The Makkah Agreement: A Muslim NATO—or a New Strategic Contradiction?

Something important happened in Makkah on 7 August. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement declaring, in essence, that an armed attack against one of them would be regarded as an attack against all three. The language inevitably recalls NATO’s collective-defense principle. Yet the comparison raises a question more important than the treaty itself: what threat, precisely, is this new Muslim security arrangement intended to answer?

The question is not provocative for its own sake. It goes to the heart of what collective defense means. Türkiye has said that the agreement is not directed against Iran or any other particular country. Pakistan has similarly described it as defensive. If that is indeed its character, then the agreement could represent something potentially historic: the beginnings of a security architecture in which major Muslim states assume greater responsibility for their own collective security rather than relying indefinitely upon external powers.

But if there is no particular adversary, what insecurity has brought these three countries together at this particular moment? The answer may lie not in a single country but in the growing instability of the regional order itself.

For decades, the security of the Gulf has rested substantially upon external military power, especially that of the United States. American military installations and defense relationships stretch across the region. This arrangement has provided deterrence and reassurance to friendly governments. But it has also created a strategic contradiction that the present conflict has made increasingly difficult to ignore.

What happens when a foreign power uses military facilities located on the territory of a Muslim country to conduct operations against another country—and that country retaliates against those facilities?

The question is no longer entirely theoretical. Iran has repeatedly stated that its military responses in the region are directed against American and Israeli targets rather than Arab states themselves. Yet when American military infrastructure is located inside Muslim countries, the distinction becomes increasingly complicated. An attack on a foreign military installation may be intended as an attack on the foreign power, but its geographical location inevitably brings the sovereignty and security of the host country into the equation.

This creates an extraordinary question for the Makkah Agreement. Suppose an American military facility located within the territory of one of the three signatories were attacked by Iran. Would that constitute an armed attack upon the host country? Would the collective-defense commitment be activated? Would the other two members then be expected to respond militarily?

We do not know. The full operational meaning of the agreement has not been sufficiently clarified in the public domain. And that ambiguity matters. Because if an attack on a foreign military facility were automatically treated as an attack on the host state, a Muslim collective-defense agreement could potentially draw Muslim countries into a war arising from the military operations of an external power.

That would be a remarkable paradox. A security arrangement created to increase Muslim strategic autonomy could inadvertently become an instrument through which Muslim states participate in somebody else’s war. This is precisely the kind of question that must be answered before, rather than after, the alliance is tested.

There is no argument here that foreign military partnerships are inherently illegitimate. Sovereign states have the right to enter alliances and invite foreign forces onto their territory. Nor is there any suggestion that Iran’s regional policies should escape scrutiny. Iran has supported armed groups beyond its borders and pursued policies that have generated legitimate security concerns among neighboring states.

But the opposite simplification is equally dangerous: to assume that every regional conflict involving Iran can be understood solely as Iranian aggression while the circumstances preceding the conflict are ignored. The Muslim world has seen enough of that logic. What it needs now is a security doctrine based upon clear principles: sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual defense, non-aggression, diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

And this is where the Makkah Agreement could become much more important than a conventional defense pact. If it is genuinely intended to strengthen Muslim security, then its purpose should not be to create another bloc against Iran. Nor should it become a mechanism for confrontation with the West. A Muslim security architecture worthy of the name cannot be defined merely by identifying an enemy.

Its purpose should be to make Muslim countries less vulnerable to coercion—whoever the source may be. That requires a fundamental rethinking of security.

Military power matters, but armies alone cannot make a civilization secure. A country that cannot guarantee its food supply is vulnerable. A country dependent upon foreign technology for critical infrastructure is vulnerable. A country unable to manufacture essential medicines is vulnerable. A financial system exposed to external shocks is vulnerable. A state that cannot protect its digital infrastructure or secure its energy supplies is vulnerable. Security is therefore inseparable from economics.

This is why the Makkah Agreement should ultimately be judged not only by the number of aircraft, missiles or military exercises it produces, but by whether it encourages a broader architecture of Muslim strategic resilience.

Saudi Arabia has financial strength and energy resources. Türkiye possesses an increasingly sophisticated industrial and defense base. Pakistan possesses substantial human capital, strategic depth and military capability. Their combined potential extends far beyond defense.

They could cooperate in pharmaceuticals, food security, energy, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, cyber security, space technology, infrastructure and investment. Islamic finance could help mobilize capital into strategic industries. Shared supply chains could reduce dependence upon vulnerable external sources. Such an approach would transform collective defense into something more ambitious: collective strategic resilience.

That is the opportunity before Makkah. But there is also a larger question that cannot be avoided. If the Muslim world is serious about building its own security architecture, how long can its security remain structurally dependent upon external military powers?

This is not an argument for isolation. Strategic autonomy does not mean refusing cooperation with the rest of the world. It means possessing sufficient indigenous capability to cooperate from a position of strength rather than dependence. The distinction is crucial.

The Muslim world is not poor in resources. It is fragmented in their use. It possesses energy, capital, markets, strategic geography, young populations, scientific talent and enormous productive potential. Yet these assets remain divided among states that often lack the institutions necessary to combine them strategically.

The Makkah Agreement could begin to change that. But only if its conception of security extends beyond the battlefield. There is also an opportunity to rethink the relationship between Muslim states themselves.

Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations in 2023 after years of rivalry and agreed to respect sovereignty and non-interference. That reconciliation did not eliminate their differences, nor should it. But it demonstrated that rivalry need not become permanent hostility. That lesson should not be forgotten.

If the emerging security architecture is to be genuinely Muslim rather than merely regional, it must eventually find a way to accommodate differences within the Muslim world itself. Iran cannot simply be transformed into a permanent civilizational enemy because it follows a different theological tradition. At the same time, legitimate security concerns about Iranian conduct cannot simply be dismissed in the name of Muslim solidarity.

A mature order must be capable of doing both: defending against aggression without institutionalizing permanent enmity.

That is a far more difficult undertaking than building a military alliance. But it is also far more worthy of the Muslim world’s aspirations. The Makkah Agreement may therefore prove to be one of two things. It may become another regional defense arrangement—useful, perhaps, but ultimately operating within a security architecture still shaped by external powers.

Or it may become the beginning of something more consequential: a gradual movement towards Muslim strategic autonomy, supported by economic integration, technological capability, financial resilience and diplomatic mechanisms capable of preventing conflicts among Muslim states themselves.

The difference will not be determined by the language of the signing ceremony. It will be determined by what comes next.

Will the members build indigenous capabilities or remain dependent upon external suppliers? Will they develop shared economic and technological institutions or limit cooperation to military matters? Will they establish clear rules governing foreign military operations and retaliation? Will they create mechanisms for preventing disputes among Muslim states from becoming wars? And will they ultimately conceive security as something broader than the ability to retaliate?

These are the questions that matter. For the Muslim world has spent too long responding to insecurity after it arrives. The greater achievement would be to build an order that makes insecurity less likely in the first place. That is why the Makkah Agreement deserves serious attention—but also serious scrutiny.

It should not be judged by whether it resembles NATO. It should be judged by whether it can help the Muslim world move beyond the logic that made NATO necessary in the first place: a world in which security depends upon permanent blocs, external guarantees and the identification of enduring enemies.

Perhaps the real promise of Makkah is not a Muslim NATO at all. Perhaps it is the possibility of something more difficult and more profound: a Muslim security architecture in which Muslim countries are capable of defending themselves, resolving their differences, strengthening one another economically and technologically, and cooperating with the wider world without surrendering responsibility for their own security.

That would be more than an alliance. It would be the beginning of strategic maturity. And the question before Makkah is ultimately a simple one:

Will the Muslim world merely rearrange its dependencies—or finally begin to build the capacity to determine its own strategic future?