The war has been a failure. Moscow has taken only about 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, thus failing to rebuild a decisive buffer. It has weakened the Russian economy. And it imperiled the regime by sparking unrest and coup attempts, which Moscow successfully suppressed. Russia has done what it does best: It has failed but survived. It must now devise a strategy for the future that is more than just survival.
On Feb. 11, the U.S. and Russia exchanged prisoners after President Vladimir Putin said U.S.-Russia relations were in danger of collapsing. For his part, President Donald Trump said phone calls between them were constant. Rumors of summit planning were in the air and have since been validated by reports that Trump and Putin spoke on the phone, with both agreeing to start negotiations to end the war. (Trump spoke later with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.) This is all a fairly normal negotiation process: One side threatens to leave the table, the other side displays patience, and both sides ultimately reach small agreements. In order to understand the geopolitical meaning of all this, we must consider the positions and strategies of both Russia and the United States in these negotiations.
Russia is in the process of redefining its relations with the rest of the world while preserving the state, building a healthy economy and wielding foreign influence. Strategically, Russia’s problem is that it is a vast country vulnerable to potential adversaries. The nation could not regain its position without unity, and unity required a powerful military and economic center. Throughout history, the government has been stable, but it had limited options, which forced it into strategies it did not have the resources to execute.
Russia’s failure to conquer Ukraine has created an economic – and even military – threat from Europe. To its east, Russia faces China, which is a historical Russian enemy with which it fought border wars even when both were communist states. China did not vote to support Russia in its invasion of Ukraine at the first United Nations meeting on the matter. (It abstained.) China was far more interested in relations with the United States and Europe than anything Russia had to offer. Strategically, Russia had to win the war outright to demonstrate its power. It failed, and now it has no strategic ally with an interest in supporting it. In other words, Russia has no strategic counterweight.
Russia’s long-term adversary is the United States, which thwarted Russia’s strategy in Ukraine. The U.S. has no existential threat facing it. Europe is divided. China has significant economic and internal problems, and its military is currently in no position to challenge the United States. Russia therefore must accept its current weakened position or deal with the United States.
The U.S. has a history of getting into unthinkable alliances with former enemies. U.S. grand strategy is founded on opportunism and flexibility, its passions reserved for domestic conceptions. Trump has demonstrated systematic unpredictability, which means that he has given himself maximum flexibility in negotiating with Russia. That the U.S. is fundamentally unthreatened on the world stage gives it options in negotiations. In stating – during his election campaign – that Ukraine was a European war and not an American war, Trump told Russia that it could deal with the U.S. For Washington, the fear was that Russia would, under Soviet rule, dominate Europe and thus radically shift the balance of power in the global system. If that was still a concern before 2022, Russia’s subsequent failure has put it to rest.
Without a sufficient military that is able to fully defeat Ukraine militarily, Russia is left to focus on economic development to return to power. This is a very long and potentially dangerous path as it leaves Russia militarily exposed. The other option is to reach an accommodation with the United States. Washington has no moral qualms in overlooking ideology and behavior to form worthwhile relationships. If an understanding were reached, the U.S. would be free of its responsibility for European security, eliminating China’s already vain hope of establishing an alliance with a powerful ally, and giving it more room to tend to its own interests. National interest rules all, and national interest is determined by power.
Ending a war is easier if one side has won and the other side has lost. It’s much trickier if the goal is to create long-term peace, rather than a brief suspension, absent a decisive outcome. That is the issue now. Russia, like Germany after World War II, must demand economic growth in which the U.S. would likely participate. (Russia is Russia, of course, so caution must be exercised as it recovers.) The negotiations will seem painful and filled with insults, breakdowns and threats. And hanging over all of this is the threat of nuclear weapons, which I believe are irrelevant to the negotiations; mutually assured destruction means that whoever attacks will be dead with his family within the hour. But, in time, the negotiations will bear the fruit that the diplomats will take credit for, even though it was raw power that decided the outcome.
George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures.
Courtesy: Geopolitical Futures
