. Coastal erosion and flooding threaten communities and infrastructure, emphasizing the need for urgent climate adaptation and resilience measures.

Political and Social Polarization

The closely contested elections underscore deep divisions within the electorate. While Mahama’s victory signals a demand for change, it also highlights the need for reconciliation and unity. Institutional reforms—especially in electoral transparency and anti-corruption measures—are imperative for restoring trust in governance.

The Task Ahead for John Mahama

Mr. Mahama faces an uphill battle in stabilizing Ghana’s economy, fostering political reconciliation, and rebuilding public trust. As Ghanaians anticipate the new government, they are eagerly awaiting a clear stance on zero tolerance to corruption. It is crucial for the Mahama administration to demonstrate its commitment to rooting out corruption at all levels of government. This could mean not only actively recovering looted public funds but also ensuring that former government officials found guilty of corruption or abuse of office are held accountable. These officials must face legal consequences to reassure citizens that integrity will define the new government’s leadership.

This stance on corruption is essential for rebuilding trust with the people, ensuring that transparency and accountability are at the core of governance. If Mahama’s administration takes bold steps to uphold these principles, it would mark a crucial turning point in Ghana’s fight against corruption. Holding wrongdoers accountable, recovering stolen assets, and implementing new anti-corruption measures could restore public faith and signal a new dawn for effective and ethical governance. Achieving these goals requires inclusive governance and innovative solutions.

Economic Recovery: Balancing Growth and Sustainability

To restore economic stability, the Mahama administration must prioritize sustainable development:

  1. Diversifying the Economy: Investments in agro-processing, renewable energy, and manufacturing can reduce dependence on traditional exports and create jobs.
  2. Enhancing Revenue Collection: Strengthening tax systems and closing loopholes can increase government revenue without undue burden on citizens.
  3. Promoting Fiscal Discipline: Conducting comprehensive audits of government spending can identify inefficiencies and reduce waste.
  4. Green Transition: Climate adaptation and renewable energy initiatives can position Ghana as a leader in Africa’s green economy, ensuring long-term resilience and sustainability.

Environmental Sustainability as a Cornerstone

Addressing climate change must be a central pillar of Ghana’s recovery. As one of the nations most vulnerable to climate impacts, Ghana should:

  • Implement reforestation programs to combat deforestation.
  • Invest in clean energy solutions, such as solar and wind, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
  • Promote sustainable agricultural practices to boost productivity while conserving resources.
  • Strengthen disaster preparedness systems to protect communities from flooding and other climate-related threats.

Political Reconciliation and Institutional Reform

In a polarized political environment, fostering unity is paramount. Mahama’s administration should focus on:

  1. Electoral Transparency: Enhancing the independence and capacity of the Electoral Commission.
  2. Anti-Corruption Measures: Establishing independent agencies to investigate corruption, regardless of political affiliation.
  3. Decentralization: Empowering local governments to address regional disparities and bring governance closer to the people.

Strengthening Social Infrastructure

Addressing the immediate needs of Ghanaians requires significant investments in education, healthcare, and housing:

  • Universal Healthcare: Expanding the National Health Insurance Scheme to ensure comprehensive coverage.
  • Educational Reforms: Emphasizing vocational training and STEM education to equip the youth for emerging industries.
  • Affordable Housing: Partnering with private investors to reduce the housing deficit.

Lessons from the Past: Rethinking External Dependence

Ghana’s reliance on IMF-led programs often exacerbates inequality and undermines sovereignty. For instance, the 2014 IMF bailout program required Ghana to implement austerity measures such as subsidy removals and public sector wage freezes, which disproportionately impacted the poor and stoked public dissent. To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Mahama administration should:

  • Develop Homegrown Policies: Leverage Ghana’s resources and potential to craft context-specific solutions.
  • Engage Regional Partners: Strengthen trade and collaboration within ECOWAS to build a resilient economic bloc.
  • Pursue Diverse Partnerships: Balance relationships with development partners, including China and the European Union, to maintain strategic autonomy.

A New Path Forward

Ghana stands at a critical juncture. The electorate’s demand for change reflects widespread yearning for economic relief and governance reforms. Mahama’s leadership will define Ghana’s trajectory in the years to come. By prioritizing sustainability, inclusivity, and innovation, Ghana can rebuild itself as a beacon of resilience and progress on the African continent. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but with decisive action and visionary policies, Mahama’s administration has the potential to restore hope and create lasting prosperity for all Ghanaians


Spread the love
Continue Reading

Trending

Copyright © 2024 Focus on Halal Economy | Powered by Africa Islamic Economic Forum