Connect with us

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

From Libreville, An Ugly Postcard, and From Abuja, Fanfare of Ministerial Bluster

Published

on

Spread the love

By Chidi Amuta

The immediate past president of Gabon, Mr. Ali Bongo Ondimbo, has joined the new crop of video -posting toppled rulers. The luxurious expanse of his gold plated presidential mansion in Libreville has shrunk into a tiny sitting space surrounded by book shelves and inconsequential furniture.  From here, he has posted an online video that casually urged the world to ‘make some noise’ to draw attention to his altered circumstances. He of course pretends to be unaware of what is happening around him as he admits he is confined to a room while the whereabouts of his wife and family are yet uncertain.

In the last couple of months, some of the footages of Mr. Ali Bongo’s public appearances before the coup showed an infirm man recovering from a debilitating stroke but still firmly in power as the c heir to a family political dynasty that has presided over Gabon for the last 55 years.  The younger Bongo is the son of former President, Omar Bongo who often wore high wedge shoes covered by a baggy James Brown -style ‘bongo’ trousers to enhance his dimunitive proportions.

In spite of his personal infirmity and the obviously dysfunctional state of Gabon, Mr. Bongo went ahead to prepare for last weekend’s presidential election. He predictably ‘won’ the election. Opposition parties and groups throughout Gabon  however dismissed the election as a fraudulent sham. Mr. Bongo clung to his victory and power  nonetheless but was quickly toppled in a palace military coup, barely four days after. The election would have given him a third term in an office he assumed in 2009. He had tweaked the constitution to give himself room for a third presidential term.

Soon after the election of last weekend, it was predictable that his party, the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) which he inherited from his late father would win. With a time tested combination of rigging, violence and official intimidation, the perpetual victory of the ruling party was fairly much guaranteed.  But opposition forces had of late increased in strength and been joined by masses of disenchanted youth and the urban poor. Gabon, a nation of a little over 2.4 million people has the fourth highest GDP per head in sub Saharan Africa but lately wracked by unemployment and poverty.

Mounting political opposition led to a belated coalition of 16 opposition parties into an electoral alliance that presented a joint candidate to challenge Mr. Bongo at last weekend’s presidential election. That did not alter what was a foregone outcome in what has become a typical African sit -tight tradition of democratic persistence disguised as succession.

In continuation of a recent fashion among French speaking African countries, Gabon has fallen to the new coup contagion. The military struck barely four days after the election results were announced. In a televised photo opportunity that has become typical of the recent Franco-phone coups, a group of soldiers appeared on Gabonese national television to announce that they had decided to topple the democratic order ‘in the name of the Gabonese people’.

Predictably, they declared last weekend’s presidential elections as flawed, dubious and therefore annulled. Typically, the soldiers have suspended the constitution and all institutions of the state. They have also placed the ousted president under house arrest while taking in one of his sons on a charge of ‘high treason.’ As it turns out, the cop leader and transitional president is Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, commander  of the  presidential guards and a cousin of Ali Bongo.

The coup in Gabon comes barely two months after that in Niger which is still the centre of feverish activity within ECOWAS and the African Union. The Gabon coup merely increases the tally of a series of coups that have ravaged Franco-phone Africa. In quick succession,  Sudan, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and now Gabon have all literally fallen onto the sword. Previous coups in the countries under review have been advanced and marketed as the result of a series of identical causes ranging from insecurity caused by Sahelian jihadist terrorists to economic adversity and political misrule by leaders enthroned by democratic elections.

The Gabonese coup has pointedly indicated an open political dimension. The Gabonese military has added its voice to that of African opposition parties who have of late decried abuses in recent African democratic elections. The Gabonese coup makers have been clear and direct in joining their voice to that of opposition parties and groups. They have openly rejected the conduct and outcome of last weekend’s presidential election in Gabon as well as the long misrule under the Bongo dynasty.

Without doubt, all the coup makers in French -speaking West and Central Africa have acquired their audacity as a result of one single factor: the reduction and even outright decline in French presence and influence in the region. The disengagement of France from its former African colonies is the direct result of a latter day revolt by African countries against certain extant exploitative colonial era arrangements  between France and its former African colonies. This arrangement which has gained recent currency defines an essentially exploitative economic relationship between France and its former African colonies.

According to the outlines of the arrangement, France has retained tight control over the international financial transactions of these former colonies as well as curtailed the autonomy of their central banks. This has made these countries subject to French supervision and ultimate financial authority.  Therefore, the political storm at the bottom of these recent coups seems to be a general revolt of former African French colonies against the last vestiges of a colonial relationship that has left these countries politically independent but

Financially and economically dependent on Paris.

The progressive French disengagement from Africa has also removed the safety switch of ready French intervention and stabilization forces which used to be the guarantee against instability and wider insecurity in these countries. In the absence of standby French intervention and stabilization forces, the frail armies of these countries have taken to an easier recourse to coups to assert some authority.

The frenzy of coups in West and Central Africa will destabilize the region strategically in the near term. It may end up destabilizing not just the region but also upsetting an already stressed global order. The decline of French influence and military presence in the region exposes Western oriented countries in West and Central Africa to direct  jihadist terrorist threat. More dangerously, West and Central Africa are now under the direct threat of recent Russian ambition and influence through the conspicuous presence and activities of the Wagner Group of mercenaries in the region.

For Africa, the recent spate of coups challenges our leaders to increase confidence in democracy by ensuring that the processes and practice of democracy meet the hopes of the people. But this is not just an African challenge. For the free world, there is a clear and urgent task of restoring confidence in democracy by using diplomatic pressure to roll back the specter of coups in Central and West Africa.

For the West, there is an immediate issue of defending a vital sphere of western influence from the ills of authoritarian rule and potential Russian influence.  The ultimate question for the West is not merely diplomacy as usual. It is also an overarching  moral burden. When and where does democracy deserve and qualify to be defended by its global champions? There must be a clear indication that global democracy has a guarantor that will stoutly defend it whenever and wherever it is under threat. Democracy is clearly under threat in Africa today. How the West responds will determine whether the forces of authoritarianism championed by China and Russia will prevail in the contest for a new world order or beat a retreat.

From Abuja, Fanfare of Ministerial Bluster

The great national festival of the last fortnight was the swearing in and deployment of Tinubu’s mammoth ministerial assembly. The event was preceded by the comedy of curious confirmations. While the nominees were facing the Senate, no one knew what portfolios they were being processed for. So, a blindfolded Senate was interviewing a series of equally blindfolded ministerial nominees in a charade that served mostly an entertainment function for Nigerians who watched on television.

The poor senators were in no position to ask any pointed or specific questions. For the more familiar faces among the nominees,  especially those who had served as state governors, it was the usual “Bow and Go!” comedy. No questions asked. No answers required. Just show up and proceed. For the less known ones, there were no challenging probes. Just show face and mutter something,  Confirmed! Go onto the mountain and proclaim thyself: Distinguished Honourable Minister!

On first appearance, some of the more anonymous nominees seemed somewhat like sorry shy creatures. Imagine an innocuous fellow appearing in blindfold in front of the hallowed  chambers of the Senate full of strangers with arrows and darts aimed at you. In the end, it was a typical Nigerian ‘mass promotion’ oral examination. Everybody passed including the gentleman prodigy who completed secondary school by age nine and an ingenious young lady who got appointed minister as a serving NYSC member!

After last Monday’s swearing in ceremony, however, something novel happened among the new ministers. As if by consensus, straight from the inauguration hall, most of the ministers addressed the media at their disposal on their mission. You would think the feverish campaigns of the 2023 elections were still raging.  Promises and commitments came tumbling over one another.

Each new minister, as if on a prompt, addressed the media to market their priorities and advertise their unique selling points. It was like an advertising contest for self -promotion. It ended up a day of hyper bluster, mostly a fanfare of ministerial fantasies.  Some of the ministers sounded more like politicians on the soap box all over again than as prospective departmental chief executives of government. Just a sample from the copious parade.

The new Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Betta Edu, boasted that the federal government is poised to migrate 136 million Nigerians out of poverty in a short time. I guess she needed to be reminded that even the worst estimates of Nigeria’s poverty population has put the figure at no more than 130 million people. By this ministerial bluster, before she leaves office, there will be no more poor people in Nigeria. On the more immediate matter of equitable distribution of hunger palliatives among Nigerians, she even surpassed herself . She promised that government will deploy GPS for the distribution of bags of rice and packs of Indomie noodles. No reporter had the presence of mind to ask her the meaning of GPS!

Not to be outdone, the new Minister of Information who has just succeeded the ubiquitous Lai Mohammed promised that henceforth, government will stop lying  to Nigerians. As it were, this minister will reinvent government publicity and communication. If government were to stop lying to us, what other business will be left for government?

Yet another Minister, Mr. Adebayo Adelabu, who is Minister for Power promised uninterrupted power to all Nigerian homes and businesses within the shortest time, precisely within one year. Many Nigerians recall that a similar promise was made immediately on assumption of office by President Obasanjo’s  then new minister of power, the late Bola Ige who probably did not quite know the difference between an electric pole and a transformer. He promised uninterrupted power supply in six months in 1999! We are still waiting.

On his part, Mr. Abubakar Atiku Bagudu, the new Minister of Budget and National Economic Planning used the occasion to promise that he will “unlock the vast economic potentials of the nation” through his ministry. It is hard to decipher what a minister locked away in  an office with a pile of statistics and Power point projections of government’s economic scenarios will have to do to ‘unlock’ the nation’s prosperity in the midst of an army of economists, central bankers and drivers economic drivers. There is information on good authority that Mr. Bagudu has a key to free some long missing resources!

Not one to be left out of a bluster festival, my friend, Mr. Dele Alake, the journalist turned Minister of Solid Minerals, used the opportunity to rationalize his new role. For a man who in less than 90 days of the Tinubu administration has rapidly exchanged choice roles with fancy titles so many times, it was pretty easy to market his new role. He predictably praised the wisdom of the president in recognizing his genius and universal versatility by sending him to help diversify the nation’s revenue and foreign exchange sources through the Solid Minerals sector as an alternative to the long standing dependence on hydrocarbons.

Similarly, the Minister for Steel Development, Mr. Shuaibu Audu, committed to the completion of the moribund Ajaokuta Steel Mill which was started by the Shagari administration since the 1980s. There is no indication of where Nigeria ranks among steel producing countries today and where we fit into the global steel market today.

Not to be sidelined by his colleagues, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yusuf Tigard promised to initiate what he called a foreign policy of 4-Ds: Development, Democracy, Demographics and Diaspora. He was wise enough to leave his policy initiative at the level of just those four key words. In the context of the mass emigration of Nigerians to Canada, United Kingdom, Rwanda and other places, the nation awaits the unfolding of this word based foreign policy against the background of the Buhari administration which uttered not a single word on foreign policy in all of eight years.

Predictably the most dramatic and boisterous of the lot was the new Minister of the FCT, former Rivers Governor Mr. Nyesom Wike. In his characteristic disruptive boisterousness, Wike promised to demolish as many buildings as possible in Abuja for as long as they violate planning approval in strict compliance with the original Abuja master plan. Of all the ministers, Wike has been the first to move into an ‘action’ phase. He has already demolished some fancy mansions and ordered their owners arrested. He has indicated a desire to complete the long abandoned Abuja light rail project. He has ordered all FCT contractors back to site and promised to pay indigenous land owners nearly a trillion Naira in compensation for a 4 kilometer new runway at the Abuja airport.

It is yet uncertain what King Wike will do about minor issues like urban sanitation, public health, the FCT public school system and the quality of the Abuja environment which is incrementally being degraded by basic urban challenges like traffic congestion and  creeping overcrowding of the suburbs. It needs to occur to the bi partisan minister that Abuja has long ceased to be a construction site but is now a thriving urban city with all its implicit challenges.

There is nothing wrong with ministers stating a diversity of aims and aspirations. What is yet uncertain is whether in fact there is a unifying vision that runs through this cacophony of voices and fantasies. May be the mantra of the Tinubu administration of “Renewed Hope” after the hopelessness of the Buhari interregnum could provide a binding theme for this season of bluster.

There is something deserving of the excitement that has produced this burst of bluster among the new ministers. Some analysts have insisted that becoming a minister of the federal republic of Nigeria is an opportunity to ‘serve and to chop’. No doubt an opportunity that transforms mendicants of yesterday into islands of prosperity deserves the unguarded bluster and bragging that has featured among our new ministers. In a vastly religious society, to become a minister is seen by some as an earthly embrace of salvation, the arrival of some pilgrims at the place of their eternal quest. For some of them, it is an opportunity to serve and make a difference. In real terms then, the ministerial term is a race to separate those who came to serve from those who are here to ‘chop’.

Taken together, there is something refreshing about the season of ministerial bluster that is now graduating into a period of activity for the new men and women of power.  The tenure of each of this motley assembly of ministers will be determined by how faithful they remain to some of the boasts and noises that heralded their emergence.

Dr. Amuta, a Nigerian journalist, intellectual and literary critic, was previously a senior lecturer in literature and communications at the universities of Ife and Port Harcourt


Spread the love

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The War in DRC Explained

Published

on

By

Spread the love

Fighting between the DRC’s armed forces and the M23 rebel group has reached new levels of intensity in the eastern part of the country, with claims and counter-claims about which one controls the region’s biggest city, Goma. Judith Verweijen and Michel Thill argue that the government in Kinshasa has made some poor strategic decisions about the country’s armed forces, among them steps taken three years ago to create a reserve army out of more than 100 armed groups. They set out why it was always doomed to fail.

After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has only intensified. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion – which claims to control the main eastern DRC city of Goma since January 26 – has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum started in 2022 when the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

The creation of the reserve army – which remains on paper at this stage – allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will it actually work? Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons. The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur. This is already happening in anticipation with numerous armed groups stepping up their recruitment. Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them. Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

The Wazalendo: Eastern DRC’s Predatory Patriots

On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign. Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation. This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

Chequered history of integration

A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration. Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy. The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

Hurdles to integration

The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment. The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups. Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

Painkiller or cure?

The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it. Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

Judith Verweijen is an Assistant professor, Utrecht University and Michel Thill is Senior Program Officer, University of Basel

Courtesy: The Conversation


Spread the love
Continue Reading

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Mozambique’s Cycles of Violence won’t End until Frelimo’s Grip on Power is Broken

Published

on

By

Spread the love

Mozambique’s political history has been defined by violence, authoritarianism and disputed elections – patterns that persist in the wake of the 2024 polls. Mass protests, fuelled by allegations of electoral fraud, and police violence have highlighted the country’s fragility. Researcher Manuel Francisco Sambo explains why Mozambique is trapped in a cycle of instability and what must be done to break it.Mozambique’s political history has been marred by violence, disputed elections and authoritarian control. The pattern continues. As the 2024 elections have shown, Mozambique remains trapped in a cycle of violence and instability. Mass protests due to widespread allegations of electoral fraud and police violence led to the deaths of dozens of people and widescale destruction.

My research on peace and security in east and southern Africa has focused on Mozambique’s post-independence political history. Based on my work, I argue that Mozambique is at an impasse. It is unable to fully embrace authoritarianism – or to build a functioning democracy.

One obstacle to full authoritarian rule is social media. It has reduced the state’s grip on what information is shared, who shares it and what voices are heard. The government has lost the ability to silence critics and dictate what it wants the country to believe.

To appease the international community Mozambique has maintained a democratic posture. But the country hasn’t been able to build a strong democratic state. It’s prevented by the entrenched power of the political, economic and military elites through Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), the ruling party. Frelimo has dominated since the country’s independence in 1975. The result is cycles of violence and political instability.

These cycles will continue unless Mozambique undertakes sweeping economic and political reforms. These would need to include the decentralization of power, dismantling the Frelimo-linked patronage networks that control the economy, establishment of an independent judiciary, and fairer political competition.  It is unclear whether the newly inaugurated President Daniel Chapo will dare to ignite these reforms.

Why authoritarianism hasn’t worked

For much of its post-independence history, Mozambique was governed by an authoritarian regime under the single rule of Frelimo. Frelimo came to power in 1975 after leading the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule.

In the 1990s, the country adopted multiparty democracy and a new constitution. The constitution established universal suffrage and periodic elections for the presidency and legislature. It also guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life and protection from torture.

But Frelimo maintained its hold on power. The party did this through political repression, manipulation of electoral processes and patronage systems. The political landscape has changed in the last decade, however. It’s more difficult for the state to maintain – or expand – its authoritarian grip. Authoritarian regimes control opposition and dissent, but the state’s capacity to do this is diminishing. Social media and digital communication tools have made it difficult to suppress ideas. Historically the government relied on state-controlled media to control the narrative and censor opposing views. Smartphones and social media platforms have revolutionised the way information circulates. For instance, news about election irregularities, corruption and violence spreads fast. It often outpaces state censorship.

The ongoing protests after the 2024 elections are a testament to this. While the government has deployed forces to quell dissent, the scale of the protests and the speed at which they spread demonstrate the power of social media. Mozambicans have a platform to build alternative narratives, mobilise and resist.

Retaining international support

Another factor constraining the state has been the need to retain international support. This means maintaining the outward appearance of a democratic system. Mozambique’s economy is highly dependent on external assistance, particularly from western countries and international financial institutions.

Government officials are aware that they could lose foreign aid and investment if the democratic process is abandoned. This would deepen the country’s economic crisis and Frelimo’s challenges.

The withdrawal of aid in 2016 following the hidden debt scandal is evidence of donors’ leverage over Mozambique. Three Mozambican state-owned companies took loans from western donors for national projects that never materialised. As a result of aid suspension, Mozambique was forced to arrest prominent individuals. They included the former head of the secret services and the son of former president Armando Guebuza.

Democracy still a pipe dream

Frelimo’s widespread control has made it resistant to meaningful political change. A genuine democracy would require dismantling these entrenched structures of power. Frelimo has protected the political and economic elites who benefit from its dominance. The party has kept its grip on power through a combination of patronage networks, corruption and control over key sectors of the economy. These elites include business people, military leaders and government officials. All are deeply invested in maintaining the status quo.

A genuine democracy, in which opposition parties could freely compete and challenge Frelimo’s monopoly on power, would threaten their interests. The party has shown time and again that it is willing to manipulate the electoral process, use violence and stifle opposition to maintain its hold on power. Elections are held regularly. Seven general elections have been held since the inception of multiparty democracy constitution. But they often lack transparency and fairness.

What needs to be done

Reforms are needed to break up patronage networks and redistribute power and resources. Frelimo’s leadership has shown little interest in doing this. It would jeopardise their control over state resources and the wealth they’ve accumulated over decades. Mozambique’s political economy further complicates the prospects for democracy. Frelimo-linked elites dominate key sectors, such as natural gas, mining and agriculture, and benefit from favourable policies, state contracts and access to state-owned enterprises. These economic interests are deeply intertwined with the party’s political power. It’s unlikely, therefore, that the elite will willingly relinquish control.

Manuel Francisco Sambo is a PhD candidate, at the Doshisha University

Courtesy: The Conversation


Spread the love
Continue Reading

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Reconstructing a Shattered Nation: Ghana’s Path Forward

Published

on

By

Spread the love

Ghana, often celebrated as a beacon of democracy in Africa, has once again showcased its commitment to democratic principles through free and fair elections. The opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), led by John Mahama, secured a decisive victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections. This shift in political power reflects growing public dissatisfaction with the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP). As Mahama assumes office as the president of the republic of Ghana on January 7, 2025, he inherits a nation in crisis. Baba Yunus Muhammad explores the factors behind the NPP’s defeat, the current state of Ghana, and the formidable challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the incoming administration, incorporating perspectives on environment and climate resilience.

The NPP’s Fall from Grace

The NPP’s electoral defeat is rooted in economic mismanagement, unfulfilled promises, and a growing disconnect with the populace. Ghana’s economy, once a model for regional stability, has faced severe challenges, including soaring debt, inflation, and unemployment.

Economic Missteps

Under President Nana Akufo-Addo, Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached an alarming 82.9% (IMF) by the end of 2024, driven by extensive external borrowing to fund infrastructure projects. Coupled with the global economic slowdown and decreased demand for key exports like cocoa, gold, and oil, the economy struggled to regain momentum. Inflation escalated from 10.4% in 2021 to over 38% in 2024, severely eroding purchasing power. Unemployment reached 13%, with youth unemployment exceeding 20%. These statistics highlight the deteriorating living standards for millions of Ghanaians.

The NPP’s reliance on IMF-prescribed austerity measures, including salary freezes, tax hikes, and subsidy cuts, further alienated the working and middle classes. The perceived prioritization of urban centers over rural communities compounded this disenchantment, especially in the underserved northern regions.

Political Missteps

Corruption scandals and accusations of nepotism plagued the NPP’s tenure. Mismanagement in the energy sector and opaque procurement deals eroded public trust. Additionally, the party’s inability to fulfill promises—such as creating one million jobs and improving education and healthcare—undermined its credibility. This dissatisfaction fueled the NDC’s campaign, which resonated with marginalized groups seeking change.

Ghana’s Current State: A Nation in Crisis

Economic Challenges

Ghana’s cedi depreciated by over 50% against the US dollar in three years, driving up import costs and inflation. Servicing public debt consumes over 60% of government revenue, leaving little for essential social investment. The rising cost of living has reversed years of progress in poverty reduction, leaving millions vulnerable.

Environmental Vulnerabilities

Climate change exacerbates Ghana’s challenges. Rising temperatures, deforestation, and erratic rainfall are disrupting agriculture and increasing food insecurity. Coastal erosion and flooding threaten communities and infrastructure, emphasizing the need for urgent climate adaptation and resilience measures.

Political and Social Polarization

The closely contested elections underscore deep divisions within the electorate. While Mahama’s victory signals a demand for change, it also highlights the need for reconciliation and unity. Institutional reforms—especially in electoral transparency and anti-corruption measures—are imperative for restoring trust in governance.

The Task Ahead for John Mahama

Mr. Mahama faces an uphill battle in stabilizing Ghana’s economy, fostering political reconciliation, and rebuilding public trust. As Ghanaians anticipate the new government, they are eagerly awaiting a clear stance on zero tolerance to corruption. It is crucial for the Mahama administration to demonstrate its commitment to rooting out corruption at all levels of government. This could mean not only actively recovering looted public funds but also ensuring that former government officials found guilty of corruption or abuse of office are held accountable. These officials must face legal consequences to reassure citizens that integrity will define the new government’s leadership.

This stance on corruption is essential for rebuilding trust with the people, ensuring that transparency and accountability are at the core of governance. If Mahama’s administration takes bold steps to uphold these principles, it would mark a crucial turning point in Ghana’s fight against corruption. Holding wrongdoers accountable, recovering stolen assets, and implementing new anti-corruption measures could restore public faith and signal a new dawn for effective and ethical governance. Achieving these goals requires inclusive governance and innovative solutions.

Economic Recovery: Balancing Growth and Sustainability

To restore economic stability, the Mahama administration must prioritize sustainable development:

  1. Diversifying the Economy: Investments in agro-processing, renewable energy, and manufacturing can reduce dependence on traditional exports and create jobs.
  2. Enhancing Revenue Collection: Strengthening tax systems and closing loopholes can increase government revenue without undue burden on citizens.
  3. Promoting Fiscal Discipline: Conducting comprehensive audits of government spending can identify inefficiencies and reduce waste.
  4. Green Transition: Climate adaptation and renewable energy initiatives can position Ghana as a leader in Africa’s green economy, ensuring long-term resilience and sustainability.

Environmental Sustainability as a Cornerstone

Addressing climate change must be a central pillar of Ghana’s recovery. As one of the nations most vulnerable to climate impacts, Ghana should:

  • Implement reforestation programs to combat deforestation.
  • Invest in clean energy solutions, such as solar and wind, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
  • Promote sustainable agricultural practices to boost productivity while conserving resources.
  • Strengthen disaster preparedness systems to protect communities from flooding and other climate-related threats.

Political Reconciliation and Institutional Reform

In a polarized political environment, fostering unity is paramount. Mahama’s administration should focus on:

  1. Electoral Transparency: Enhancing the independence and capacity of the Electoral Commission.
  2. Anti-Corruption Measures: Establishing independent agencies to investigate corruption, regardless of political affiliation.
  3. Decentralization: Empowering local governments to address regional disparities and bring governance closer to the people.

Strengthening Social Infrastructure

Addressing the immediate needs of Ghanaians requires significant investments in education, healthcare, and housing:

  • Universal Healthcare: Expanding the National Health Insurance Scheme to ensure comprehensive coverage.
  • Educational Reforms: Emphasizing vocational training and STEM education to equip the youth for emerging industries.
  • Affordable Housing: Partnering with private investors to reduce the housing deficit.

Lessons from the Past: Rethinking External Dependence

Ghana’s reliance on IMF-led programs often exacerbates inequality and undermines sovereignty. For instance, the 2014 IMF bailout program required Ghana to implement austerity measures such as subsidy removals and public sector wage freezes, which disproportionately impacted the poor and stoked public dissent. To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Mahama administration should:

  • Develop Homegrown Policies: Leverage Ghana’s resources and potential to craft context-specific solutions.
  • Engage Regional Partners: Strengthen trade and collaboration within ECOWAS to build a resilient economic bloc.
  • Pursue Diverse Partnerships: Balance relationships with development partners, including China and the European Union, to maintain strategic autonomy.

A New Path Forward

Ghana stands at a critical juncture. The electorate’s demand for change reflects widespread yearning for economic relief and governance reforms. Mahama’s leadership will define Ghana’s trajectory in the years to come. By prioritizing sustainability, inclusivity, and innovation, Ghana can rebuild itself as a beacon of resilience and progress on the African continent. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but with decisive action and visionary policies, Mahama’s administration has the potential to restore hope and create lasting prosperity for all Ghanaians


Spread the love
Continue Reading

Trending

Copyright © 2024 Focus on Halal Economy | Powered by Africa Islamic Economic Forum